Interview: Sławomir Majman. THE POLISH-UKRAINIAN CRISIS AND WAYS TO RESOLVE IT

Slawomir Maiman, Deputy Director of the Institute for Security and International Development in Warsaw (Poland).

Hello, dear friends. This is Vitaly Barvinenko, Institute of Danube Research. I have with me a well-known expert, Deputy Director of the Institute for Foreign Policy and Security in Warsaw, Mr. Slawomir Maiman. Mr. Maiman, welcome to our YouTube channel.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Dear Mr. Maiman, the first question I would like to ask is about President Duda's statement that in case of some events, which he did not describe clearly enough, he may order to close the airport in Rzeszów, through which military cargoes go to Ukraine. Ukraine and a number of other countries believe that this is actually their airport, which they operate. How do you assess this statement? What was it made in connection with and can it change the logistics of support for Ukraine at all and affect, I guess, Ukrainian-Polish relations? How do you assess this statement?
Slawomir Maiman: Well, I would say that this statement by President Duda, who is already finishing his term in August and will no longer be president, is quite harsh. I will remind you that President Duda said: western partners and Ukrainians forget that this is a Polish airport. If something goes wrong, the Rzeszów airport will be closed for repairs, because this is the right of the owners of this airport from the Polish state. Why the suddenness of such an announcement? Because until now, three years since the beginning of the Russian aggression, Rzeszów's Jasienka airport has been the main center for logistics of military equipment from the West, primarily from the United States, to Ukraine. This is, I think, the result of President Duda's frustration, yes, not only President Duda in Poland, with this attitude of what he sees as disregard for Poland and for what Poland is doing for Ukraine. Despite Duda's very warm farewell visit to Kyiv a week ago, where he met with Zelensky and received a major state award from Ukraine, the last few months have been a period when the Polish side felt unappreciated by its Ukrainian partners. There was a dialog between Ukraine and Western countries, and the biggest part of this dialog, except for one meeting in Kiev, when Prime Minister Tusk arrived, was without Poland. With the Germans - yes, with the French - yes, with the United States - yes. Poland somehow disappeared from the Ukrainian government's horizon. This was very painfully accepted, as we hear, first of all by the Polish president. This is as far as Ukraine is concerned. Almost two years ago we heard very sharp predictions of the Ukrainian president about Poland. The role of Poland, which was very large, first of all in the very initial period of the war, is a bit unclear. When the Germans got involved, other countries got involved, this Polish role was somehow forgotten in Kiev.
And as for the West, all the recent meetings that took place there in Paris, in London, in other Western cities, in other capitals, with the participation of the Americans, with the participation of the main European countries - all these meetings were held without Poland. That's why Duda found it possible to say: "Well, if you don't need us, then you don't need this airport, through which 90% of military aid passes. If you don't need the airport, we can close it, it's exhausted, it needs repairs." This, I realize, the president's statement is a little bit sudden, but as a result of such a very strong upset. And let's just say that I think the Ukrainian side has gone too far in this underestimation of the role of the Polish ally. We will remind you that most of the military aid goes through the Polish airport. Another part, about 20% of this logistics of military equipment, goes through the Polish port of Gdynia. That is, if there were not this logistical assistance from the Polish side, there would be no military equipment in Ukraine, simply and simply.
Vitaly Barvinenko: And, excuse me, I will continue the logic, if I may. If there is no military equipment in Ukraine, where will be the Russian-German and Russian-Polish border?
Slawomir Maiman: You know, I don't take it seriously that the Polish side will cover these two main, sea and air, routes into Ukraine. This, I think, is just a signal, such a very strong diplomatic, I would say, more than diplomatic, non-diplomatic signal from the Polish side. "Guys, we are friends, well, please give us respect. We are not tired of hearing that we supply less military equipment than the Germans and the Americans, because our main role in Poland now is the most significant logistical assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine."
Vitaly Barvinenko: Continuation of this topic. The president of the country, no matter if he leaves in two months, a week or three years, it is the president of the country who, understandably, makes a statement, assessing these or those real opportunities, these or those real risks. And it is not just a politician from the parliament who voiced it. Are any plans to repair this airport really ready, and have the risks been calculated? We stopped this airport to provide assistance to Ukraine. What's next?
