An Interview with Plamen Dimitrov “Between Anchorage and the White House”

Plamen Dimitrov.Political Scientist and Head of the Bulgarian Geopolitical Society.

 Anchorage and Washington: Trump’s Diplomatic Choreography

 Vitalii Barvynenko:

Mr. Dimitrov, don’t you think that the recent meetings in Anchorage and Washington were somewhat of a political mystification? President Trump appears eager to show that everything is under control, while in reality the situation is far from that.

 Plamen Dimitrov:

If we are talking about peace, or even just a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, it is obvious that nothing of the sort exists yet. Trump’s true intention is to act as a mediator, to position himself as a peacemaker — perhaps even with the hope of receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. But his motivation is partly irrational.

 Trump breaks traditional diplomatic formats. All actors — Putin, European leaders, President Zelensky — have realized that in order to win his favor, they must flatter him, make compliments, and show admiration. Putin did exactly that in Anchorage by stating that Trump’s victory had been “stolen” in the 2020 election, and that under Trump there would have been no war in Ukraine. Such remarks delighted Trump, while European leaders and Zelensky could never say such things — not only because it is untrue, but also because it would effectively justify Russian aggression.

 For Europeans, this war is both a moral and existential challenge. Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine the victim, and the war threatens Europe’s security. For Trump, however, it is neither a moral issue nor a threat. He is convinced Russia poses no danger to the United States, citing the “beautiful ocean” separating America from Russia and Europe.

 For Putin, the meeting in Anchorage was crucial not only for symbolic recognition but also for returning to the “club” of world leaders shaping global affairs. The red carpets, ceremonies, and the very fact of meeting Trump on equal footing strengthened his international image.

 Vitalii Barvynenko:

And how would you assess the meeting in Washington?

 Plamen Dimitrov:

That meeting demonstrated that Europe had re-entered the diplomatic game. Trump had no choice but to invite European leaders, as peace talks without them would have been impossible. Yet, I believe he also wanted to pre-emptively shift responsibility. Trump increasingly realizes that he may not be able to achieve a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. By involving Europe, he creates a narrative: “I did my best, but this is Europe’s problem — let them handle it.”

 Would you like me to continue translating the rest of the interview into English (on NATO security guarantees, the “frozen conflict” scenario, the South Caucasus, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria’s internal politics), so you’ll have the full expanded version ready for publication?

 NATO and Security Guarantees for Ukraine

 Vitalii Barvynenko:

At the Washington meeting, NATO Secretary General was present as well. Many European leaders mentioned some kind of “security guarantees” for Ukraine, resembling Article 5 of NATO. Could you explain what exactly is meant by these guarantees, and how the idea is perceived in Europe?

 Plamen Dimitrov:

First of all, it is important to note how Trump talks about NATO. When the question of U.S. arms supplies to Ukraine came up, Trump said: “We will supply the weapons, but NATO will pay for them.” This illustrates how he views NATO as something external — “we, the United States, and they, NATO” — whereas it should be “we and NATO together.”

 Therefore, I think it’s already clear that the prospect of Ukraine’s membership in NATO is not on the table. Trump is categorically against it.

 As for possible guarantees, they could only emerge after a ceasefire, not during the war. And they would not come from NATO as an alliance. More realistically, they would be bilateral agreements that Ukraine might conclude separately with individual European states.

 Even at the level of the European Union this is unlikely, as there is no consensus. So I see these guarantees as bilateral, and most likely framed in very general terms — promises of support, but without precise commitments. Talking about guarantees equivalent to Article 5 is unrealistic, because that would obligate countries like Germany to send troops into Ukraine in case of a Russian attack — something their governments are not prepared to do.

 Frozen Conflict and Future Scenarios

 Vitalii Barvynenko:

As a geopolitical analyst, what kind of framework agreement on security regarding the Russia–Ukraine war do you consider realistic? How could Ukraine’s protection from future aggression be guaranteed?

 Plamen Dimitrov:

I believe such agreements will only be possible after a ceasefire — and unfortunately, that won’t come soon.

 The most realistic outcome is not a peace treaty but a ceasefire: both armies remain where they are, the conflict is frozen. Neither side will be able to recognize the territories occupied by Russia as definitively Russian or Ukrainian, so the issue will simply be postponed.

 After that, Ukraine could sign bilateral agreements with major European countries. But again, these agreements are unlikely to contain strict military commitments. Whether European troops would be deployed in Ukraine remains highly uncertain — Russia would never agree to this, and European governments may not risk provoking Moscow. Much will also depend on the domestic political climate in Europe at the time — for example, the rise of the far-right “Alternative for Germany” could dramatically change Berlin’s position.

