Interview: Andrei Andrievski. ELECTIONS IN MOLDOVA.

Andrei Andrievsky, political scientist, editor-in-chief of the media resource AVA-TV (Moldova)

Vitaly Barvinenko: Good afternoon, dear friends. This is Vitaly Barvinenko, Institute of Danube Studies. Our guest today is Andrei Andreevski, a well-known blogger, media expert from Moldova. Mr. Andreevski, thank you for taking the time to join our broadcast.

Schengen travel ban for the mayor of Chisinau and other Moldovan figures.

Mr. Andreevsky, one of the news items that is quite actively discussed in the infopole is yesterday's decision to ban the mayor of Chisinau, former Prime Minister Tarlev and, I think, one of the Moldovan journalists from entering the Schengen zone for 5 years. There are three people on that list - Natalia Morari. This morning there was already a clarification from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the level of threats from Mr. Ceban is quite consistent with the adopted sanctions of a 5-year ban on entry into the Schengen zone. Can you please tell me what this is related to? Is it an aid to the ruling party before the parliamentary elections? Are these really some actions of Ceban that threatened the security of Romania, or how do you assess this rather serious decision for the mayor of the capital?

Andrei Andreevsky: Well, I don't think that he could personally threaten Romania with anything, but there is a very big game going on here. The thing is that Ceban and his bloc "Alternative" (when I say "his" it's not quite right, because there are four leaders) - all these people were known to us as pro-Russian about 5 years ago. There is the former Prime Minister Ion Cicu from the time of President Dodon, Mark Caciuc, who at one time was the ideologist of the Party of Communists, when they were almost trying to organize a union state here. Accordingly, Cheban. Well, and Stainoglo, who, in general, probably was not seen in these pro-Russian forces, pro-Russian parties, but the fact that he was nominated for president from the Party of Socialists, which is clearly pro-Russian (although he was not a member of it), this also speaks about his priorities.

So now the European Union and Romania have shown that, yes, they can consider themselves to be anything they want, they can claim that they are pro-European, but we do not consider them to be so. Moreover, we see them as a certain threat. Because when the intelligence services put such bans (obviously, it comes from the intelligence services), they never explain in detail. This is the same situation as it was with Calin Georgescu - when there are also some accusations, some sanctions, nobody goes into details and explains why, how it is. But everybody understands everything. And so do we here. And it is obvious that this did not happen right now, yesterday, as a surprise. No, it was coming to this, because this year all the projects of cooperation between the Chisinau City Hall and Romanian colleagues have been canceled. Before that Romania had invested a lot in Chisinau, but this year all the projects were canceled. That is to say, it already spoke about the fact that a serious cooling is beginning. And now this announcement is the culmination. And, well, it is quite symbolic that together with Tarlev, who is now planning to enter this megabloc pro-Russian, which we are forming together with communists, socialists and the former Bashkan of Gagauzia Irina Vlah, he was included. And Natalia Morar, who also positions herself as a pro-European journalist, but, in general, in the public space there are talks about her ambiguous ties with Moscow. She studied there, she had some interesting story that she made an investigation against Putin, a criminal case was opened against her, and she became a member of both the Russian opposition and the Moldovan opposition, but after that she had no further investigations against Putin. So it's an interesting story.

But the point is that I think here, of course, there is an electoral element, that is, they showed that, because in fact, this "Alternative", they have a very serious chance of getting into the parliament on the wave of this, to say, "Are you disappointed in PAS?". And certainly there are a lot of people who are disappointed with the government. It's natural. And you won't vote for this mega-Russian bloc that is being created by the Kremlin, will you? So, let's vote for us, "Alternative" said. We are pro-European, but we are correct, we are not like PAS, we will not repeat their mistakes, we will do everything well. And so it's like Europe is saying, no, we don't consider you pro-European. And in fact, lately they are also like, well, speaking this jargon, they are "falling down", I mean this "Alternative", because more and more often they have some statements that "yes, of course, we are pro-European, but we don't like this EU, yes, we don't like the officials, and in general this Europe, everything is wrong with it". Kiku, who is one of the leaders of the "Alternative" bloc, had a fight with the EU ambassador to Moldova. This happened last year, if I'm not mistaken, or at the beginning of this year. So, probably, it became more obvious, what was clear to people who realized even earlier that they are not pro-Europeans, that this is, in general, such an imitation, an attempt to play on this theme, that, say, "well, you do not like the government, but you want to go to Europe, but let's go with us". Well, everyone was told that no, you will definitely not get to Europe with them. This is something like a Georgian dream.

