Exclusive. The Black Sea Is Becoming a Test for Türkiye: Where Does Ankara’s Strategic Patience End?

Author: Toğrul İsmayıl - political scientist, Professor at the Department of Political History, Kahramanmaraş University , exclusively for the Institute of Danube Research and DANUBE.EU

The Black Sea is gradually evolving from a theatre of Russian-Ukrainian confrontation into one of the most sensitive security zones for Türkiye itself. The latest attack on a Turkish vessel carrying cargo to Russia, which injured members of its crew, can no longer be viewed as an isolated episode against the background of the ongoing war. It follows a series of incidents involving vessels linked to Türkiye and raises a more fundamental question: how much longer will Ankara limit itself to diplomatic statements and appeals to the parties to ensure the safety of civilian shipping?

This question is particularly relevant because the issue extends far beyond another damaged merchant vessel. What is at stake is the gradual erosion of a security environment that Türkiye has regarded for decades as vital to its economy, trade and national security. For Ankara, the Black Sea is not merely a geographical direction. It encompasses maritime communications, ports, energy routes, grain trade, logistics, fisheries and shipping and, ultimately, represents one of the most important elements of Türkiye’s geopolitical identity.

The latest incident occurred at a time when the Russian-Ukrainian war had entered a new phase of dangerous escalation. The Turkish vessel Nadezhda, operated by a Turkish company and sailing near Novorossiysk, was struck by drones. Initial reports indicated that four crew members were injured, including Turkish citizens. The Turkish authorities confirmed that the attack had taken place and expressed serious concern. However, Ankara remains extremely cautious about directly attributing responsibility. This distinction is crucial: both politically and analytically, media reports and statements by crew members must be differentiated from an officially established finding as to who carried out the strike.

Yet even without a final determination of responsibility, a more important reality remains. This is not the first time that Turkish commercial interests have been directly affected by the war. In May, a Turkish-owned vessel sailing under the flag of Vanuatu and carrying cargo from Odesa to Türkiye was attacked by a drone, injuring two Turkish citizens. In June, another Turkish-owned vessel was attacked near the Ukrainian port of Chornomorsk, with Turkish citizens again among the injured. In both cases, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew attention to the threats posed to Turkish interests and the safety of navigation.

The issue today is therefore no longer whether an isolated incident has occurred. The real question is whether the Black Sea is becoming an environment in which civilian shipping is incorporated into military strategy. If this process continues, it will become increasingly difficult for Türkiye to preserve its previous model of conduct.

The paradox is that Türkiye is objectively interested in ending the war but cannot afford a sharp deterioration in its relations with either Kyiv or Moscow. This is precisely why Ankara has so far avoided adopting one-sided, confrontational rhetoric. Türkiye seeks to preserve room for dialogue with both parties. This is one of the defining features of Turkish foreign policy in recent years: rather than fully aligning itself with one side of the conflict, Türkiye uses its geopolitical position to pursue an independent course.

For this reason, Ankara’s response may appear insufficiently forceful to public opinion. However, Turkish diplomacy in this case is not limited to public statements. A substantial part of the real work takes place behind closed doors.

Publicly, Türkiye stresses the need to guarantee the safety of civilian shipping and prevent further escalation. As early as May, following an attack on a Turkish vessel, Ankara stated that its concerns had been communicated to all relevant parties at every level and warned of the risks of uncontrolled escalation. At the same time, Türkiye again proposed regional and results-oriented mechanisms to prevent further escalation.

This is diplomatic language, but it carries a fairly firm political message.

Ankara is effectively telling Moscow and Kyiv: you may continue your war, but its consequences must not become a direct threat to Turkish national interests.

This is where the question of Türkiye’s so-called “red line” arises. Where does it lie?

For now, Ankara prefers not to define it publicly. This is understandable. If Türkiye were to announce in advance that a particular type of attack would trigger a specific response, it would restrict its own room for manoeuvre. Moreover, Türkiye does not want its statements to become part of the military logic of the conflict. Its comparative advantage lies precisely in its ability to communicate with both sides.

