Interview: Geopolitics, Economics, and Demographics — Plamen Dimitrov's Perspective

Plamen Dimitrov, political scientist, head of the Bulgarian Geopolitical Community

Vitaly Barvinenko: Hello, dear friends and viewers. Today we are joined by political scientist and member of the Bulgarian geopolitical community Plamen Dimitrov. Mr. Dimitrov, thank you for taking the time to join us on air. Hello.
Plamen Dimitrov: Thank you for the invitation. 
Vitaly Barvinenko: Thank you again for joining us, Mr. Dimitrov. I would like to ask you a few questions so that our viewers can understand your point of view and your expert assessment of the situation in Bulgaria, as well as some of the events taking place in the world around us during this period.
Bulgaria is switching to the euro: Challenges and opportunities.
Vitaly Barvinenko: My first question concerns the decision to transition the Bulgarian economy and currency system to the euro in 2026. You posted this information on your Facebook page and in news feeds. What are the main economic challenges facing Bulgaria on the eve of this transition, and how might it affect financial and, possibly, political stability?
Plamen Dimitrov: Yes, Bulgaria will join the eurozone at the beginning of next year. This was officially decided by the Eurogroup. Yesterday, there was also a vote in the European Parliament, and it was decided by an overwhelming majority that Bulgaria would join the eurozone, so everything is clear now. There are now about six months left before accession. During this time, the government and the Ministry of Finance must conduct a good information campaign so that all Bulgarians know what will happen, how to exchange money, and what the new euro banknotes and coins look like, so that everything goes smoothly. This is especially important for older, conservative people who find it difficult to accept change.
The main concern is rising inflation. However, the experience of other Eastern European countries that have joined the eurozone shows that the euro has a minimal impact on inflation. Only in Croatia did inflation rise upon entry, but that was during a period of high inflation throughout Europe.
The main advantage of joining the eurozone is stability for investors. Although the Bulgarian lev has been pegged to the euro for 28 years and the exchange rate never changes, foreign investors still perceived the lev as the currency of a small country, and the euro is a completely different matter. So the investment attractiveness of our country is improving. It is also important that we will no longer pay currency exchange fees. The bulk of Bulgaria's trade is with eurozone countries, and for large companies, these seemingly small fees were a significant expense in terms of the scale of trade.
Of course, there are some concerns in the economic sphere. For example, there is concern that some eurozone countries, such as Greece, Italy, and even France, have large debts. Bulgaria is not a guarantor of these debts, but as the example of Greece showed when it became insolvent more than 10 years ago, the European Central Bank intervened and provided assistance. But this assistance is not free; it is actually money that the European Central Bank lends to debtor countries. Greece is now repaying this money. So I don't think there are such big risks.
Of course, there is anti-European propaganda in Bulgaria. They say: “Poor Bulgaria will pay the debts of France, Italy, and so on.” This is one of the challenges. Some traders may take advantage of this moment of entry into the eurozone and try to raise prices. But, as we know, prices depend on the level of competition, not the type of currency. I hope this will not happen. Of course, the state and our government, the Commission for Protection of Competition, are already holding press conferences explaining that they will take strict measures against speculators. But this is most likely a psychological effect, because what is a speculator in a market economy? There is no such concept.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Ah, yes, socialism ended long ago, and so did the Soviet Union, when the concept of a speculator existed...
Plamen Dimitrov: Yes, of course, of course. What does speculator mean? If he won 10, 20, or 30% there, where is the line for speculation? It is completely unclear. Another thing is that in Bulgaria, the Commission for Protection of Competition has been working poorly for a long time and does not attack certain monopolistic organizations, including the Russian oil refinery Lukoil, which is a monopolist in the market for various fuels and energy materials in Bulgaria.
This will be very important, otherwise Bulgaria will already have a say in the decisions of the European Central Bank, because for the last 28 years Bulgaria has not had an independent monetary policy, as the exchange rate of the lev to the euro was fixed by law and never changed. At the same time, our country did not participate in the meetings of the European Central Bank. In principle, this is seen as a major success for Bulgaria. Bulgaria is already part of the core of the European integration project, which includes almost all the large, wealthy countries of the European Union, except Sweden and Denmark, which have different circumstances. So, in principle, this is also considered by the politicians who are currently in power, and they, of course, take credit for it. Former Prime Minister Boyko Borisov said, “It is my achievement that we have joined the eurozone, even though he has not been prime minister for four years.” 