Vitaly Barvinenko: Andrei, tell me, will this consolidate the pro-Russian electorate around the leader of "Alternative", the mayor of Chisinau, or on the contrary, will it limit it in some maneuvers? Don't you get the impression that this may strengthen his position and he will be, in fact, the only leader of the opposition there, unlike Dodon and all the others?

Andrei Andreevsky: The thing is that if this happens, it will only benefit the government, because now Russia is kind of.... well, if we take as a basis conspiracy theory that here comes this mega pro-Russian bloc and plus in the center goes "Alternative", then "Alternative" does not need the sympathy of the pro-Russian electorate, because it will take away from that openly pro-Russian bloc. Their very idea was to go as pro-Europeans. That is, the better it becomes liked by pro-Russians, the worse it will be for their main bloc, because their total electorate is, let's say, more pronouncedly pro-Russian, it does not exceed 40%. Therefore, it doesn't matter what proportions they will divide them among themselves, but his main task was to get into the field of the PAS party, yes, and just what happened is pushing him out of there. So they will start to say: "How come? This is a pro-European politician, whom Europe does not want to accept even on its territory. They say that he poses some kind of threat to security. Well, we will not believe such a thing.

So the fact that some of the pro-Russians will like it, it will not help Cheban, who is in a difficult situation, yes, their whole bloc, because they, criticizing, though, very carefully criticizing Russia's policy, well, they had to somehow integrate into the pro-European field, they lost the sympathy of the pro-Russians, but they did not gain the sympathy of the pro-Europeans, because, well, many people see them as a Trojan horse. But nevertheless, they had a certain percentage, which, well, let's say, it's not even Sandu's pure electorate, it's more like moderate Euroskeptics, who as if they want to join the EU, but "let's put a lot of our conditions, that if you accept us, we want this and that. We are not blindly following the Brussels officials, we will somehow take our position like Orban, like Fitzo". And now these people, of course, will wonder what is the point of voting for him, that is, if in principle no one will accept him in the European Union, then, well, it turns out to be the same Dodon, just sort of wearing a shirt of the colors of the European Union. So this is a very serious blow for him, which undermines their last attempts to pretend to be pro-European.

Tudor Ulianovski's new alliance and Shor's prospects.

Vitaly Barvinenko: Thank you. Andrei, please tell me the next question. Tudor Ulyanovski, the leader of SDK, announced that they will also create another alliance, a European bloc, I think, the European Alliance of Moldova or something like that. And he says that they have 103 mayors, heads of municipalities. Tell me, are there any prospects for this alliance, for this structure that is being created? And if it will be created, who will get votes, this European Alliance of Moldova?

Andrei Andreevski: Well, he is on the same field as Ion Ceban. And theoretically, this blow to Ceban, i.e. some part of the electorate will leave him, may go to Ulyanovskiy, among others. But the problem of Ulyanovsky is that he is very little promoted and he is, you know, like, well, this is I call such politicians like Yavlinsky. That is, he seems to say some right things, he seems to say something, but somehow he doesn't have political charisma, he doesn't have the ability to work with the audience. I mean, he's saying the right thing. It's not that he's mumbling something, he has a good speech. But there are people who say everything right, but no one hears them or wants to hear them, because he performed very poorly in the presidential election. I mean, he almost had the worst result there. And that's why, I mean, I don't really believe that he will be able to promote himself in these remaining months. And, by the way, the polls confirm that he will be able to spin up to a level sufficient to enter the parliament.