Slavomir Maiman: Well, you know, after three years of very intensive operation of the airport, which is not a military airport, it's an ordinary civilian airport, of course, it's not in the best condition, and it could use some repairs. Well, here I don't think it's a serious threat. It's just an observation. Look, you, dear friends in Kiev, please be kind enough to treat us with the same respect as other Western powers.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Thank you. Also, Duda made harsh statements about difficult historical situations. These are the OUN-UPA, the Volyn tragedy. These words can affect the historical dialog between Poland and Ukraine. Today the Ukrainian Embassy in Poland made a statement that two meetings of historians and experts have already been held there, and the dialog continues. How do you assess how much this may affect the established historical dialog?
Slawomir Maiman: First of all, I don't consider it a historical dialog. That's one. Secondly, what President Duda said about President Duda, he was referring to the ideological legacy of OUN-UPA, Bandera's ideology, its influence on the modern political life of Ukraine. This is nothing compared to what the next Polish president, Mr. Nawrocki, who publicly signed a pledge that Poland would never agree to Ukraine becoming a member of the European Union unless Ukraine pays for the dark pages of its history. Why is this not a historical question? We have not raised this issue, first of all the Volyn genocide, for the last three years, because there was a war, but also because we decided that Polish-Ukrainian relations are now at a completely different level than before the war. And on the Ukrainian side there will be some new realization that something has to be done about something that concerns not only the Polish presidents, Navrocki, Duda, or Polish nationalists, or Polish right-wingers, but in general the majority of the Polish public.
First of all, it is incomprehensible to us how it can be that the new pantheon of Ukraine includes such people as Bandera and Shukhevych - extreme nationalists, associates of Hitler. Duda said that he believes that most Ukrainians do not take positively to the fact that streets and squares in Ukraine are being renamed to streets and squares of Shukhevych and Bandera, because most Ukrainians do not know what the essence of this terrible ideology of Ukrainian nationalism is. That for most Ukrainians these are just people who fought for the independence of Ukraine with the Soviet Union. Well, so much for the fact that these were people who were simply associates of fascism, people who, personally Shukhevych, gave the command to the Volyn holocaust, that is, the murder of almost 200,000 Polish Christians, just because they were Poles. The only reason. Well, for us this is unacceptable. Even a few years ago, Jaroslaw Kaczynski said: "You will not enter the European Union with Bandera." And now that we have not waited for any gestures from the Ukrainian side, this is repeated almost by the entire political environment of Poland. One more thing, why this is not a historical issue: because what may seem the simplest thing from our point of view, i.e. burying the victims of the Volyn massacre, the Ukrainian government has not agreed to this for many years. They allowed to bury SS men, but they do not allow to bury Polish Christians. And this is completely incomprehensible in Warsaw. I repeat once again, this is not a historical issue, it is a current issue. That is, it is very difficult to establish relations when we know that there are Poles, mostly children and women, lying unburied there. It is very difficult to establish relations. If almost the main element of the ideology of the new Ukrainian nation, which is now being formed during the war, is Banderism. This is simply incomprehensible to us.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Mr. Maiman, thank you for your answer. And for your position. Tell me, please, you mentioned Karol Nawrocki, the elected president of Poland. He is known for his kind of conservative anti-migrant rhetoric. Tell me, please, what do you think was the key factor in his victory?
Slawomir Maiman: Well, you know, nobody expected that Navrotski would win the presidential election. Nobody knew about him before the elections. The director of the Institute of National Memory is a non-governmental figure.
Vitaly Barvinenko: That's why I asked this question. What happened? How do you assess it now, in retrospect?