Diplomatic restraint, however, should not be mistaken for a lack of capabilities.

Should it be established that the Ukrainian side deliberately attacked a Turkish vessel, particularly if the strike were intentionally directed at a civilian target and Turkish citizens, Ankara would have a wide range of instruments at its disposal. The first level would be a direct diplomatic protest and a demand for official explanations. The second would be a private warning to Kyiv that a repetition of such actions would be unacceptable. The third would involve internationalising the issue of civilian maritime security. The fourth would consist of strengthening practical protection measures for Turkish vessels and changing the conditions under which they operate in the most dangerous areas.

There is also another exceptionally important instrument: negotiations.

Türkiye can use its position as a mediator. If Ankara continues to maintain channels of communication with both Kyiv and Moscow, it can raise the issue of maritime safety directly within diplomatic contacts aimed at ending the war. This would mean that the security of merchant vessels would no longer be a secondary matter but could become a distinct component of future agreements.

Türkiye could effectively propose the following formula: the belligerent parties are not required to agree with one another on political issues, but they must guarantee the safety of civilian shipping in the Black Sea.

This would be fully consistent with the Turkish approach. Ankara does not need to become a party to the conflict in order to protect its interests. On the contrary, its refusal to become a direct participant in the war allows Türkiye to demand that both sides respect its security.

It is especially important today to avoid misinterpreting Turkish caution. From the outside, Ankara may appear to be taking a soft position. In reality, Türkiye is attempting to act in accordance with the principle of strategic autonomy. It does not want to respond emotionally to every attack because it understands the potential cost of such a response.

Strategic autonomy, however, also has a reverse side. If a state tolerates attacks on its interests for too long, both adversaries and partners may conclude that its red lines have no real substance. Türkiye must therefore find a balance between restraint and demonstrating its ability to defend its interests.

The Ukrainian dimension is particularly difficult for Ankara.

Türkiye supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity, does not recognise Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories and continues to develop relations with Kyiv. At the same time, Ankara has not joined a policy of complete rupture with Moscow. Türkiye maintains diplomatic channels, economic ties and the ability to communicate with the Russian leadership. It is precisely this position that has enabled it, at various stages, to perform a mediating role.

A sharp response to Ukraine would therefore damage not only Turkish-Ukrainian relations. It could also undermine one of the most valuable features of Türkiye’s position: its ability to speak to both sides.

Yet there is another risk. If Ukrainian attacks on Russian ports and infrastructure increasingly affect Turkish vessels, Ankara may gradually conclude that Ukrainian military strategy is beginning to pose a direct threat to Turkish interests. At that point, the issue would no longer concern sympathy for Ukraine or Russia but Türkiye’s national security.

This is why the current incident should be viewed as more than another drone attack.

It may signal a transformation in the very nature of Black Sea security.

Until now, the Black Sea has remained an area in which Türkiye has sought to maintain a certain balance. The Montreux Convention has provided Ankara with a unique instrument for controlling the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits. After the outbreak of the war, Türkiye closed the Straits to the warships of the belligerent parties while preserving access for civilian shipping. In this way, Ankara effectively became one of the principal regulators of military dynamics in the Black Sea.

A new challenge has now emerged: how can Türkiye control not only the movement of warships but also the risks facing the merchant fleet?

When civilian vessels become exposed to drone strikes, naval mines or other forms of military impact, the problem becomes considerably more complex. Controlling the Straits alone is no longer sufficient. New maritime security mechanisms are required.

Türkiye could initiate a regional early-warning mechanism for civilian shipping. Such a mechanism could include the exchange of information, designated warning zones, coordination between coastguard services and permanent channels of communication among the belligerent parties and international maritime organisations.

This would be a far more effective response than another diplomatic note.

Türkiye could also act through NATO. Yet Ankara would probably remain cautious in this respect as well. It has no interest in allowing the Black Sea to become a theatre of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. Turkish policy has traditionally sought to prevent the militarisation of the region beyond a certain level.

Türkiye’s strategy is therefore likely to focus not on bringing more military forces into the Black Sea but on establishing mechanisms to prevent the conflict from expanding further.

