Ian Lisnevscki. “In Moldova, geopolitics has long become an instrument of imitation rather than real development”

Ian Lisnevscki, Moldovan expert, political analyst and political strategist 

In his conversation with Vitalii Barvinenko, Director of the Institute of Danube Research, Ian Lisnevschi offered a sharply critical assessment of Moldova’s current political situation. In his view, most major political battles in the country are not centered on internal reforms or practical solutions for citizens, but on geopolitical markers that parties use to mobilize their electorates. This, he argues, is precisely why the issue of Moldova’s withdrawal from the CIS has suddenly returned to the center of public debate.

— Mr. Lisnevscki, why has the issue of Moldova’s withdrawal from the CIS, which for a long time seemed largely formal and politically “dead,” suddenly become so visible in the Moldovan media space?

— That is indeed the case. Unfortunately, in Moldova politicians are largely unable to raise domestic issues in a meaningful and substantive way. As a result, the entire struggle between political forces is concentrated mainly around geopolitics — vectors, orientations, symbolic divisions between “East” and “West.”

But in reality this is, to a large extent, imitation. Practically all political forces in Moldova use themes such as the EU, the CIS, Russia, the West or other external directions as political tools rather than as the subject of a coherent policy. That is why issues that society had long considered exhausted are returning to the information agenda. They are not being raised because they truly determine the country’s future, but because they allow politicians to re-enter the news cycle and create the illusion of political action.

— Does this mean that geopolitical confrontation in Moldova is, to a large extent, a political technology rather than a substantive divide?

— Exactly. Political parties in Moldova have long played on this confrontation as the simplest mechanism for mobilizing voters. Some present themselves as pro-European forces, while others position themselves as advocates of closer ties with Russia or of “friendship” with Russia. But if one analyzes not the rhetoric but the actual historical record, the picture is much more paradoxical.

For example, if you look rationally and chronologically, you will see that many important agreements related to rapprochement with the European Union and even NATO were signed under governments that are not usually described as strongly pro-European. At the same time, those forces that declared themselves maximally pro-European often ended up discrediting that very vector in the eyes of part of society. As a result, citizens increasingly distrust the sincerity of any geopolitical declaration.

— You referred to Igor Dodon’s visit to Moscow and the Moldovan prime minister’s trip to Bucharest as examples of this logic. Why are such visits so politically important today?

— Because public interest in “pure” geopolitics is declining. People are much more concerned with economic, social and everyday problems. Precisely for that reason, politicians try to restore their symbolic identity through demonstrative foreign contacts.

These visits are primarily aimed at sending a message to their own electorate: “I remain loyal to my vector.” For one politician, that means a meeting in Moscow; for another, a prominently displayed visit to Bucharest or Western partners. This is diplomacy only in a very limited sense — above all, it is a domestic political signal. Before new electoral cycles, such signals become especially important because they help maintain or restore the confidence of the political base.

— How much does Moldovan society today believe in the sincerity of these political positionings?

— Trust is very low. Society increasingly perceives most political actors as part of a “grey zone” in which the declared vector does not match real practice. People see that those who call themselves pro-European often make decisions that discredit European integration. And likewise, those who speak about closer ties with Russia usually have no realistic plan for how this could actually be achieved.

As a result, geopolitics loses substance and turns into a set of electoral markers. That is why politicians constantly need to reinforce their rhetoric through new demonstrative actions — foreign visits, loud statements, symbolic contacts.

— Turning to domestic affairs: how do you assess the government’s constant references to crises — energy, security, international instability — as explanations for Moldova’s internal problems?

— In my opinion, Moldova’s main crisis factor is not only the external environment, but above all a crisis of decision-making, an intellectual crisis of governance, and a lack of strategic foresight. When the authorities continually explain their failures through external causes, they are effectively demonstrating their own inability to prepare for risk.

The real problem is that the state has not created an effective system for forecasting and responding. If a government lives in a permanent state of emergency, but at the same time fails to produce long-term solutions, then this is no longer crisis management — it is the preservation of managerial helplessness. The state of emergency becomes a convenient political justification, but not an instrument for overcoming problems.

— Can one therefore say that Moldova’s European integration increasingly exists at the level of rhetoric rather than real progress?