Vitaly Barvinenko: Well, we have a saying: victory has many fathers, but defeat is always an orphan. So it's not surprising that Boyko Borisov and everyone else are taking credit for this victory.
The demographic situation: myths and reality.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Plamen, please tell me, I read your interesting post about the birth rate, where you debunk another myth that, as I understand it, exists in Bulgaria, that the country's birth rate is lower than in other countries. You cite statistics for Albanians and French, and Bulgaria has a rate of 1.74 children per woman. Is this due to some government benefits or is there a special program? Today, I specifically spoke with our Institute of Sociology and the Institute of Demography of the National Academy of Sciences, sent them these figures, as I was curious myself. Could you elaborate on whether this situation is being studied in your country? Are there any special programs, or is it because of the people?
Plamen Dimitrov: A few years ago, it was not a myth, it was true that the birth rate in Bulgaria was very low. You mentioned 1.74 children per woman (for the entire period when she gives birth to children). A few years ago, this figure was below 1.5. Now it has risen slightly. In addition, this indicator has declined in many other countries, such as France and the United Kingdom. So now Bulgaria has taken first place in the European Union. Well, I want to say right away that this does not mean that Bulgaria has positive natural population growth. For it to be positive, there must be at least 2.1 children per woman. So, the natural growth rate remains negative, but there has been a shift for the better over the past few years.
And this is by no means the result of government policy. We know that many countries around the world with low birth rates usually implement some kind of demographic policy and take certain measures. And, in principle, these measures do not work anywhere. Because the standard of living is not the most important factor here. If it were important, there would be fewer children in Nigeria than in Germany. This process, called demographic transition, has practically run its course, and all European countries are already at the end of this transition. And we can say that most of them have even passed the lowest point of fertility. So, it seems to me that in Bulgaria, over the last 3-4 years, there has been more confidence in the economic future, in the economic situation of Bulgarian families. The population's income has increased.
I would also like to note another, in my opinion, more important demographic result: for four years now, the number of people who have settled in Bulgaria has been greater than the number of those who have left Bulgaria. Of course, these are not only Bulgarians, but also Ukrainians who have fled the war. But there are not that many of them. And there are also some Bulgarian Turks who are returning to Bulgaria from Turkey, having emigrated a long time ago. So, perhaps we should say that life in Bulgaria has improved, and that is why there is a certain confidence. But still, the birth rate in Bulgaria is not that high.
What you have noticed is really interesting, that the birth rate in Bulgaria is higher than in Turkey. It is usually believed that the birth rate in Turkey is high, yes. And Bulgaria's birth rate is higher than in Azerbaijan and Iran. It is also higher than in Kosovo and Albania. Well, these are myths, of course, at the moment. Ten to fifteen years ago, it was true that the birth rate in Iran and Kosovo was very high, but this is no longer the case. The trends are simply different, and the world is changing rapidly.
And the last thing I wanted to add here, which I think is one of the most important, I would even say geopolitical processes that we are seeing in the modern world, is the demographic catastrophe in China. China's population has been declining for the third or second year, I think, and the birth rate in China is practically 1.0 children per woman. In the coming decades, China will lose more than 10 million people every year. By the end of the century, according to demographic forecasts, there will be half as many Chinese as there are now.
Germany: From Economic to Geopolitical Leadership.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Let's return to geopolitics. In an interview in Bulgarian for Focus, you spoke about the upcoming signing of a defense agreement between the UK and Germany. At the same time, Chancellor Merz said in his speech that diplomacy with Moscow has been exhausted. What do you see as Germany's current geopolitical position regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war and, in parallel, regarding bilateral defense relations with other European countries?
Plamen Dimitrov: Yes, indeed, Chancellor Merz said today that, keep in mind, this was a response to a statement by the leader of the opposition, the far-right opposition, the leader of the Alternative for Germany party, which, of course, called for not spending so much money on defense and not providing aid to Ukraine, and so on. But it seems to me that with Chancellor Merz, Germany is already taking on the role not only of economic leader, but also of political leader of Europe, I would say, and geopolitical leader.
