Interview: Dialogue Platforms, Turkish Strategy, and Regional Tensions —with Prof. Turgul Ismail

Togrul Ismail - a political scientist and professor at Kahramanmaras University (Türkiye).

Vitalii Barvynenko:
Greetings to all our viewers. This is Vitalii Barvynenko from the Danube Research Institute. Today we have the honor of speaking with Professor Turgul Ismail — a renowned Turkish political scientist, Doctor of Political Science, and professor at the International University of Kahramanmaras.  Professor Ismail is widely recognized for his balanced and well-reasoned analyses of geopolitical developments in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Professor Ismail, thank you for joining us!

Prof. Turgul Ismail:
Thank you, Mr. Barvynenko. It’s a pleasure to be here with you and your audience. I will do my best to provide detailed and clear answers to your questions.

Possible Israel–Syria Dialogue in Baku?

Barvynenko:
Let’s begin with a potentially significant development. According to a number of regional media outlets, during Bashar al-Assad’s recent visit to Baku, there were unofficial reports that a secret meeting may have occurred between Syrian and Israeli representatives. This, if true, would be groundbreaking. What do you think of this possibility and Azerbaijan’s role in such a dialogue?

Ismail:
There is no official confirmation of such a meeting. The Syrian President’s visit to Baku was officially conducted in the framework of intergovernmental relations between Azerbaijan and Syria. However, there were reports — particularly from regional think tanks — that such a meeting may have taken place indirectly or through intermediaries.

Azerbaijan is in a unique position. On one hand, it has very strong relations with Israel, including military-technical cooperation and trade. On the other, it maintains neutral or at least working relations with Syria, largely thanks to its close coordination with Turkey. Moreover, Turkey now has relatively normal communication channels with Damascus, even though official diplomatic relations haven’t fully resumed.

Given this context, Baku could indeed serve as a neutral venue for initial backchannel contacts between parties that do not have formal diplomatic relations. The Azerbaijani leadership has the diplomatic experience and credibility to facilitate such encounters discreetly.

Turkey’s Geopolitical Calculus in Syria

Barvynenko:
Let’s turn to Turkey’s own position in this dynamic. Ankara has long maintained military presence in northern Syria and has expressed deep concerns about Kurdish militias operating near its borders. What are Turkey’s current priorities in Syria?

Ismail:
Turkey’s top priority in Syria is national security. This primarily means preventing the creation of a Kurdish autonomous zone that could link up with separatist movements inside Turkey. Beyond that, Turkey wants to avoid a major humanitarian crisis along its southern border, which could result in additional refugee flows.

That being said, Turkey is not interested in a direct military confrontation with either Syria or Israel. Ankara is trying to maintain a balance. While it supports the territorial integrity of Syria, it also demands that no threats emerge from within Syrian territory against Turkish interests.

Recently, we have observed an increase in Turkey’s willingness to coordinate — even indirectly — with Damascus, especially via Russian mediation. This reflects a broader Turkish strategy: to reduce conflict, stabilize borders, and focus on economic recovery and trade routes.

Israel–Iran Conflict: Turkish Neutrality and Risks

Barvynenko:
The Israel–Iran conflict is another flashpoint. How does Turkey navigate this highly polarized situation?

Ismail:
Turkey is pursuing a policy of active neutrality. Ankara does not support Iran’s aggressive policies in the region, especially its proxy networks in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. At the same time, Turkey strongly condemns many of Israel’s actions in Gaza and the West Bank.

The core Turkish interest is preventing a large-scale regional war. Such a war would destabilize energy markets, disrupt trade corridors like the Middle Corridor and the Zangezur Corridor, and directly harm Turkey’s economy.

Turkey is trying to act as a mediator or at least a stabilizing force. Ankara consistently promotes multilateral dialogue platforms. President Erdoğan has stated more than once that peace in the Middle East requires a just solution for the Palestinian people — but not at the cost of regional war.

Turkey and the Ukraine–Russia War: Mediation and Peace Proposals

Barvynenko:
Turkey has been actively involved in diplomatic efforts around the war in Ukraine, including hosting negotiations and promoting the grain deal. What is Turkey’s current role and vision regarding the conflict?

Ismail:
Turkey is one of the few NATO countries that maintains diplomatic channels with both Russia and Ukraine. This allows it to play the role of a constructive mediator. Ankara hosted several rounds of peace talks early in the war, and it continues to support initiatives for ceasefire or humanitarian corridors.

President Erdoğan recently proposed a four-party summit involving Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. The idea is to create a realistic roadmap toward peace, although it’s clear that no single actor can impose a solution.

Turkey’s position is grounded in principles: respect for territorial integrity (including Ukraine’s), the importance of dialogue, and the belief that prolonged war benefits no one. Ankara also sees its own regional role strengthened through such mediation.

The Zangezur Corridor: Strategic Significance and International Law

Barvynenko:
Azerbaijan is pressing for the establishment of the Zangezur Corridor to connect its mainland with Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. How do you assess this demand?

Ismail:
This issue is very sensitive. But it’s important to understand the background. The Zangezur corridor existed during Soviet times as a transportation link. Today, Azerbaijan demands the reestablishment of this corridor, not through annexation, but as an unobstructed and secure passage. It does not involve taking Armenian territory but seeks legal guarantees of transit.

Such a project would benefit not only Azerbaijan, but also Armenia — by linking it to Turkey, the EU, and Central Asian markets. However, the geopolitical environment complicates this.

The United States recently sent official delegations to Armenia, which Ankara and Baku view as external interference. Turkey believes this issue should be resolved regionally, through trilateral mechanisms involving Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan — not by global powers.

Israeli Law on West Bank Annexation: Turkish Reaction

Barvynenko:
Just yesterday, the Israeli parliament passed a law formalizing the annexation of the West Bank. What’s Turkey’s view on this move?

Ismail:
Turkey sees this as a provocative and dangerous step. It contradicts international law, specifically UN Security Council resolutions that recognize the West Bank as occupied territory. This move by Netanyahu is likely driven by domestic political calculations — to maintain the support of far-right and religious factions in his coalition.

But such actions isolate Israel internationally. Over 140 countries now recognize the State of Palestine. If Israel continues this course, it risks long-term diplomatic consequences, especially in Europe and the Global South.

From Turkey’s perspective, this move blocks the road to a two-state solution, deepens the conflict, and increases instability across the region.

Barvynenko:
Professor Ismail, thank you for this deep and thoughtful analysis. Your insights help us better understand the complex geopolitics shaping our region.

Ismail:
Thank you, Mr. Barvynenko. I hope our conversation contributes to a clearer understanding of regional dynamics. Dialogue, mutual respect, and strategic thinking are more important today than ever.