In this situation, I'm getting away from your question. The blow to Cheban is probably more likely to help Renato Usatom, because he was balancing on the verge of going in or not going in. And if now there will be a serious outflow of voters from the "Alternative" bloc (I can't confirm this yet, we need to wait for some polls, but hypothetically it can be assumed that it will happen), and then some of these voters may flow to Usatomu. Probably some small percentage or even part of a percentage will also go to Ulyanovsky, but it will not be enough to enter the parliament, which means that all other arguments on this topic are meaningless.

Vitaly Barvinenko: Tell me, please, once again in Russia there was a congress, I don't know how to call it correctly, probably only legal organizations can have a congress. It was just some kind of meeting there. I'm talking about the one organized by Shor. A number of deputies of the Moldovan parliament were present, including a deputy who escaped through Transnistria from Moldovan justice. Tell me, please, given the fact that a number of Shor's associates have been arrested, there are a number of criminal cases, what does he count on, how does he plan to legalize his movement on the territory of Moldova, how does he plan to participate in the parliamentary elections?

Andrei Andreevski: He does not expect any legalization. That is, everything that is happening is an operation of distraction. That is, he is drawing attention to himself, because he announced there that Moldova should join the CSTO, which, in general, contradicts our neutral status. This is impossible. Even in the best of times it was impossible. In the best times for Russia, I mean. And he was saying that we should almost unite with Russia, that we should go directly under the control of Russia. So these are all such radical messages that are like "well, look, we are so radical, we are the most ultra-Russian". Then, of course, his bloc will not be registered. It's obvious. That is, we even have a law now that political systems affiliated with Shor cannot be participants in the electoral process. This at the level of the law is accepted, so it will not be registered.

But why is he doing this? Because in order to draw away the negative public reaction to such a radically pro-Russian agenda from the big pro-Russian bloc, where he will actually make efforts, especially since many experts say that Victoria Fortuna may be connected with him. She is not in that bloc, she is still separate, but she also has approximately the same rhetoric. From that bloc they say Tarlev, Voronin, the former president, are connected with him. So he is pulling away from them that, well, they look quite adequate against his background. Well, they are not saying that we should completely lie down under Russia. They are not saying that we should join the CSTO, i.e. participate in Russian wars and so on. Well, look, they are quite adequate people. So that's kind of the idea. He's such a lightning rod, because he understands perfectly well that his directly affiliated politicians have no chance of running in the elections. I mean Alexei Lungu, there's that Chance party and so on. So they are all, of course, out of the running. Gutsul is likely to be jailed altogether before that time. And that's why he said that she will be at the head of this political project. So he just diverts attention, pulls away all the negativity with such a radical agenda. But at this time, the big pro-Russian bloc will look so white and fluffy, and everything will be fine. That is, they have been preparing this operation for a long time.

This, of course, will be a great tragedy for the same people of Shor, who stayed in Moldova, because he is pushing them now right under criminal cases. They already have a problem, he is pushing them even more. Well, they seem to think that they can sacrifice pawns in a big game, so now there may be some more arrests, some new sanctions from Europe. That is, people will lose the opportunity to enter the European Union. Well, Shor realizes that he has nothing to lose. He is already under all possible sanctions. He's been sentenced in Moldova for 15 years. So he has no plans to leave Russia in the next decades. So he has already gone to all sorts of trouble, and his people will only suffer from this.

Vitaly Barvinenko: The arrest of Gutsul, the case is already in court. 9 years the prosecutor's office is asking for a term. This is what I say to our viewers so briefly outline the situation. It is clear that she, from what I see, she will not be an active participant and will not, in fact, lead, as she should Gagauzia? What is the situation now? Has she already forgotten and passed or, so to speak, does she still have some prospects there, are there some people behind her, supporters of Gagauzia, among others, or has she just changed and moved on?