Slawomir Maiman: Jaroslaw Kaczynski's instinct that he decided that Navrotsky would be a good candidate did not fail once again. Ten years ago he turned his attention to Andrzej Duda, one of many MEPs, and it turned out he made a statesman, twice elected president. Now his eye has not failed him in the case of Nawrocki. Why did he become president? Well, first of all, because the candidate of the Liberals and Democrats, Mr. Trzaskowski, is not that strong. He is a very cultured, very civilized politician, but, well, let's just say that there was once a definition of a "soft-bodied intellectual," and he is a soft-bodied intellectual. That's one. Secondly, he lost because people are fed up with Donald Tusk's government. Donald Tusk almost personally created a coalition and won a landslide victory in October 2023. Well, then the government he created didn't work. Failed ministers and deputy ministers, there's 100 of them there in general deputy ministers. The coalition nature of this government, where, if you do the math, there are 13 different political parties from the extreme conservative to the left, and they could not agree with each other. The fact that none or almost none of these projects that he promised during the election campaign in the twenty-third came true. This government the majority of Poles, especially the young Poles, were fed up with it.
Third, Nawrocki and other right-wing candidates, even more right-wing than Nawrocki - the Confederates and a certain Mr. Brown, whose dream is to crown Jesus Christ as king of Poland - they collected 70% of the votes of the 19-28 year olds. That is, the youth went after these most right-wing candidates, who were among these thirteen candidates who were trying to become president of Poland. Not because the Polish youth turned out to be somehow extremely conservative. They just wanted candidates who were somehow different from the crowd. Nawrocki, the Confederates, well, actually different. They were so... Well, if this same candidate Trzaskowski was always talking, traveling around the country, talking about democracy, Nawrocki was talking about Poland and the people, the nationality. That's, I think, the third reason why he became president of Poland. Completely unexpectedly. And fourth, of course, nationalism. Of course, nationalism, and that nationalism played out. And finally, you would think that these pro-Western liberals and democrats should do well in the modern media, but it turns out that the extreme right-wingers on the Internet are the czars. That's why we have a new president who is an even more extreme conservative and nationalist compared to Duda.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Tell me, and in general, this global growth of conservative movements, starting from Trump, which went further in many countries, this influence of this growth of global trend could have somehow influenced the fact that Navrotsky got such a result, or you don't see a parallel between the processes that were in the U.S. and the election of Navrotsky?
Slawomir Maiman: I am not at all convinced that it is Navrotski, his victory and the victory of the right in general that is the result of some Polish version of Trumpism. Of course, Nawrocki went to Washington, he was photographed there in the White House with Trump. Trump wished him well there, but that's not the deciding factor. We have a very difficult case with Trumpism and support for Trump, because Justice, which is our right-wing party, supports Trump, but does not support his policy towards Russia at all. So it's hard for our right-wingers, isn't it?
Vitaly Barvinenko: It's a bit hard for them, yes. For the right-wingers, yes.
Slawomir Maiman: Our right-wingers are for Ukraine and against Russia. So it's kind of hard for them to love Trump. It's a difficult love. So I don't think the decisive factor was that the United States has Trump or Italy has Giorgia Meloni. I would say that those results, which may indicate a certain shift to the right in Poland, are the result of our internal problems.
Vitaly Barvinenko: There is a risk, as we can see, after Duda's statement, after understanding, probably, some general understanding of what Navrotsky's policy will be. It is clear that everything is going towards the cooling of Poland's relations with Ukraine and, accordingly, with the European Union. Please, tell me, what steps should be taken by the two sides in order to balance national interests, international obligations, and so that Poland does not go the way of Hungary in relation to Ukraine? What mutual decisions should be taken?
Slawomir Maiman: You know, we are talking about Nawrocki, who is an enemy of the European Union in general, we are talking about people who are Euroskeptics. Well, here is the role of the president of the republic in Poland is very limited. Policy is led by the government. Mr. Tusk's government is a pro-European government, one of the most pro-European governments in Europe. True, it is in such a state after these presidential elections, like, I don't know, like Napoleon's troops returning from Moscow in the winter of 1812, rubbed.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Ragged. Yes, yes.
