Namig Aliyev. Minsk group: the failure of the OSCE, which became a loud lesson of history

Author: Namig Aliyev, Doctor of Law, Professor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Head of the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy, Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group: Legal Confirmation of a “Political Corpse”

On August 8, 2025, following a meeting in Washington between US President Donald Trump, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan appealed to the OSCE to dissolve the Minsk Group.
On September 1, 2025, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe officially announced the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group. The OSCE Ministerial Council decided to close the Minsk process and all related structures, with administrative procedures to be completed by December 1, 2025. All previous decisions on the conflict were declared null and void.

The very fact of dissolution is recognition that the format had exhausted itself. In reality, it is not just the end of a mandate, but the belated legal formalization of a political death. The Minsk Group had become a non-functioning mechanism long before it disappeared from the agenda.

Who and Why “Conserved” the Conflict?

Created in 1992 to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the Minsk Group initially had a mandate and legitimacy. However, in decades of activity, it never fulfilled its main mission — to ensure the withdrawal of occupying forces from Azerbaijani territory and the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity.

Worse, the group effectively substituted international law with political “rules” dictated by the interests of its co-chairs — Russia, the US, and France. None of them were interested in a quick settlement, as the frozen status quo gave them leverage over the region.

“Diplomatic Tourism” and Substitution of International Law

Over the years, the group turned into what experts sarcastically called “diplomatic tourism”: dozens of visits, meetings, and press releases — but not a single strategic document or objective legal assessment of the conflict.

None of the four UN Security Council resolutions of 1993, demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces, were used as the basis for negotiations. Instead, the group offered “confidence-building measures” while ignoring the ongoing occupation of Azerbaijani territories and the OSCE’s own principle of respect for territorial integrity.

Monopoly Instead of Solution

Another flaw was the monopolization of the negotiation process. Any attempts by other international organizations — the UN, Council of Europe, EU, or NATO — to become involved were blocked by the co-chairs. This “closed architecture” made it possible to artificially prolong the conflict, benefiting geopolitical players rather than peace and stability.

Tensions grew after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022. The US and France cut ties with Moscow, while Russia itself declared the group defunct. In reality, the Minsk Group ceased functioning at that moment.

The War and the Death of the Format

The 44-day Patriotic War in 2020, Azerbaijan’s liberation of occupied territories, and the restoration of full sovereignty over its territory in 2023 finally rendered the Minsk Group obsolete.

For this reason, Azerbaijan consistently insisted: the Minsk Group was a political corpse, and preserving it served only to perpetuate the conflict rather than resolve it.

Armenia and Double Standards

Armenia avoided recognizing this reality for years, clinging to the Minsk Group as a tool for revanchist diplomacy. This allowed Yerevan to sustain the illusion of an “unfinished conflict” and nurture revanchist sentiments in part of Armenian society.

Only in August 2025, after real progress in peace talks and border delimitation, did Armenia join Azerbaijan in a joint appeal to the OSCE to dissolve the group.

Conclusions

• The OSCE Minsk Group became the first major failure of the OSCE in peacekeeping, clearly demonstrating how international mechanisms, deprived of political will and subordinated to external interests, can sabotage peace instead of achieving it.

• For Azerbaijan, this is a diplomatic victory, confirming that consistency based on international law and an active foreign policy bring tangible results: territorial integrity has been restored, the conflict is over, and international mechanisms are cleansed of ballast.

• For Armenia, this is an opportunity to free itself from illusions, leave behind a mythologized ideology and conflict rhetoric, abandon revanchism, and move toward normalization — including through honest recognition of past actions and the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

• The OSCE has received an opportunity to rebuild its work in line with the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and to rethink approaches to mediation in conflict zones.

The Minsk Group is an example of how a conflict can be turned into an endless process when international law gives way to geopolitical interests. But like any artificially sustained mechanism, it could not live forever. History, after almost three decades, has put an end to it. And that end is a legally certified death certificate.