Andrei Andreevsky: No, from the legal point of view, it can still drag on, because now at the beginning of August the verdict will be announced. I think it is very likely that the verdict will be confirmed. That is, what the prosecutor's office is asking for there, well, give or take maybe some years, which doesn't make much difference. Then we have the appeals court, where they will appeal. I don't know how long it will be pending there. So it could hypothetically take longer.

But the point is, again, it's all part of this here's the distraction project, so she's not going to be dropped now, I mean, Shore. They're going to pump, they're going to get people out every time there's a court hearing. By the way, just yesterday the police detained these people again when they were handing out money to them for participating in these protests, because I can't imagine a person who can come there for free and shout for her in the heat, because no one is interested in her as a politician. But for money they gather a crowd, there are 100-200 people shouting something. And this will be done because, first of all, it shows that "look how terrible the regime is, how it wants to put her in jail". They're putting emphasis on the fact that she's a mom of two children. I mean, well, apparently, when she was engaged in illegal activities, she forgot that she was a mom. And now they've brought it all up. And now they are pumping this theme, that here is a terrible regime, political persecution, and at the same time these ultra-Russian slogans of Shor, that is, all together it is like a lightning rod, which will take attention away from their main Kremlin projects. Therefore, that is, this topic has not been abandoned, it will keep popping up and popping up, at least as long as they can, until Gutsul finally closes the prison doors behind her. That is, this topic will continue.

Moldova-EU summit and the European perspective.

Vitaly Barvinenko: Let's move on to geopolitics, including the events that took place at the summit. The Moldova-EU summit took place. And it seems that before that there was a common case, i.e. Ukraine and Moldova went together on action plans, on joining the European Union. Now Moldova is at some stage being singled out as a separate case. How would you comment on this summit? Is it an ordinary event, which was simply declared about intentions, is it some concrete step-by-step action plan? Is it an endorsement of Sandu or what are the consequences of this summit that took place?

Andrei Andreevsky: Well, it's certainly support for the pro-European authorities in Moldova. And I wouldn't say that it's a regular thing, because the European Union rarely makes direct summits of the European Union and any state. So it is quite such a, well, very indicative gesture, very important. I don't remember if I mentioned your program, but I have, let's say, contacts in Brussels who told me that the decision has been made that Moldova will join the European Union until 2028.

As for our common case with Ukraine, yes, there is such an opinion in Brussels that we should be divided, because at least as long as there is a war in Ukraine and as long as there is a very tough position of Orban that he will not accept, Hungary will not vote (and this decision should be a consensus of all EU countries on accession). So this is the view that it is necessary to divide us. But here we are kind of talking now about the political, legal, but there is, of course, the moral side. That is, it is very wrong from the moral point of view, because Ukraine today is shedding its blood for, among other things, our freedom, for the freedom of Moldova. And it is not right for Moldova to follow a separate path in this situation. Therefore, our authorities have taken the most rational position here. That is, they say that we want to go together with Ukraine, we insist on it. But, of course, they keep in their minds that if the European Union says: "That's it, the door is open, come in", we will come in. That is, there will be no such thing as "no, if they don't take Ukraine, then we won't come in", because, well, that would be strange. Moreover, I think that again, despite the fact that, of course, there will be sentiment in Ukraine that, well, how come we were "thrown off", but I think that objectively, of course, it will be better for Ukraine if Moldova becomes a member of the European Union in this situation, because it will put an end to Russia's attempts to pull us to itself. That is, of course, pro-Russian parties will not disappear, pro-Russian forces will not disappear, it will continue to boil for many years as long as Putin is alive, at least at least. But, nevertheless, being inside the European Union, I can't imagine that with all these benefits that accompany joining the European Union, that our citizens will still seriously argue that we don't need the European Union, that we don't need to trade with Europe, let's trade with Russia, and all this nonsense that pro-Russian forces are talking about. So in this situation, of course, for Ukraine, if we rationalize the outcome, it will be more favorable for Moldova to join the European Union, even if it is earlier, but of course there will be resentment. It is understandable, because, in fact, we got the candidacy now only thanks to Ukraine, because before the war it was not discussed that Moldova would become a candidate for accession so quickly. And if we enter the European Union by 2028, it will also be only thanks to Ukraine, thanks to the situation, I mean, because, well, let's say, thanks to the war, but not just the war, but because Ukraine was able to contain this war. And it's been going on for almost four years now. And that is, if, of course, Ukraine had fallen, nobody would consider Moldova as a candidate for accession, because who knows what if tomorrow Putin attacks Moldova as well. Therefore, in this situation there is a twofold situation. On the one hand, it looks morally not very beautiful, but legally and rationally it looks like the only possible option for today.