Slavomir Maiman: But these elections, this defeat led to some internal splits, disputes. I mean, despite everything that's going on, the Hungarian way is not the Polish way. Donald Tusk is not the Orban way. Donald Tusk is not Fitzo. It's true that support for the European Union is declining in Poland. It was the highest in Europe. Now, well, it's a little bit lower. And that is, most Poles realize that this huge jump in the standard of living, in the level of economic development, which we made after 2004, that is, after joining the European Union, this huge jump is largely due to the fact that we were good, we are good members of the European Union, we receive funds from the European Union. Well, any fool can get money from Brussels. Well, here in Poland, despite which government, right, left, red, yellow, checkered, all these governments have managed to make good use of these funds received from the European Union. This is now probably the last year that we are getting this money. Now we will have to pay others, but still, the fact that the standard of living in Poland, I read these statistics with bewilderment, the standard of living in Poland after these 20-odd years has become higher than the standard of living in Japan. Well, I, well, I would, if somebody had told me 15 years ago, I would have sent him to the madhouse.
Vitaly Barvinenko: And yet support for the EU is falling among the population.
Slawomir Maiman: It's falling, yes, it's falling, it's falling, because still in Poland they also notice, not as sharply as Orban, that on the one hand the EU is a kind of talk, where it's very difficult to make any decisions. On the other hand, there is a feeling that the EU is interfering in matters where it should not interfere, which should be the prerogative of local politics. And, well, and finally, what we have had in recent years, which is this wave of suspicion of Germans, that the EU is an organization that is hugely influenced by Berlin. Those who dislike Donald Tusk's government reproach him for being on the dole from the Germans and so on. This role of one power in the European Union is not to everyone's liking.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Well, we can rephrase it in such a way that the general background or, maybe, cynically, that we got what we could financially, now it's time to give back, so we don't need the EU.
Slawomir Maiman: No, people don't think that way. Well, there are, of course, politicians who are extreme right-wing politicians, let's say the Confederates. So this is the party that is to the right of the right, right?
Vitaly Barvinenko: To the right, well, to the right of the right, yes.
Slavomir Maiman: Well, it's the party of the youth, by the way, because it's a right-wing party with an extremely liberal economic program. That's what young people like. Well, there's no such sentiment. "They got the money well, they distributed it well." No, because the second generation is growing up now, which cannot imagine life without the European Union, despite all the difficulties, without the Schengen zone, without freedom of movement, without freedom of labor, without all these benefits associated with membership in the European Union.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Well, it's like air, as long as we have it, we don't feel it. When there is not enough air, we begin to realize that something is missing. So, the blessings you mentioned... it seems to me that the ones that are not very satisfied with that, just led to it as air free movement, everything else. 
Slavomir Maiman: You know, well, not everybody is an enthusiast of these boons like LGBT freedom and equality. Not everybody likes that, even in the younger generation. And when intellectually the EU is associated with these leftist, leftist agenda, notions, yes, I think it probably reduces the support for the EU in Poland to a certain extent. We are still, I didn't say, I can't say that we are a right-wing nation, but we are a slightly conservative nation, and this should not be attributed to the influence of the Catholic Church, which is falling, but somehow to the Polish mentality. We are still more conservative, say, than Germans, Czechs and our other neighbors.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Mr. Maiman, the closure of the Polish-German border due to the influx of illegal migrants is controversial. How does this measure reflect Poland's current migration policy, what consequences can it have for relations with Germany and the EU?
Slawomir Maiman: Well, you know, even before the border was covered, the government, the liberal government of Tusk, started to pursue a rather right-wing migration policy: ending the right of asylum for migrants. These are, well, rather drastic steps, not related to liberalism at all. And this was done more than a year ago, back when there was an outbreak of this hybrid war with Belarus, when Lukashenko was moving thousands of illegal immigrants into Poland. Now, that was canceled, of course, liberal left circles resisted. Well, for example, Tusk canceled the right of asylum in Poland. What happened now? The wave of refugees has diminished, but the right-wing, namely Law and Justice and the Confederates, have started a clamor that because the Polish government is somehow subordinate to Berlin, the Polish authorities agree to the German police cramming refugees from Germany into Poland. And that it is a matter of national pride not to allow the Germans such acts. The right-wingers have created something, I don't know how to say it, people's militias of some kind, vigilantes.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Druzhynniki, druzhynniki, yes.
