Interview: Ruslan Aisin. Geopolitical Shifts in the Caucasus and Balkans, Turkey's Role, and the Palestinian Question

Ruslan Aisin – a Tatar activist, publicist, and political scientist, currently residing in Turkey.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Good afternoon, dear friends! This is Vitaliy Barvinenko and my YouTube channel. Today, my guest is Ruslan Aisin – a Tatar activist, publicist, and political scientist, currently residing in Turkey. Ruslan is known for his publications in various Tatarstan and Russian outlets as an expert on national issues and the status of Islam in Russia. I should note that the Russian Ministry of Justice considers him a foreign agent, a designation with which the publicist himself disagrees. Mr. Aisin, thank you for taking the time to join our broadcast. Thank you!

Ruslan Aisin: Thank you very much, Vitaliy, for inviting me. And I greet our esteemed viewers.

Azerbaijani Gas Supplies to Ukraine: The Decline of Russian Influence

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Ruslan, I have a few pressing questions for you regarding the current agenda, and then we'll discuss how Turkey's influence is spreading in the Balkans. But before that, Ruslan, information emerged this morning that Azerbaijani gas supplies to Ukraine have begun via the Trans-Balkan corridor, along the Romania-Ukraine route. What geopolitical consequences, in your opinion, will such a supply have? It's obvious that for Russia, above all, the gas issue is key – both in its foreign policy and in its ideological stances. If you recall, "Gazprom" was considered Russia's main non-military foreign policy instrument. In fact, at one point, the well-known Miller, who heads Gazprom's board of directors, stated that Gazprom's capitalization would soon reach 1 trillion dollars. But now, I've looked, and experts have provided interesting data: it turns out Gazprom is worth less in terms of capitalization than companies that deal with some funny toys, like Labubu, I think... everyone's going crazy over them right now.

Ruslan Aisin: Yes, Labubu, or Palucherashka, as everyone's obsessed with now. This speaks to the influence, or rather, the degree of Russia's influence. Therefore, another layer of understanding immediately opens up regarding the conflict between Azerbaijan and Russia. I understand that this issue was pre-agreed with the Azerbaijani side. Consequently, everything we've seen – these initial provocations and the killing of ethnic Azerbaijanis with Russian passports – is simply an element of this major geopolitical upheaval that has occurred. It's clear that Moscow was simply unprepared for it, because it's evident that Moscow is no longer capable of playing a "chess game" or a serious solitaire on the international stage. It's losing. It is, in fact, withdrawing from the South Caucasus. It effectively has no serious play in former Yugoslavia, the so-called Balkan Peninsula. We remember that the First World War actually began on the Balkan Peninsula. Even before the war, it was generally called the "powder keg of Europe." At that time, Moscow, under the pretext of defending its "Orthodox brethren," as we recall, began mobilization, to which the German Empire responded. And then a four-year slaughter unfolded that brought down four continental empires. And I think that now Russia – and Russia is no longer an empire, it's a degrading empire or a quasi-empire – faces the same challenge: will it fall apart or not? For it, the question is not whether it will strengthen its presence; its vector is the opposite: will it survive?

Turkey's Strategy in the Balkans: Economy and Soft Power

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Today, July 28th, exactly 111 years ago, the First World War began, on this very day. And you just recalled that episode. Please tell me, returning to the question I wanted to discuss today: the issue of Turkey and the Balkans. First question: to what extent does Turkey use economic instruments, such as investment and trade, to strengthen its influence in the Balkans? And in a broader sense, what is Turkey's current strategy regarding the Balkans?

