Chingiz Mammadov. Wilson’s Fourteen Points and Xi Jinping’s Vision: A Century Apart, but Strikingly Similar

 Author: Chingiz Mammadov

Graduated from Moscow Mining Technology University and the Moscow Literature University named after M. Gorky. Earned a Master’s degree in Public and Environmental Affairs from Indiana University, USA. From 1989 to 1993, established and edited the independent newspaper Vatan. In 1992–1993, headed the Communication Unit of the President of Azerbaijan. From 2002 to 2004, chaired the Azerbaijan Micro-Finance Association. In 2004–2005, conducted research on development perspectives in Azerbaijan at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C. In 2007–2008, conducted research on nation-building in Azerbaijan at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. From 2009 to 2023, served as Head of the “Environment & Energy” Unit at the UNDP office in Azerbaijan. Delivered presentations and published articles on various aspects of national and regional development in Azerbaijan, the United States, Poland, Russia, Georgia, and other countries. Editor of the website vatan.online-com
E-mail: [email protected]

Wilson’s Fourteen Points and Xi Jinping’s Vision: A Century Apart, but Strikingly Similar

On January 8, 1918, in his address to Congress, President Woodrow Wilson presented his famous Fourteen Points for a just world order. At that time, the United States was already the world’s largest economy, accounting for about 20–25% of global GDP.

More than a century later, in late August and early September 2025, Xi Jinping — General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission — delivered a series of speeches at the annual SCO summit, at a military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, and during diplomatic receptions. In these speeches, he outlined China’s vision for a new and more just international order.

At first glance, Wilson’s Fourteen Points and Xi’s recent statements appear to belong to entirely different worlds: one was articulated in the aftermath of the First World War, the other amid twenty-first-century geopolitical realignments. Yet a closer comparison reveals striking structural parallels. Both represent not simply neutral visions of cooperation but rather blueprints for world order designed to secure a leadership role for their respective nations.

Wilson’s Universalism with an American Advantage

Wilson couched his principles in the language of liberal internationalism: open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, free trade, disarmament, national self-determination, and the League of Nations as a universal institution. These ideals promised a peaceful postwar settlement but also positioned the United States to benefit from Europe’s weakening and from expanding access to global markets.

The U.S. had no colonial empire to dismantle but could thrive in a system based on free trade and transparent diplomacy. Having suffered far less than Europe or Asia during World War I — and having profited enormously by supplying food, goods, and military equipment — the United States entered the postwar era stronger than ever. Thus, Wilson’s program, while universalist in tone, subtly favored America’s structural strengths and comparative advantage.

Xi Jinping’s Sovereignty and Multipolarity

Xi frames China’s initiatives in similarly universalist terms, though couched in different language: sovereignty, non-interference, multipolarity, shared development, and the promotion of new institutions such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), SCO, BRICS, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

If Wilson’s moment coincided with the decline of the colonial order, Xi speaks to a world of sovereign nation-states often troubled by disputes among neighbors, ethnic minorities across borders, and outside interventions. In such a setting, China’s emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference resonates strongly, especially among small and medium-sized states wary of external pressure.

The rhetoric is one of resistance to hegemonism and “win–win” cooperation, but the underlying design is clear: to embed China at the center of new economic and institutional networks. Sovereignty language protects Beijing against criticism on internal issues, while multipolar institutions dilute Western dominance and create arenas where China plays the convening role.

Different Vocabularies, Shared Logic

At first glance, the contrast is stark: Wilson’s liberal-democratic ideals versus Xi’s sovereignty-centered multipolarity. Yet in both cases, universal values provide legitimacy while the architecture advances national leadership. Wilson’s “self-determination plus League” and Xi’s “Global Governance Initiative combined with sovereignty through SCO/BRICS” serve the same function: to transform systemic transitions into opportunities for global influence.

Economic and Military Power Transitions

In the early twentieth century, rapid U.S. economic growth turned America into the world’s largest economy and, within decades, the world’s leading military power. Similarly, China today — with a GDP approaching that of the United States — is already translating its economic might into military strength.

Regional Institutions: A Historical Parallel

Another striking similarity emerges in the realm of international organizations.

Though Wilson proposed the League of Nations, the U.S. never joined, seeing it as a potential burden and entanglement in Europe’s endless quarrels. Instead, Washington consolidated influence through regional and parallel institutions where it could lead:

• Pan-American Union (founded in 1890, expanded in the 1920s–30s, and later transformed in 1948 into the Organization of American States), reinforcing U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere.
• Washington Naval Conference (1921–22), setting rules for Pacific security outside League structures.
• Kellogg–Briand Pact (1928), an international treaty outlawing war, signed by 63 states but again independent of the League.

The U.S. also reaped huge benefits in the financial sphere, as Britain and France repaid war debts using German reparations. New York rose as a rival to London in finance, and while the British pound remained dominant, the U.S. dollar was steadily gaining ground.

In short, the U.S. rejected multilateral institutions it could not control but promoted parallel initiatives that preserved and expanded its leadership.

China’s Modern Counterpart

China’s approach today mirrors this logic. While active in the UN, Beijing feels constrained by Western dominance and invests heavily in parallel structures:

• SCO, focused on Eurasian security and cooperation.
• BRICS/BRICS+, bringing together emerging economies, many with anti-Western orientations.
• BRI, a global development and connectivity initiative.
• AIIB, a financial institution seen as an alternative to the IMF and World Bank.

Unlike the U.S. a century ago, China does not withdraw from global institutions — doing so would be unwise in today’s interdependent global system. Instead, it supplements them with parallel architectures where it can shape norms and rules more advantageously.

Technology and the Cold War Echo

China has also begun to surpass the U.S. technologically. For the past five years, China has filed 1.5 times more patent applications than the United States. Its financial reserves allow it to pay competitive wages and attract young innovators and talented prodigies.

Like the U.S. in the early twentieth century, China is cautious about wars that could undermine its development. Aware of U.S. efforts to build a coalition of countries on its periphery — Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, India, Australia — Beijing seeks to neutralize threats diplomatically, as it did with India at the recent SCO summit.

Thus, under the rhetoric of multipolarity, China is steadily guiding the world toward a new bipolarity. This recalls, in part, the Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union — though with crucial differences that merit a separate discussion.

To be continued…