Interview with Petru Macovei, Head of the Moldovan Media Association

Petru Macovei, Head of the Moldovan Media Association

The “Democracy at Home” phenomenon and Vasile Costiuc

Vitalii Barvinenko: Mr. Macovei, many were surprised by the entry of the “Democracy at Home” party led by Vasile Costiuc into parliament. How do you explain this phenomenon?

Petru Macovei: Honestly, even seasoned experts were shocked. A political force that previously had almost no visible presence suddenly secured over 6% of the vote. This was not the result of internal work or the leader’s charisma. Costiuc has never been a popular politician; he remained in the shadows for years. What we are seeing is the result of external political technologies.

Firstly, the party was actively supported by George Simion, the leader of Romania’s AUR party — a radical, pro-Russian structure banned in Ukraine and Moldova. Secondly, they massively exploited TikTok and other social media platforms, targeting younger audiences with aggressive algorithms. Thirdly, the diaspora was mobilized effectively, especially through church networks in Western Europe.

All of this combined produced the “Costiuc phenomenon.” I would argue this is not a genuine political party, but rather a project promoted by outside influence centers, successfully inserted into parliament.

The role of mayors’ parties: Usatîi and “Alternativa”

V.B.: How should we assess the performance of the so-called mayors’ parties – Renato Usatîi’s group and “Alternativa”? Are they pro-Russian?

P.M.: These are two different cases. Renato Usatîi used to be a flamboyant populist, but his influence is clearly waning. In Bălți, his stronghold, his results are now far weaker than in the past. He is no longer the threat he represented in 2015–2016.

As for “Alternativa”, the case is more complex. Formally, they present themselves as “pro-European.” But if we look at their composition, it tells a different story. Figures like Mark Tkaciuk, the architect of the Kozak Plan, and former prosecutor general Alexandr Stoianoglo, who was supported by pro-Russian forces, are part of it. So, in reality, we are dealing with a hybrid project: European slogans on the surface, but pro-Russian cadres within. Therefore, I would not expect a genuine pro-European policy from them.

The defeat of the “Patriotic Bloc”

V.B.: Polls predicted the “Patriotic Bloc” would secure over 30%, but they ended up with 24%. Why such a discrepancy?

P.M.: There are several reasons. First, there was very high voter mobilization, especially in urban areas. Citizens did not want to return to the old schemes and corrupt leaders. Second, the “Patriotic Bloc” committed serious mistakes.

Think about the scandals: Dodon’s “bag of money” or Tkaciuk’s public statements endorsing the Kozak Plan. These repelled voters. They assumed PAS had lost support and that power would fall into their lap. But they underestimated people’s desire for stability and a European course. In the end, many who were not enthusiastic PAS supporters still voted for them as the pragmatic choice.

Prospects for pro-European forces

V.B.: PAS has won another mandate. But is there room for alternative pro-European forces to emerge?

P.M.: This is a crucial question. Democracy cannot be sustained by a single party. Yes, PAS is now the main driver of Moldova’s EU integration. But in the future, once Maia Sandu completes her mandate, the question will arise: who next?

Unfortunately, we have seen that other parties branding themselves as “pro-European” were willing to cooperate with pro-Russian forces just to enter parliament. This sends a worrying signal to voters. Still, there is a younger generation of politicians who can carry the European torch forward. I’m thinking of figures like Nicu Popescu and Marcel Spatari. They could become the new leaders of Moldova’s European path.

Regional challenges: Transnistria, Gagauzia, Taraclia

V.B.: The election results highlighted serious regional divides: Transnistria, Gagauzia, Taraclia. Is political reintegration possible?

P.M.: This is perhaps the most sensitive issue. In Transnistria, surprisingly, PAS received relatively decent results at polling stations, even better than in Gagauzia. It is paradoxical: in a separatist region, pro-European forces did better than in an autonomous region that enjoys full rights within Moldova.

In Gagauzia, however, we see boycott, distrust, alienation. The state has no consistent policy there. Authorities remember the region only during elections. This is a mistake. Without constant government presence, investment, and dialogue, Gagauzia will remain Moldova’s “Achilles heel.”

Conclusions and outlook

V.B.: So what do these elections ultimately show us?

P.M.: I would put it this way: these elections were a serious test for Moldova’s democracy. They proved that even under conditions of aggressive campaigning by pro-Russian forces, foreign interference, TikTok manipulations, and hybrid political projects — Moldovan citizens still chose a European future.

This result is, without exaggeration, a slap in the face to the Kremlin. But it is also a challenge for PAS: to retain voter trust, avoid corruption, and remain accountable. And it is the responsibility of civil society and the media to monitor the government closely, ensuring it does not repeat the mistakes of its predecessors.