Ruslan Aisin: Turkey, obviously, sees the Balkans as part of its future project. This doesn't necessarily involve territorial conquest, as some portray it, for example, in Russia. Power projection implies cultural soft power, and, as you correctly noted, economic and investment presence. Here, Turkey has certain advantages. Part of this territory was once part of the Ottoman Empire, and cultural, religious, and partly ethnic ties remain. Therefore, they will naturally enter through these channels. And through the economy, because Russia cannot fully enter for obvious reasons – it simply doesn't have the capabilities, and it's heavily burdened by sanctions. So, Turkey remains. I think that even the EU, by and large, is not strongly against Turkey entering, as long as it keeps Russia out. Plus, for the EU, in the current state of affairs, the Balkan Peninsula is too complex to simply take and digest right now, because Ukraine is knocking on the EU's door, and there's the looming potential war with Russia. It's clear that resources are needed for other fronts. Therefore, Turkey will enter. The region doesn't require serious capital investments, as we understand, because there are already decent industrial bases and centers. Plus, hypothetically speaking, the tourism sector can be developed there, which Turkey handles quite well, as well as certain agricultural endeavors. And, most importantly, housing construction. In Turkey, this sector is generally an economic driver. Here, the Turks, having learned from the Germans in the 1950s, are probably among the leaders on this large European continent. So, I think Turkey will continue to expand there, given its desire to firmly establish itself in the Mediterranean Sea. As we understand, there is competition there, primarily with the Greeks. And partly there was with the French, who allied with the Greeks. But now it seems Macron is proposing not to conflict with Turkey, but to coordinate their spheres of influence and interests.

Turkey's Balance Between the EU and NATO in the Balkans

Vitaliy Barvinenko: And how does Turkey balance its relations with the EU and NATO in the Balkans, given the tensions with some European countries?

Ruslan Aisin: By and large, the same Macron, whom I mentioned, once spoke of NATO's "brain death." This was a diagnosis implying that NATO would now represent a fragmented system. And that's exactly what's happening. You know about Trump's decision to withdraw the American military contingent from Europe – primarily Germany, where there are, I believe, 38,000 personnel. And then Poland, 15,000, I believe, and Italy, 10,000. There was some issue in Romania, something, I think, wasn't entirely clear, but in any case, this means that it is now very important for the European community to replace this contingent. And, as you know, senior German government members stated the need to involve the Turks in all of this, so that they would take an even more important place in the NATO bloc than they currently have. This refers to troop numbers, obviously. And it's also an attempt to position the Turks at the frontiers – primarily the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. Consequently, Turkey's influence will increase. If anyone is against it, well, it's hard to say. Again, the French are not ready to replace the Turks. The Germans, in principle, agree. I think Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states won't be strongly opposed either. So, most likely, Turkey will increase and strengthen its presence in the NATO bloc. Of course, many don't like this. Israel, above all, doesn't like this, but Israel is not a member of NATO or the European community, although its lobbying capabilities, as we know, are not the weakest.

Turkey's Role in Supporting Muslims in the Balkans: Ideology and Culture

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Please tell me, does Turkey's role in supporting Muslim communities in the Balkans – Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kosovo – hold significant importance in Turkey's overall strategy in the Balkans today, or are these more like cultural remnants? How do you assess this?

Ruslan Aisin: No, no, I think it has a very serious significance, primarily in Turkey's policy, because Turkey's policy, pragmatic as many consider it, still relies on a certain ideological foundation, primarily Islamic. At least, Erdoğan and his AK Party, which he leads, declare precisely these values. That is, it's an ideocratic principle. Yes, generally speaking, the ethnic composition is certainly not Turkic, but, for example, there are Turkic-speaking peoples in Macedonia. Of course, in Kosovo and Albania, they don't represent the Turkic world, but overall, they are part of the Islamic space, even if it's a bit complicated there. In Albania, there is a movement like the Bektashi. It has a somewhat isolated position in the Islamic world, but that doesn't hinder Turkey from working through them, because Turkey itself is quite a Sufi-oriented country, with these so-called orders, and it is through and by means of these that Turkey conducts its policy. Therefore, Turkey builds mosques there, actively establishes its cultural centers, like the Yunus Emre Institutes, everywhere. This is analogous to the Goethe-Institut in Germany or the Pushkin Institute, which promotes the Russian language from Africa to Latin America. The Turks also use this, and, it must be said, quite successfully and skillfully.