Slawomir Maiman: Which thousands of these vigilantes stood, yes, and they stand on the Polish-German border and do, well, impossible things. I mean, people like you and me checking documents, inspecting cars and so on. Well, and then the government again, Tusk, showed itself as reactive, that is, it did what the right-wing demanded: it covered the border, it covered the Polish-German border. Well, there was no way to reach an agreement with the Germans, whose new immigration policy was to cram everyone without documents back to where they came from. That is, they came through Poland and went to Germany. Well, it was decided that we would cover the border there, and then we put almost 1000 border guards on the border, and so far we have caught four emigrants from Iraq. But this has not reduced the tension, because the right-wingers, these militias, these vigilantes, stand there almost every day, almost half of the Sejm goes there to check what the border guards are doing. Well, today I talked to representatives of government supporters who say: "Well, excuse me, guys, why do we pay the police? Why don't we send three squads of guys over there and have them disperse these illegal vigilantes?" But the government is afraid.
Vitaly Barvinenko: It's such a big popular pastime, I understand. The vigilantes, they consider themselves participants in the process of saving the country from some Iraqis. 
Slavomir Maiman: These are vigilantes who have appointed themselves vigilantes. I'm telling you they want to be involved in something. It's a dangerous thing. The other thing with the fact that we have covered the Lithuanian border. That is, the current government has created, well, 99% effective barriers and crossed the traffic from Belarus to Poland. Therefore, those who want to somehow cross from Asia to Poland, go to Latvia and Lithuania, where there are forests and it is somehow easier to get here. And that's why they decided to cover this border. Although it should be honestly said that Lukashenko suspended this pressure on the Polish border. Some say that because when President Duda went to Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping likes him very much from the first time they met, and asked Xi Jinping to talk to him, to influence Lukashenko to stop this inconvenient for the Polish authorities flow of immigrants.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Mr. Maiman, for some reason nobody commented on this in Ukraine. So, a small amount of news went viral, but for some reason not official bloggers, it is to say, not pro-government ones. No one is commenting on the situation. The meeting between Kellogg and Lukashenko, which was, I think you've been following it too , it was a six-hour meeting, six-hour conversation. After that, one of the former opposition leaders, Tikhanovsky, was released. And how do you assess Kellogg's visit and this legitimization of Lukashenko in general?
Slavomir Maiman: You know, Lukashenko has always flirted with the West from time to time. That is, he had such moments when he decided that he would start pursuing a multi-vector policy. I myself remember once, I don't know, about 10-12 years ago, we started traveling to Minsk. Lukashenko and his ministers welcomed us very warmly. I remember our chairman of the Polish Senate, who came back to Warsaw, said that he was a very warm, good person. And the West also flirts with Lukashenko from time to time. Now, of course, it is more difficult for Lukashenko, although he is such a horny Belarusian, but still the war has led to the fact that he is more dependent on the Russians than before the Russian aggression. Well, he's still trying this dialog. Kellogg's dialog with Lukashenko has led to the release of 14 people so far. It's certainly good that people are out of jail. I think that this dialog is not over. It does not change the essence of Lukashenko's regime, yes. Well, and he is now getting the Americans to lift some duties and ban some products of the Belarusian chemical industry so that they can be sold in the West. Again, I think he'll be allowed to do that. Then he will go to the Kremlin with a victory and everything will start to go round and round.
Vitaly Barvinenko: But there was a legitimization of Lukashenko, because when Kellogg's message was official, he didn't just write "Alexander Lukashenko", but "President Lukashenko". We can say that the situation with the last presidential election has been forgotten. In fact, he is legitimized formally, isn't he?
Slavomir Maiman: First of all, an official representative of the president of the United States spoke to him, not only a retired general, it's an official. That's the first element of this, as you say, legitimization of Lukashenko. Secondly, I think one element of Trump's kind of realpolitik is to recognize that Lukashenko is actually the president of Belarus because he holds the executive power in the country. Third, I am afraid that the White House, Washington does not notice Belarusian emigrants. We see them here, in Poland, although it is more and more difficult to put these groups, different groups of Belarusian emigrants at the same table, because they have argued among themselves and very seriously argued among themselves. It is such a fate of emigrants who, the further the prospect of returning home gets, the more and more they argue among themselves, yes, the more governments in exile they create.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Yes, yes, yes. It was already at the beginning of the last century with white emigration.