— Exactly. Frankly speaking, European integration in Moldova today exists to a considerable extent as a declaration. There are public statements, negotiating rhetoric, discussions about clusters, reforms, and readiness for a future political decision in Brussels. But if one looks at the actual state of institutions, the quality of reforms, the level of trust in government and the effectiveness of governance, it becomes obvious that the country is not demonstrating the readiness it officially claims to have.

Moreover, in some respects Moldova has, in my view, moved backwards. Judicial reform has not increased public trust, the anti-corruption agenda has not become more convincing, and state institutions are increasingly clashing with one another. This creates the impression that the authorities and society live in different realities.

— You speak quite sharply about Moldova’s lost opportunities in 2023–2025. What exactly do you mean by that?

— Moldova had a unique window of opportunity. Because of the new geopolitical situation and the broader European context, the country had a chance to accelerate its path toward the EU. But this required action not only in external rhetoric, but also inside the country: improving people’s well-being, building a realistic reform model, strengthening institutions and addressing sensitive internal questions, including Transnistria.

In my view, with sufficient political will and a proper strategy, Moldova could have moved forward much faster. But the authorities focused primarily on elections and on dividing the electorate along geopolitical lines. As a result, that opportunity was largely lost. The international context is now different: the EU, the United States and regional actors are increasingly occupied with their own problems.

— You also touched on the very sensitive issue of Transnistria. Do you really believe that this problem is less hopeless than it is often presented?

— Yes, I do. It is often presented in a far more rigid and simplified way than reality suggests. According to the research I referred to, Transnistria is not in fact the most anti-European or the most pro-Russian region of Moldova. On the contrary, there is a certain openness there toward closer ties both with Chisinau and with the broader European environment.

This means that the problem is not purely mental or civilizational. To a large extent, it depends on the ability of the central authorities to pursue systematic, intelligent and consistent policies, rather than using difficult regional questions merely as arguments in domestic political struggles.

— How likely do you consider a reshaping of Moldova’s government?

— I consider it very likely. But the problem is that such a reshuffle is unlikely to represent a systemic breakthrough. It is more likely to be a political technology of restarting expectations. When public frustration reaches a critical level, the authorities often replace the prime minister in order to create a sense of renewal and buy themselves more time.

We have seen this before. A new figure in the office of prime minister creates a short-lived effect of novelty, hope and deferred criticism. But if the governing model itself does not change, if there is no professional team, no strategic plan and no кадровий reserve, then even a new government will not be able to fundamentally change the country’s trajectory.

— So in your view the problem lies not only in individuals, but in a systemic deficit of state capacity?

— Absolutely. One of the key factors is the кадровий deficit. When the current authorities came to power, there was much talk about depoliticization and bringing professionals into state institutions, but that never really happened. Instead, the emphasis shifted toward “their own people,” which led to nepotism, a decline in the quality of governance and the expulsion of many professional cadres from the state system.

In such a situation, even a strong politician cannot work effectively without a team. If the government system has developed a deep shortage of professionals, then replacing one prime minister with another will have more symbolic than practical impact. That is why restoring trust in political institutions is no less important than changing individual officeholders.

— What, then, should a new prime minister be like if such a change takes place?

— First of all, this must not be someone who merely explains problems, but someone who manages solutions. Society no longer needs to hear why the country is struggling. People already understand that there is war, international instability, energy risks and security threats. A prime minister is needed not to repeat the obvious, but to present a concrete plan of action.

A new head of government should speak in terms of specific steps: what is Plan A, what is Plan B, what compensation mechanisms will exist, how price growth will be contained, how the state will respond to the demographic crisis, how it will support education, healthcare and the regions. Without that, any new appointment will quickly lose whatever credit of trust it initially receives.

— What overall conclusion would you draw about Moldova’s current political condition?

— Moldova’s main problem is that the country lives in a mode of political maneuvering instead of strategic development. Vectors — pro-European, pro-Russian, or any other — are increasingly used as ways of deceiving or mobilizing the voter, rather than as real programs of action.

In such a system, time is lost, opportunities are lost, and trust in institutions is eroded. Unless a long-term plan for at least the next five to ten years emerges, and unless the authorities begin to treat economic, social, demographic and institutional problems as true priorities, no government reshuffle by itself will become a turning point.