Recognition of Palestine: Humanitarian Crisis and European Self-Interest

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Let's turn to another topic that is stirring up the media space. A number of European countries have begun to mass-announce that they will, to varying degrees and at various times, recognize Palestine as an independent state. And today, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom announced that, despite Cabinet members being on leave until September 1st, he will hold an emergency meeting on this issue this week. Macron spoke out, as did the Prime Minister of Italy. How do you assess these statements? What are they related to, specifically at this time? And what consequences will this have?

Ruslan Aisin: The consequences will be far-reaching. Essentially, the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding there, of course, cannot be peripheral to the understanding of Europeans, especially European politicians. After all, despite criticism directed at Europe, Europe tries to maintain its primary humanistic dominance in its political, cultural, and other positions. And, simply put, the Palestinian issue can only be resolved through the creation of a full-fledged state. Everyone clearly understands that Netanyahu's policy has led the country to a dead end. And, in fact, it has led Israel to a dead end. And this is an unending slaughter. Everyone clearly understands that Netanyahu's goal is simply to retain his seat. Therefore, he will provoke these wars endlessly: Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Palestine, Syria. This is also the possibility of a clash with Turkey, because they are already threatening Turkey. Turkey, as we've already discussed, is a NATO member country. This means Europe will be directly involved in this conflict. Naturally, no one wants that. Plus, pro-Palestinian and, consequently, anti-Israeli sentiments are growing very significantly in Europe. This is also a factor that European politicians pay attention to, because these are their direct constituents. And I think that after France – and France is the first country from the G7 (including Canada, the USA, Germany, the UK) that has directly stated its recognition. The others have already recognized it – China and Russia, major powers. Consequently, after France, the others will probably follow. Plus, France, of course, wants to either seize this agenda or keep it as a close and friendly one. I recall that more than 200 years ago, Napoleon, who went to Egypt, addressed Muslims and said, "I appear before you as a friend of the three hundred million Muslim people." At that time, Muslims were considered 300 million. Macron is also not averse to this. Why not? After all, he needs to promote his successor in France, and the Muslim population there is significant, with pro-Palestinian sentiments exceeding 70%. Therefore, this means he also has an undeniable internal political interest.

The Zangezur Corridor: A New Geopolitical Hotspot

Vitaliy Barvinenko: The next question I'd like to discuss with you is, in my opinion, a very interesting development over the last month, at least, surrounding the Zangezur Corridor. This, I remind our viewers, is a corridor from Azerbaijan to Azerbaijan through Armenian territory. So, a month ago, an article first appeared in the Carnegie Endowment publication stating that Americans want to lease operational activities in this corridor. Then many experts said it was fake. Then the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey stated that they want to lease these 32 kilometers for 100 years. Later, Prime Minister Pashinyan confirmed that there had been such an appeal from the United States of America. Then Trump stated that he participated in stopping the situation around Karabakh. And all of this began to unfold. If before this, the Zangezur Corridor was mostly a matter between two countries, in the last three weeks it has begun to acquire a rather large geopolitical significance, as we see from the statements being made. And one of the Iranian leaders, presidential aide Velayati, stated that the Zangezur Corridor is a U.S. project aimed against Iran and Russia simultaneously. Please tell me, how do you generally assess this raising – I won't say the temperature – but raising, perhaps, the geopolitical importance of this Zangezur Corridor, with key players, including the United States of America, engaging in heated discussions: lease or no lease, operating company or no operating company? In parallel, there's the statement from one of Iran's leaders that it's, so to speak, a challenge to two friendly countries, Russia and Iran, which itself sounds quite interesting, to say the least. And why is Iran actively opposing the opening of this corridor, and how is this connected to Tehran's political interests? And in general, what is currently happening around this story?

Ruslan Aisin: You are right that Zangezur has important strategic significance. It's only a small stretch of road, 32 kilometers are in question. But it breaks the previous construction. Why did everyone get so excited? Because the status quo, which existed, suited everyone. It suited Russia, it suited Armenia, it suited Iran, it suited the West. Everyone, except for Azerbaijan, of course, and Turkey. And even China wasn't entirely pleased, because through Zangezur, one of the branches of the Silk Road, "One Belt, One Road," is planned – a direct route that, in general, will unhinderedly deliver goods to Europe, as planned. But let me deviate a little, if you allow.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Yes, of course.