This is the fundamental distinction between the Turkish approach and the logic adopted by many other states.

For Türkiye, the Black Sea must remain not only an area of military security but also a space of economic connectivity. Trade flows between Türkiye, Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus and other regions pass through it. The destruction of this connectivity would harm not only Russia or Ukraine. It would directly affect the Turkish economy.

For Ankara, the safety of shipping is therefore simultaneously a matter of national security, economic stability and geopolitical influence.

There is another factor that should not be underestimated. If fear of attacks becomes systemic, insurance premiums will rise, transport costs will increase, shipowners will begin changing routes, and crews may refuse to work on certain routes. The war would then begin to affect regional trade not only through direct sanctions or the destruction of ports but through the increased cost of maritime communication itself.

This is particularly sensitive for Türkiye because the country is building its economic strategy around its role as a transport and logistics hub connecting Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia and the Middle East.

In other words, the Black Sea forms part of a much broader Turkish concept of connectivity.

This is precisely why Ankara cannot allow the war to turn it into a “closed sea”.

Does this mean that Türkiye should adopt a forceful response?

In my view, not yet.

A military response would be extremely risky. It could trigger a chain reaction in which Türkiye gradually transformed from a mediator into a party to the conflict. Such a development would contradict the entire logic of the current Turkish strategy.

However, endless diplomatic caution is also becoming dangerous.

The most realistic option for Ankara is therefore to gradually increase the cost of such incidents. The first step would be an official warning. This would be followed by private diplomatic demands and then by international pressure. In parallel, Türkiye could strengthen protection for its shipping and enhance intelligence monitoring in the Black Sea. Finally, if the attacks continue, Ankara could adopt more concrete political and economic measures.

It is especially important that such demands be directed not only at Ukraine but also at Russia.

This is what currently makes the Turkish position more credible. Ankara already insists that both sides must guarantee the safety of civilian shipping. This allows Türkiye to avoid appearing as a participant in the information war while protecting its own interests.

It is particularly important for Türkiye to prevent Moscow and Kyiv from beginning to treat Turkish shipping as an acceptable element of their military strategies. If that happens, the question will no longer be who carried out the latest strike. The question will be why a third party is being exposed to military risk at all.

For Türkiye, this is a fundamental issue of sovereignty.

Ankara’s current restraint should therefore be viewed not as weakness but as an attempt to preserve strategic room for manoeuvre. That space, however, is not unlimited.

If the attacks continue and the number of injured or killed Turkish citizens grows, public and political pressure on the government will inevitably increase. Ankara will then no longer be able to limit itself to expressions of “deep concern” and appeals for “de-escalation”.

This raises the most important question for the future: can Türkiye preserve its role as a mediator while clearly and credibly defining its own red lines?

The answer will have implications far beyond the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The Black Sea is becoming one of the most significant tests of Türkiye’s concept of strategic autonomy. Türkiye does not want to be merely a NATO member reacting to decisions taken by other centres of power, nor merely a neighbouring country forced to adapt to Russian or Ukrainian strategies. It seeks to act as an independent regional centre of power capable of shaping the rules of the game in its immediate neighbourhood.

The status of a regional power, however, entails more than diplomatic influence. It also requires the capacity to protect economic communications, citizens, the merchant fleet and strategic interests.

The question today is therefore no longer simply: why is Türkiye not responding more forcefully?

A more accurate question would be: what level of threat must be reached before Ankara’s diplomatic patience gives way to a policy of compelling respect for its red lines?

This moment will determine Türkiye’s future policy in the Black Sea. For now, Ankara is trying to halt the escalation through words and diplomacy. But if the Black Sea ultimately becomes an environment in which Turkish vessels are incorporated into the military calculations of Moscow or Kyiv, Türkiye will have to choose between the role of mediator and the role of a power that defends its own maritime security.

At that point, the issue will no longer be how to respond to an individual attack. It will concern a new security architecture for the Black Sea.

For Türkiye, this will be not only a foreign-policy issue. It will be a question of its status as a regional power.