Vitaly Barvinenko: Look, we have the experience of Hungary, Slovakia, and partly Bulgaria. Joining the European Union does not always insure against the emergence of absolutely pro-Russian figures in the leadership of countries, not just individual deputies, but in the leadership of countries. Will this not be another risk for the European Union, including after accession in 2028? How does the European Union assess these risks and what kind of dialog is going on with the current Moldovan authorities in order to buy these risks? Because we see that even the countries that joined earlier, for example, Slovakia, Hungary, the incomprehensible government that was in Bulgaria, is now pro-European, which was before, yes, and the position of President Rudev is quite pro-Russian. How will this part be bought? As you can see, strategically, I'm not talking about specific elections in September, but strategically, it will be some additional grants, it will be some infusion of money, it will be, I don't know, Euronews will be broadcasting on every corner, that is, there will be some normal, cool communications center, which will be essentially a propaganda center of European values. How do you see this in general? How will this plan be realized?

Andrei Andreevsky: Well, probably, all of this, and if we talk strategically, they probably still believe that in any case, the advantages of the European Union they win. Because even if you take the situation that you say, well, in Romania, it's probably particularly surprising to me that there are people in Romania who are Euroskeptic, because I think it's completely artificially inspired. There's too much difference between how Romania was before the EU and after. So it's such a colossal breakthrough that it's just amazing to me now when someone else says that no, the EU is something wrong.

And about Hungary, we know that now Hungary has kind of slipped to the last place in terms of economic development. It is in the situation when the European Union, because of Orbán's position, has reduced many of its financial injections into Hungary, and they have suffered a lot. I mean, well, if you want to be full-fledged Europeans, then, well, probably, you have to play a common game. And Orban is trying to sit on two chairs, and even, probably, with a bias towards Moscow. And as a result, ordinary Hungarians suffer from this. I think it will affect him at some elections, when they, I don't really follow their domestic politics, but it will certainly have an impact. And as you can see, in Romania, the pro-European forces are winning in the end. In Bulgaria too, well, more or less they somehow control the situation.

Therefore, I think, strategically, the European Union sees it this way, because all this negativity against the European Union is artificially fueled. That is, if a person tries to think rationally, he sees that while there are certainly questions and disadvantages to the European Union, it is a more advanced system and more favorable for people than what is offered by Russia. Actually, nothing is proposed from Russia's side. That is, some historical myths are offered and, well, to exchange, let's say, the high level of pensions and salaries of the European Union for the possibility that we have monuments to, I don't know, World War II or something else on every street. Well, I guess it's probably important for some people, but I don't think it's for the majority.

Transnistria and anti-corruption bodies.

Vitaly Barvinenko: Andrei, interesting, in connection with this question and reasoning. So, we have the year 2028, potential accession to the European Union for Moldova. At the same time, legally, officially Moldova has a territory that includes unrecognized Transnistria. Does this mean that this part of Moldova, these citizens, these residents become EU citizens after this year? How will this situation be regulated?