Of course, since the most important security issue in Europe at the moment is Russia's war against Ukraine, Merz's policy towards Ukraine immediately makes an impression. He is a staunch supporter of Ukraine and advocates strengthening military support for Ukraine. Of course, Germany does not have the same military resources as the US, for example. It cannot replace many of the weapons platforms that the Americans provide. Nevertheless, Germany is determined, and this determination is reflected in the decision by the government and parliament to invest around half a billion euros over the next few years to strengthen the German army. This means purchasing weapons, and it most likely means increasing the size of the German army, its level of mobility, and so on. So I think Germany is on its way to becoming a serious military power. These complexes associated with defeat in World War II, with Hitlerism, and so on, are no longer on the agenda. The geopolitical situation is completely new. I would say that this page of the geopolitical order that was created after World War II has already been closed.
Within the framework of these ambitions of Germany, this military cooperation with Great Britain is emerging. Since only two countries on the European continent possess nuclear weapons — France and Great Britain — Germany is seeking cooperation with them. Incidentally, it has a military-economic cooperation agreement with France, not just with the UK, which will most likely be signed next week. This is a process, I would say, of the Europeanization of NATO and the Europeanization of European defense itself. Since it is clear in the current situation that the Americans are inclined to disengage from the defense of the European continent, so to speak, and focus on the Middle East, East Asia, and so on, Europeans are forced to strengthen the European component of NATO and increase defense spending. This decision was already made at the NATO meeting, the NATO summit, which took place last month in the Netherlands. So I see these trends in the direction of security.
As you know, a decision was made that the European Commission will issue debt of up to €150 billion, and then this money will be distributed among EU member states for defense spending. In addition, the European Union allows countries that wish to do so to spend more on defense. And this 1.5% of gross domestic product will not be counted as a deficit under this requirement that the deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP. But here I want to note another factor. So, it is clear that there is an opportunity to increase military spending. But those countries that have large debts, such as Italy, Greece, France, Spain, and so on, are somehow hesitant — to do this or not to do this, because after all, debt is debt. Debt must be repaid. If not immediately, then sometime in the future. For example, 15 of the 27 member states of the European Union have decided to take advantage of the budgetary concessions offered by the European Commission, while the remaining 12 will not. France and Spain are among the countries that are unlikely to significantly increase their military spending.
Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations: Breakthrough or symbolism?
Vitaly Barvinenko: Thank you. Please tell us, is there a meeting planned for tomorrow in Abu Dhabi between Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, within the international format? Do you think this meeting could be a breakthrough in the negotiations on a peace treaty, which has not yet been signed, or is it still symbolic against the backdrop of anti-Russian rhetoric on both sides?
Plamen Dimitrov: Well, as you know, the text of the agreement was agreed upon several months ago, but it has not yet been signed because Azerbaijan has put forward other conditions: that Armenia remove from its constitution the preamble to the constitution, the reference to the declaration of independence, which refers to Karabakh as Armenian territory. Azerbaijan also wants the OSCE Minsk Group to be officially abolished.
That is the situation. Most likely, Azerbaijan is not inclined to sign the agreement until Armenia has fulfilled these conditions. Armenia is ready to sign the agreement because the wars in 2020 and 2023 showed that Azerbaijan is stronger than Armenia militarily and is in a more advantageous position. So it would be beneficial for Armenia to end this conflict now and sign a peace agreement.
Recently, there have been some rumors or speculations that the Americans are putting pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is because Donald Trump really wants to win the Nobel Peace Prize. And since we can see that he has virtually no chance of ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, he tried to take credit for the peace between India and Pakistan — but somehow Pakistan did not agree that Trump had done this. There will soon be no peace in the Middle East either. And there remains a conflict where small countries like Armenia and Azerbaijan have been fighting. And maybe it's easier for them to achieve success. So there are assumptions that the Americans are putting pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan. And that is why the meeting will be in Abu Dhabi, well, there are the United Arab Emirates, they are allies of the US, as we know, they act as mediators in many negotiations. So, perhaps, I do not rule out that there will be some kind of agreement tomorrow, but, of course, I am not 100% sure.
The same thing we have been seeing in recent weeks is the increasing tension between Armenia and Russia and between Azerbaijan and Russia. But this, of course, in no way means that there is some kind of agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan to jointly oppose Russia. These are separate processes taking place in Armenia. This is related to Pashinyan's desire, on the eve of next year's elections, to, so to speak, clear the political field a little so that there are no serious opponents. And, of course, the pro-Russian forces that exist in Armenia are hindering him. Well, it's no secret that the Armenian Apostolic Church is most likely pro-Russian.