Slavomir Maiman: One group in Vilnius, another group in Warsaw, a third group in Berlin. To put them... I tried at one of the conferences this year to put three Belarusian leaders at one conference table. It didn't work. It didn't work. They almost fought.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Also a good illustration of the real situation in the opposition.
Slawomir Maiman: Well, it was the same, it was the same with Russian emigration, Polish migration after World War II. That there were almost 50 political parties among the emigration in London. 
Vitaly Barvinenko: One last question. How do you assess the last two weeks of events? Trump-Putin negotiations, Trump-Zelensky. In general, the case of the Ukrainian-Russian war at what stage do you think it is now, and Trump's position? Is he washing his hands, is he admitting that this is a much more complicated issue than he imagined, or does he still have some ephemeral plan?
SLAVOMIR MAYMAN: You know, Trump has had six talks with Putin so far, and you have to give him credit that unlike Biden and the European Democrats who did nothing to end the war or negotiate a cease-fire, Trump is trying. He was actually hoping that this would be the end of the war between Russia and Ukraine, the end of aggression. It would be one of the excuses for him to be awarded the Nobel Prize. He's dreaming about it. Obama got it, then why not me? True, I don't know why Obama got it either, but that's another matter. And I think that Trump expected that the common interests between Russia and the United States, not related to Ukraine, Iran, the Middle East, weapons proliferation, all that stuff, that these common interests between Americans and Russians would lead to Putin listening to him. But it turns out it didn't. And Ukraine, Europe, are not any political, global priorities for the Trump administration. For them, of course, the Pacific Ocean, the Middle East and so on are 100 times more important. So Ukraine is not a priority. It was a pretext to make a deal with Putin. One more thing. The Americans have a wonderful tradition. In general, big powers have such a beautiful tradition that it is very easy for them, that it is the easiest for them to come to an agreement with other powers. That is, Americans have always fallen in love with Russians: in the beginning with Lenin, then with Ankle Joe, then there was Gorbamania.
Vitaly Barvinenko: And Khrushchev-Kennedy, too.
Slawomir Maiman: Yes, and Khrushchev-Kennedy, yes, that's right. And it's easier for Americans to talk to a country like, well, let's say, a former power like Russia than it is to talk to such small points on the map of Europe, I don't know, some Bulgaria, Romania and Belgium, yeah, they understand each other, because the mentality of Russians and Americans in the field of politics is similar. That's, I think, another reason for Trump to maintain dialog with Putin. Will maintain dialog with Putin, even though he is very annoyed by what Putin is doing now in Ukraine.
Vitaly Barvinenko: Thank you for your answer. Such also about Trump and the point on the map. He sent a letter yesterday to Maya Sandu, President Trump, where he introduced twenty-five percent duties and he wrote this text that I am deeply respectful and deeply happy to inform you that here we are in Moldova introduced 25% duties. And I asked my colleagues, parliamentarians from Moldova, I specially dialed them today and I said, please tell me, what kind of trade turnover and what goods Moldova sends to Poland to be sanctioned? And they said that there is only one company that supplies something there, some nuts, something unclear. And in general, so to speak, well, to Moldova's great regret, they have no trade turnover. So this is a kind of ritual letter. And I think that also this colleague of mine replied to me, saying, "Well, it's very good, because Maya Sandu can now write a letter to Trump, and he will know that there is Moldova." So everyone has their own resonances for answering these questions.
Slavomir Maiman: Maia Sandu herself is Moldova's best export.
Vital Barvinenko: Yes. Thank you, dear friends, dear viewers. Today I had as my guest a well-known expert, deputy director of the Foreign Policy and Security Institute in Warsaw, Mr. Slawomir Maiman. Watch us. Read on the website, watch the YouTube channel, subscribe. Mr. Maiman, thank you for an interesting conversation.
Mr. Slawomir Maiman: Cheers. Thank you.