Andrei Andreevsky: Well, those of them who have Moldovan passports, of course, they become EU citizens in this situation. And they have all the same rights as Moldovan citizens in terms of staying on the territory of the European Union, getting education for their children and there is a lot of other things. But on the other hand, the territory itself is uncontrolled and it is actually seized by the local authorities. That is why I think that Moldova will have to establish an administrative border, which we have almost none at the moment. That is, there is some kind of post, let's say, of patrol police, which is not even a post, but they just sit in a car. And, that is, well, probably, we will have to put a full-fledged administrative border with document checks, so that people who do not have Moldovan citizenship can not enter the territory of the European Union.

But the thing is that I have the feeling that this issue may be resolved very suddenly and very quickly, because the situation there is simply critical. I predicted this and, well, let's say, predicted it back in the winter, because all the opportunities for budget replenishment have practically collapsed. What was used to fill the budget of the so-called Transnistria? From the income from the money received for Russian gas, which they received without paying a single penny for it to anyone. And they sold it, first of all, inside enterprises. They had large enterprises that could buy this gas, yes, at a huge discount, but it was money nonetheless. Plus to the population, plus they generated electricity from it, which they sold to Moldova and Ukraine. So today all this has practically collapsed. That is, they do not have enough gas for their enterprises, no one buys electricity from them now. That is, there is simply a disaster in the budget, that it came to the point that the local oligarch Gushan, who controls everything, donated, I think, a million dollars to the budget. Well, it's like a dead poultice, well, well, they will last plus another month. And then what? Russia, they do not have such a practice of giving money for such territories. Yes, they supported pensioners with Russian citizenship, they gave them some pensions. But now, first of all, pensions in Russia are not so interesting anymore because the ruble has fallen since the war started. Secondly, well, as it were, only at the expense of pensioners, so that the region could live. By the way, the young people there have practically all run away. That is, many of them live and study in Chisinau, some of them went to Europe, some of them went to Russia. But there, of course, probably more than half of the population is now pensioners. Nevertheless, even a pseudo-state cannot exist when it has no sources of income. So, I mean, this situation, I don't know how, but it could be resolved very directly, well, literally in a matter of moments. I mean, it would have been resolved already, if it weren't for some people there, who are just in the leadership, I mean, who still hope that everything will somehow get better and they will be able to continue to run some smuggling schemes, as they used to do before, they were living happily ever after. Many of them have become multimillionaires, and they apparently hope that it will somehow come back.

Well, plus there are some people, such as Ignatiev, who is wanted by the SBU, and if Transnistria comes under the control of Chisinau, of course, he will be extradited to Kiev. So for these people they have nothing to lose, they will resist to the end. So this is the situation, but I think that perhaps by 2028, with a high probability, this will be resolved peacefully, because they will simply exhaust the potential for further existence.

Vitaly Barvinenko: Andrei, Trump signed an executive order, sent a letter to Sandu, as well as to many other leaders of countries, to raise 25% of the relevant duties on goods from Moldova. Is this more of a ritual document or is it really the balance of trade between Moldova and the U.S. that these goods will be a problem for the Moldovan economy or is this a ritual document?

Andrei Andreevsky: Trump has some kind of list of countries that he is going by. You probably remember that the first time he announced it, there were even some islands where only penguins live. So in this situation, I don't think he understands. The thing is that he, first of all, I don't really even realize that we're supplying that much there. Probably almost nothing, yes, some few firms that are doing it, they will certainly suffer from it. This is obvious, this is a fact, but I do not think that there are many such firms and there is a large turnover there.

So, nevertheless, knowing Trump's psychology, if I were our government, I would try to somehow appeal to him that we will now change our duties, because I would not be surprised if it turns out that we have some large duties against the United States, which were introduced 20 years ago, and everyone forgot about it, because, in general, there is no big trade turnover, and no one cares, and it is somehow, you know, like such clauses in the tax code, they pass from year to year, because no one cares at all. But it's nobody's business, and there's no serious lobbyists behind it. So if I were in power, I'd still try to play the game with Trump. All the more reason to draw his attention to us. They say: "Look, Moldovans want to sign a great beautiful contract with you that they will give you a discount on everything and also promise to develop our beautiful minerals, which we do not have at all". So this situation could be used here. I don't know if our authorities will use it, but nevertheless, I think it's even a good occasion, because if yesterday Trump was signing even and probably didn't have much idea where Moldova is, then today there is an opportunity to remind him about us and to say that we are friends and that, well, we are friends for America. And Trump associates himself with America, which means for him. And so we're willing to cooperate. I think it would be a good option.