In Azerbaijan, there is an even more serious escalation with Russia. And one could say that this is a bit of a surprise. Because in the last 2-3 years, Azerbaijan has been closer to Russia than Armenia. It can be said that there is a close relationship between Presidents Aliyev and Putin. And then suddenly this incident occurred at the end of last year, when Russian air defense forces shot down an Azerbaijani passenger plane. It seemed that the situation had calmed down a little in the spring of this year, but now we are seeing a new escalation. And I'm not sure that this was dictated by the Kremlin, that it was Putin personally who caused this escalation. Most likely, what happened — the murder of two members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia — is most likely related to the actions of the security forces and the general atmosphere of xenophobia that exists in Russia, including against immigrants from the former Soviet republics. And this is, of course, also linked to Azerbaijan's heightened geopolitical self-confidence after its victory in the war against Armenia. President Aliyev feels that he is now in a position to stand up to Russia and not back down from his positions. But I have some doubts that this escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia will last long. After all, Aliyev and Putin have not made any statements against each other. Perhaps in two or three months, or more, the situation will calm down.
Vitaly Barvinenko: During his entire presidential career, Ilham Aliyev has met with Putin 56 times. Last year alone, they met four times, including Putin's visit to his home in Baku. I think that Aliyev is probably one of the few leaders who knows Putin best, because, first of all, Aliyev is not stupid, and secondly, they have met many times in different situations, and I think he has studied him well. And the fact that he responds quite harshly — it's not him, it's Azerbaijan. Well, it's clear that nothing happens in Baku without Aliyev's leadership, with all due respect to the democratic institutions of that country, but that's the reality: the president has complete power. These responses are quite harsh, I mean Azerbaijan's responses to Russia — there was a refusal to accept the deputy prime minister, then the corresponding statements, so to speak. Does this mean that Aliyev is no longer impressed by Putin's capabilities? Or does it simply mean that, as you correctly said, a reassessment of Baku's geopolitical role in the eyes of President Aliyev himself has begun? How do you assess this?
Plamen Dimitrov: Yes. Indeed, they know each other well. And what is happening shows that the geopolitical situation has simply changed, because the people are the same — Putin and Aliyev. And I think that the war against Ukraine has slightly undermined Russia's image in the Caucasus. Of course, if Russia manages to win this war soon, it will be able to regain its position in the Caucasus. But since this is unlikely to happen, Russia is losing influence. It is clear that Russia is not so formidable if it has been unable to defeat the Ukrainian army for three and a half years. It is also clear that Russia's resources are limited. This has created an opportunity for local players, the presidents of the South Caucasus republics, to play their own game and diversify their foreign policy, because Azerbaijan and even Armenia are doing so. They have not completely abandoned their ties with Russia; they are diversifying and already developing ties with other partners.
In addition, specifically for Azerbaijan, I think it is very important that Turkey supports it. And in a situation where Turkey is one of Russia's main economic outlets in the context of Western sanctions, we know that Turkey is currently the largest buyer of Russian oil products. The world's third-largest buyer of Russian oil also buys Russian gas. And Turkey's position is very important for Russia. Therefore, I think that Russia will not take any drastic action against Azerbaijan, because that would mean spoiling its relations with Turkey, and Moscow does not want that in the current situation.
Moldova's European perspective.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Mr. Dimitrov, the EU-Moldova summit ended yesterday, and Moldova's European integration prospects were discussed quite intensively. How likely is it that Moldova's accession to the EU will be treated as a separate case? Because until now, there was a joint Ukraine-Moldova case. And we see that at the forum that just took place in Chisinau, for the first time, European bureaucrats and diplomats are saying that, in principle, it is possible to single out Moldova as a separate case. How realistic is Moldova's European perspective, and how would you assess the results of this summit?
Plamen Dimitrov: Yes, I think it's realistic. Because, first of all, it may seem like a technical issue, but it's very important. Moldova is a very small country, Ukraine is large by European standards, and it is much easier to integrate a small country, which also has its own, how shall we say, sister state — Romania, which is already a member of the European Union — than to integrate Ukraine. We know that Ukraine has a very large and developed agricultural sector. This is a sensitive issue for the European Union because a lot of money is allocated to agricultural producers. In addition, perhaps the most important factor is the war. Ukraine is currently at war. And until this war is over, I think it will be very difficult to make real progress towards European integration. It is not even clear from which territory Ukraine will enter the European Union. Therefore, Moldova has a better chance of joining earlier. Although this EU-Moldova summit, which took place last week, ended yesterday, it did not bring anything special. The parties simply confirmed their desire to cooperate so that Moldova can move forward on the path of European integration and so on. But there is nothing concrete.