Ruslan Aisin: Trump met with Ursula von der Leyen, and they seemingly agreed on something. Well, I'm very skeptical about all of this, because Trump agrees with everyone, and then it all goes to hell. And before that, if you remember, there was a series of devastating articles in the Western press that China and Europe simply fell out, that there was no more friendship. So, obviously, all this was prepared for the meeting with Trump, to please Trump, he probably got this digest, read it in full excitement. "Well, yes, everything's going well." But in reality, it's not like that, because Europe is now interested in cooperating with China, and China is interested in cooperating with Europe. And Zangezur occupies a certain important interstice between them. If you remember, that notorious summit that took place in Samarkand, with the participation of key EU officials and, in fact, the leaders of Central Asian states. And, you see, everything is changing, the geopolitical structure, right? And, of course, the main players, first of all, Russia and Iran, they are formally disadvantaged here, because one way or another, Iran, being a strong player, naturally influenced Tajikistan, and one way or another Uzbekistan, through its cultural aspect. No one denies strong Iranian influence. Well, and Russia, accordingly, from the north. Now everything has changed. That is, a Turkic world is forming, one way or another, which, if not directly hostile to Russia, then, well, is not its subordinate link, as it used to be. This does not suit Iran. That is why such talks have begun. As for Velayati's statement, well, he is quite an intelligent person. I participated with him at a conference in Tehran. He is Khamenei's advisor now. And, in fact, I see another point. Before that, just a day earlier, Iranian President Pezshkian stated that our strategic partners are Turkey and Azerbaijan, actually. And then Velayati comes out and says absolute nonsense that Zangezur is a project designed to encircle Iran and Russia. How is that even geopolitically, geographically possible? And here, it seems, there is also internal struggle, because the President of Iran always, in their power structure, claims and fights for foreign policy. They take it away from the president, especially powerful figures like Velayati, and he, as it were, pulls away, he also wants to be president of the country, not just deal with road construction and ribbon cutting. So, there are two aspects. First, it means that the leading players are upset that the situation is changing not in their favor, and second, there is internal political struggle in Iran itself. And what else is important is that another advisor to Khamenei, I don't remember who exactly, but on military-political affairs, flew to Moscow, where he met with Putin. Well, officially he, as it were, gave him a note of protest, saying "you, you scoundrel, didn't support us." But I think they also discussed this, and possibly Putin asked Iran to voice these issues. Well, Putin won't talk about Zangezur, will he? He's dividing the world, you know, and here's a little matchbox, Zangezur. So, I see three reasons.

Scenarios for Development and Risks for Russia in the South Caucasus

Vitaliy Barvinenko: And what, in your opinion, are the possible scenarios for the development of events around this corridor in the near future? How do you see the resolution of this issue?

Ruslan Aisin: Well, you know, I do not rule out military action. I do not rule out military action, because this region is too heated. And you know that very tragic events are taking place in Syria. And in principle, Netanyahu's cabinet does not rule out the partition of Syria, and Turkey has stated: "If there is an attempt to partition Syria, we will intervene." So there you have it, war. Accordingly, this involves the Kurds; the Kurds will rise up. There are Kurds in Azerbaijan, by the way, not insignificant numbers, and in Iran. And there you have it, all this can unfold like dominoes. Plus, most likely, Russia will be directly interested in this conflict, because it will, firstly, distract attention from Ukraine, and secondly, as a still major, serious player, it will have the opportunity to exert pressure and, in fact, have a negotiating position with Trump. "Look, I'm stirring things up here, and you claim to be a peacemaker." Now try to extinguish the conflict.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Trump stated today, to your words, that recently, an hour ago, he had already stopped six wars in the world during this period. This included, in 24 hours, the war between Buj, yes, and Thailand, and he mentioned Armenia, Azerbaijan, and, so to speak, some other potential wars. So the man truly lives in his own world. Tell me, please, does Russia understand that it is losing the South Caucasus, or not?