Anti-corruption fight in Moldova: EU Reaction

Vitaly Barvinenko: One last question. There is such an indicator or a beacon in post-Soviet countries. It is the work of anti-corruption bodies. It was in Ukraine, it was in the former Warsaw Pact countries, in the Baltic countries, former Soviet republics, special prosecutor's offices, anti-corruption courts, anti-corruption prosecutor's offices. The ruling party, the PAS party, decided to postpone the draft law on merging the two special prosecutor's offices and to create one structure in place of these two structures, which have shown themselves to be ineffective, probably, since they are being liquidated, the creation of one structure - the prosecutor's office for fighting corruption and organized crime. It was decided that the next parliament will consider it. This is the right lagoon or this situation, when these two prosecutor's offices, in fact, have already ceased to exist, and no new anti-corruption body has been created. Will this not cause some kind of reaction of the European Union structure, which, as in the experience with Ukraine, is quite, so to speak, in the Ukrainian way, "sensitive", reacts very subtly, sensitively to some such processes?

Andrei Andreevsky: Look, first of all, I think that despite the fact that there is such a project, so far everything is working as it was, that is, nothing has changed, people have not been fired, the structure is working. And I think, in fact, this bill was introduced for one purpose only. They needed to remove Veronika Dragalin, who was the head of one of these prosecutor's offices and who came into conflict with the authorities. And thus, as if her position was to be canceled and she was to be resigned. They have achieved this, she is no longer there, so I do not rule out that this project will be buried already, as if there is no point in merging anything further.

Although, of course, there were talks that it would be good to unite all these anti-corruption bodies into one, because, well, why duplicate each other's work? And others have said that no, on the contrary, it is better to let one of these prosecutor's offices deal only with particularly important cases, while the other deals with general cases, and so on. So I don't know, I think it's more like, you know, political declarations, because the closer we get to the elections, each of our politicians tries to play smart and say something about it, that "no, let's do this, let's do that". After the elections they lose interest in this topic, because it is actually a very complicated topic, because in Moldova justice, by the way, probably, as well as in Ukraine, I just don't know how things are in Ukraine now, but this system of judges, prosecutors, it has developed into a separate caste, which is so strong, and nobody could do anything with it, that every power tries to subdue them under itself. But it worked out, probably, only for Plahotniuc for a short period of time, when he arrested 17 or how many judges one day, and after that the judges started working for him. Well, it's like, you can't say that he set the system to work properly.

He just subjugated it. That's all. But no one has ever succeeded in making the system work in the full sense of the law. And I don't know when it will work out despite the fact that the staff has been very much renewed, there are a lot of young judges and prosecutors, and it would seem that everything should change, but if it changes, it changes very slowly. And I think that the issue is not to change the composition or to sharply raise salaries, as it was suggested, or something else. That is, we need to gradually create such conditions that it would be more profitable for them to work correctly than incorrectly. And this is a process. So it will take years. So I think there is a movement somewhere in that direction, it is going, but it is going very slowly. And all these stories of unification, disunification, it has nothing to do with that. They were more tactical tasks, which, as I have already explained, the authorities solved them, and then, with a high probability, no one will even remember about it in the next parliament.

Vitaly Barvinenko: Thank you for taking the time to join our program today. This is Vitaliy Barvinenko, Institute of Danube Studies. Subscribe to our YouTube channel, read our website danube.eu. And my guest today was a well-known Moldovan political scientist, media expert Andrei Andreevski. Andrei, thank you for an interesting conversation. Thank you for taking the time.

Andrei Andreevski: Thank you. Always a pleasure.