 The South Caucasus: U.S. Moves and Russia’s Silence

 Vitalii Barvynenko:

Let us turn to the South Caucasus. Recently, in Washington, an agreement was initialed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. What does this mean geopolitically, and why was Russia’s reaction so muted?

 Plamen Dimitrov:

It should be noted that the text of the peace agreement had been prepared earlier. Trump did not write it himself. The Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders only initialed it in Washington, which allowed Trump to present it as his success.

 Russia’s reaction has been practically absent. The reason is simple: for Putin, the most critical issue today is the war in Ukraine and Trump’s stance toward it. To keep Trump favorable on Ukraine, the Kremlin is willing to sacrifice some of its influence in the South Caucasus.

 Compare this to 2020: after the 44-day war, the trilateral statement said the Zangezur corridor would be secured by Russian border guards. Now, suddenly, Russian troops are absent, and instead American companies or consortia are expected to manage the corridor. This is a major geopolitical shift.

 The timing of implementation is still unclear, but the fact itself shows a significant weakening of Russian influence in the region.

 The Balkans: Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

 Vitalii Barvynenko:

Let’s move to the Balkans. In Serbia we have recently seen mass protests, even “counter-protests against protests.” Who is interested in destabilizing President Vučić’s rule?

 Plamen Dimitrov:

Primarily internal forces. The student movement, weak opposition parties — they are behind it. I do not see a strong geopolitical trace here.

 The protests reflect public frustration after incidents such as the one at Novi Sad train station, but also the fatigue of society. Vučić has been in power too long, and Serbia, unlike Russia or Azerbaijan, does have some democratic traditions since Milošević was overthrown.

 However, the initiative still lies with the president. Polls show his party would still win if elections were held today. Serbia is a “two-tier” country: in Belgrade and big cities, protests are strong, but in the countryside political apathy and loyalty remain. So the illusion arises that “all Serbs are against Vučić,” but that is not accurate. I do not foresee a quick overthrow.

 Vitalii Barvynenko:

And what about Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Constitutional Court recently annulled the mandate of Milorad Dodik, the pro-Russian leader of Republika Srpska? Could this spark a new conflict?

 Plamen Dimitrov:

The conflict already exists within Bosnia, but I doubt it will escalate into a war like in the 1990s.

 Dodik relies on support from Belgrade, but at a time when Vučić himself faces protests, he is not in a position to intervene strongly in Bosnia. Moreover, the U.S. under Trump is not particularly interested in Bosnia, unless someone presents it to Trump as a war he could personally “end.”

 The key role will remain with the EU, which has its High Representative in Bosnia with significant authority. So, formally, the state will survive, but the political identities of Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks are increasingly divergent.

 Bulgaria: Energy Issues and Domestic Political Struggles

 Vitalii Barvynenko:

Let me conclude with Bulgaria. Ukraine’s Energy Minister recently complained that Bulgaria refuses to compromise on the sale of nuclear reactor units for the Khmelnytskyi NPP. Why did Sofia back out of this deal?

 Plamen Dimitrov:

Frankly, in Bulgaria nothing has been heard about this deal lately. A few months ago, the government effectively refused it. Some say it was due to price disagreements, others that Ukraine itself hesitated about the reactors.

 Currently, the reactors remain in storage. Bulgaria has already signed a contract with an American company to build a new nuclear unit at Kozloduy, using American technology. So the Russian-made reactors have no future in Bulgaria.

 Whether Ukraine truly needs them is still unclear — yesterday’s statement from Minister Hrynchuk suggests they are trying to revive negotiations, but opposition voices in Bulgaria insist the reactors are worth much more and should not be “given away cheaply.”

 Vitalii Barvynenko:

And finally, about Bulgarian domestic politics. The mayor of Varna was recently arrested. Is this an economic or political case?

 Plamen Dimitrov:

Most likely political. Mayors of big cities control significant resources, and corruption risks are always present. But the fact that not only the mayor of Varna, but also a mayor in Sofia from the same party “We Continue the Change,” are under investigation shows the political undertone.

 Everyone in Bulgaria knows the influence of oligarch and politician Delyan Peevski over the prosecution and the Ministry of Interior. Many observers link the arrest directly to his power struggle. There are even rumors that Peevski offered the Varna mayor to switch allegiance — when he refused, the investigation followed.

  Vitalii Barvynenko:

Mr. Dimitrov, thank you for this wide-ranging and insightful discussion. We covered issues from the U.S.–Russia–Ukraine triangle to the South Caucasus, the Balkans, and Bulgarian domestic affairs. Your analysis helps us better understand the underlying motives and dynamics shaping today’s geopolitics.

 Plamen Dimitrov:

Thank you as well.