Of course, it will be very important who will be in power in Moldova, because parliamentary elections will be held in the fall. If pro-Russian forces manage to win a majority in parliament, then, of course, the road to the European Union will be much slower, if Moldova does not even go backwards.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Today, by the way, the mayor of Chisinau was banned from entering the European Union for five years at the request of Romania. An official decision has been made to ban him from entering the European Union for five years. He is one of the leaders of the large opposition bloc “Alternative,” which includes Stanoglo, Sandu's former rival. On what grounds was this ban imposed? I mean, from a legal point of view? It seems to me that it is not entirely valid, right? Nevertheless, the official position, as stated by the Romanian Foreign Ministry, is that he poses a threat to Romania's national security. Accordingly, there is a general decision on the territory of the European Union. He has been banned from entering for five years. Mr. Cheban has now made a rather harsh statement on this matter. This is the latest news.
Back when I was a member of parliament in Ukraine, Ivan Cheban was a member of parliament in Moldova, and we worked together in Brussels in the Euronest delegation. At that time, he represented Moldova, and I represented Ukraine. I don't think he was particularly anti-European, so I see this as some kind of electoral tactic. 
Plamen Dimitrov: Well, it seems to me that with this move, the European Union, or Romania in particular, is simply showing who they recognize as pro-European forces in Moldova. 
Vitaly Barvinenko: On the other hand, it consolidates the pro-Russian electorate around one person, which was previously quite fragmented. But again, we will analyze events further, but this is the event of the last few hours. And it is quite a significant thing when the mayor of the capital is banned from entering the European Union for five years at the request of Romania. So, speaking of what will happen in September at the elections. I think that these elections in Moldova will also be very turbulent, just like the presidential elections.
Plamen Dimitrov: Yes, yes, of course, of course. And the Moldovan diaspora in Europe will be a serious deciding factor.
Trump's position on Ukraine: Unpredictability and Influence.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Mr. Dimitrov, one last question for you. How do you assess the change in Trump's position on Ukraine? Could it be sufficiently long-term in perspective? President Trump made some emotional statements yesterday and the day before yesterday. How much could this affect the US's future decision on providing military aid? What consequences could this change in course have for the war between Ukraine and Russia, and for Russia in particular?
Plamen Dimitrov: Well, I think that when we talk about Trump, all predictions are risky, of course. Everyone already understands that he does not have a consistent position on the Russian-Ukrainian war. He changes it often. Personal relationships are important to him, whether with Zelensky or Putin. The amplitude of these personal relationships is also very large. Trump's moods change very often. I'm not sure that he has completely fallen out of love with Putin, because in terms of mindset and management methods, he is closer to Trump than to Zelensky, it seems to me. He is a leader of a large country, an autocrat, a decisive person.
But, of course, Putin's stubbornness and unwillingness to engage in peace talks irritates Trump, because he has said many times, “I will make sure the war ends quickly,” but it is not ending. And this irritates Trump because he is being criticized: “Well, where is your peace? Nothing is working there.” And yet Trump has already realized that the main obstacle to peace is Russia's position. It's just that Russia is now in a better position on the front lines, and it doesn't want, it simply doesn't want any peace. But again, I don't think this will be Trump's last turn in relation to this war. We will see many more.
And in general, these shifts are the norm, rather than some kind of consistent line followed by the US administration. It should be borne in mind that there is also internal struggle between different lobbies within the Trump administration. For example, as we can see, the Department of Defense is most likely on Russia's side in this war (meaning that it is taking a more cautious position, which can be interpreted as less aggressive towards Russia), while at the same time Republicans in Congress are advocating for increased aid to Ukraine. But Trump still makes the final decisions. So everything depends on Trump's mood and everything depends on subjective factors, so to speak.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Thank you, dear friends. This is Vitaly Barvinenko from the Danube Research Institute. My guest was political scientist, renowned Bulgarian expert, and member of the Bulgarian geopolitical community, Mr. Plamen Dimitrov. Mr. Dimitrov, thank you for taking the time to join us on the air. Thank you.
Plamen Dimitrov: Thank you too.