Ruslan Aisin: It understands. I think that first and foremost, the segment of the Russian political establishment that is directly connected with foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, naturally understands. And, you know, perhaps you've noticed, they've recorded very cautious statements from the Foreign Ministry, from Zakharova. That is, they understand perfectly well that one can make a lot of mistakes. But Putin and the security forces around him, they, of course, proceed from the fact that they are oprichniks, we will break, wring necks, and generally, any subtle schemes are not our business. "Now we will show everyone our fist, and everyone should scatter." But that's not how it works, actually. Therefore, Russia's policy in this regard is very strange. Very strange. That is, from the point of view of strategy, it is clear that this is a loss. But how could an empire allow such a thing? I am not trying to whitewash it. I am just trying to understand, right. An empire that has colossal experience and a foreign policy school simply takes and gives everything away like that. Well, I believe that this is simply complete collapse and complete degradation in all areas. The main thing that pulls and holds all this space together is the power resource. That's all. Everything else is a complete collapse. Nothing works. All they can do is forbid. The Internet. Now they will forbid the Internet, right. And today, the airport's website was hacked, its entire database, the whole system is down. So, you see, it was clear that these are key strategic facilities, and they should be protected first and foremost. But since the power system in Russia simply forbids and takes away businesses, naturally, it will not engage in such subtle spheres. So I think this degradation will continue. It takes a lot of effort, as Markov, you know, a pro-Kremlin deputy, said: "It takes a lot of effort to quarrel with both Armenia and Azerbaijan at the same time."

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Last question. There's an understanding that Azerbaijan is becoming a regional leader, a rather independent player. This is understood, as you rightly said, by a part of the Russian political establishment. Isn't there also a desire – yes, I think there is – but won't Russia cross that line and simply ignite this region once again? And what will deter Russia from these actions?

Ruslan Aisin: What might be deterring Russia, or rather, what might be deterring Russia from wanting to ignite this region, is the war with Ukraine. If the war is put on pause, I am more than convinced that Russia will go to the Caucasus unequivocally. Because there is an understanding that the Caucasus underpins this space, right? Well, they fought for the Caucasus for centuries, not just for nothing. In fact, even such high-profile liberals and opposition figures as Mikhail Khodorkovsky say that if the Caucasus separates, then "we will take up rifles, weapons, and go to defend it, because our grandfathers fought for it." So, this mindset doesn't go away. Ukraine is the same for them, and the Caucasus is the same. Accordingly, letting go of the Caucasus is simply unthinkable. How can one let go of Armenia, which has always been a springboard for imperial policy in the territory? No, that is, it is simply unimaginable, they cannot even imagine how it could happen. They say: "We fed, we fed this huge Armenian diaspora. Armenians hold key positions in the Russian leadership, in the media, especially in the banking sector, and so on and so forth. And then suddenly they leave for the Turks, who are their blood enemies, whom they accuse of the alleged Armenian genocide." That is, it doesn't fit into anyone's head yet, but the reality is such that it could happen. The only way out is, of course, to go to war. The other question is to what extent, for example, Turkey is ready to fight Russia. I cannot say here, because Turkey itself has many problems, as you understand, all around its perimeter. And we discussed the Balkans, that is, the south and Syria, where it needs to hold a bridgehead. There are internal problems, and one way or another, Ukraine, the Black Sea, and so on.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Thank you. 111 years ago, as I said, the First World War began, and one of the leaders at the time said that it would be a war to end all wars. Unfortunately, that didn't happen. And today, we are again discussing, among other things, existing potential wars. To our great regret, dear friends. This was Vitaliy Barvinenko, and my guest was the well-known expert-orientalist, editor, and host of the YouTube channel "Poistine" Ruslan Aisin. Ruslan, thank you for finding the time to join our broadcast. Thank you!