Namik Aliyev. Strategic Shift in Armenia’s Rapprochement with the EU: Legislative Framework and Possible Scenarios.
Author: Namik Aliyev, Doctor of Law, Professor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Head of the Department at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
At the beginning of 2025, Armenia took a historic step — the parliament adopted a bill initiating the process of integration with the EU. On April 4, 2025, Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed the law establishing the legal framework for launching the EU integration process. This is not a declaration of membership, but rather the start of a long and profound reform, with the prospect of a referendum and constitutional changes. The formal goal is to prepare a “road map” with the EU, including harmonization of legal norms and standards, following the example of the former Soviet Baltic states. Pashinyan has repeatedly emphasized that a referendum and a long preparatory period will be required.
The parliament had long prepared the relevant bill, which sharply intensified domestic political debates. The first benefits have also appeared.
The EU is providing an expanded GSP+ trade agreement and funding for defense initiatives: €10 million through the European Peace Facility. In addition to military aid, there will be border monitoring, consultations, plans for visa liberalization, and monitoring agencies. A strategic agreement has also been signed with the United States, including financial and military support, border infrastructure, energy, and reforms. $65 million has been allocated for reforms, joint exercises, and strengthening borders.
Greece is individually supplying weapons. This opens the possibility of diversifying sources, reducing dependence on Russia, and modernizing the army.
Armenia’s Double Foreign Policy Game: EAEU and CSTO Status in Limbo
Having started European integration, Armenia is not formally leaving the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), retaining full membership, but has de facto suspended participation: boycotting events, skipping summits, refusing missions and military exercises. At the same time, Economy Minister Papoyan emphasizes: “We are not trading the EAEU for another union; we strive for independence and diversification.”
Armenia has also removed Russian border posts from key borders and the airport, providing EU observers with a presence in the east of the country. It plans to nationalize “Electric Networks of Armenia.”
Prospects for Armenia
Option 1: Continued Integration with the West
Implementation of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between Armenia and the EU, signed in 2017 and in force since 2021, has become an important legal and political basis for the current rapprochement.
Unlike the association agreements with Georgia and Moldova, CEPA does not envisage immediate membership but covers 25 reforms — from justice to sanitary standards. So far, Armenia has been gradually aligning its legislation with EU directives — especially in ecology, competition, transport, and digitalization. Armenia has expressed its intention to move from CEPA to a deeper agreement — a “pre-association” model similar to that of the Balkan states.
In 2024–2025, Yerevan received €270 million from the EU to finance reforms, fight corruption, develop sustainable sectors, infrastructure, and migration regulation. Candidate status is also planned. While the EU has not yet offered a clear membership roadmap, Armenia, following the example of Moldova and Ukraine, may initiate an application by the end of 2026. Polls show growing support for integration: according to the International Republican Institute, about 60% of citizens support EU accession. Visa liberalization prospects are realistic. Armenia expects to launch negotiations on a visa-free regime (similar to Georgia in 2017), and the EU has already sent experts to assess border security.
The EU remains the largest donor and trading partner, and with successful CEPA implementation, a free trade agreement could be concluded. Armenia could thus become the first EAEU state to move toward systemic integration with the EU without formal membership, retaining some advantages of both systems.
Option 2: Maintaining Strategic Balance
The “sit on two chairs” tactic reflects Yerevan’s attempt to minimize risks: economic pressure from Russia, the absence of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, and domestic turbulence from sharp decisions. Within this tactic, Armenia remains in the EAEU and CSTO without formally announcing withdrawal. This preserves access to markets, labor migration (about 300,000 Armenians work in Russia), and cheap resources. However, Armenia’s practical participation in post-Soviet organizations is minimal: refusal of CSTO exercises, non-participation in summits, and a shift in focus toward cooperation with France, Greece, and the USA.
Gas dependence is key. While Armenia receives gas from Gazprom at a preferential price, it is already negotiating with Iran and discussing participation in EU green energy programs.
Arguments for strategic balance:
- Leaving the EAEU and CSTO could cause a sharp economic collapse and rising unemployment;
- Full EU or NATO membership in the next 10 years is virtually unrealistic;
- Undemarcated borders with Azerbaijan still push toward some level of cooperation with Russia.
In this scenario, Pashinyan’s government would pursue a “neo-multivector” foreign policy — being a Western ally without fully breaking ties with Russia.
Option 3: Reforms and Economic Diversification
Armenia clearly understands that for EU integration to be not only political but also a sustainable economic project, a large-scale transformation of its economic structure and institutional environment is necessary. Key reform areas: economic reforms, energy and infrastructure modernization, IT and innovation, and border infrastructure reform. This option envisions Armenia becoming a “subregional hub” of high technology, sustainable energy, and transit routes, serving as a bridge between the EU, Iran, and India — provided internal stability is maintained.
Risks and Opportunities
In any of the three options, Armenia is making a dynamic strategic transition, which entails serious risks and significant opportunities. The focus on the EU and the USA is driven by the desire to strengthen sovereignty and security but also threatens the existing Russia-oriented economic model. Moscow is reacting harshly, using political, economic, and diplomatic tools of pressure. The EU and USA are actively supporting Yerevan — not only with words but also with funding and military action — due to the possible military response scenario from Moscow.
Possible Consequences: The “Sinking Iceberg” Scenario
Against the backdrop of Armenia’s rapprochement with the EU and potential exit from the EAEU, gloomy forecasts are increasingly voiced by both Russian politicians and some economists. They compare the possible scenario to a “sinking iceberg” — an outwardly attractive course fraught with internal disasters. Russian officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Overchuk and Security Council head Shoigu, warn of severe consequences: risk of losing 30–40% of GDP, rising unemployment, inflation, and lower living standards.
Indeed, trade turnover with the EAEU amounts to $12.7 billion, while with the EU — only $2.3 billion. Adjusting to new standards, certification, and possible tariff increases threaten higher prices for gas and other key goods. The Russian authorities and loyal think tanks actively promote alarming assessments. The Russian Foreign Ministry directly links European orientation with “betrayal of allied obligations,” suggesting that Armenia will lose the entire range of “Eurasian benefits” — from gas to military guarantees.
Peskov has repeatedly stressed: “The European path is incompatible with the EAEU,” while officially recognizing Armenia’s right to choose. Lavrov has said that “Armenia cannot play on two fronts” and hinted at possible Russian restrictions. Russian media and Telegram channels have begun a campaign to discredit Pashinyan, comparing him to Ukrainian leaders of 2013–2014. In February 2025, Shoigu stated that a potential Armenian exit from the EAEU could lead to a “30–40% GDP collapse” and “deep rupture of all production and sales chains” in the South Caucasus.
Businessman Samvel Karapetyan (Tashir Group), one of the most influential Armenians in Russian business, before his arrest warned that Armenia “risks losing millions of consumers and thousands of jobs if it loses the common market with Russia and the EAEU.” Economic ties with the EAEU are indeed significant. In 2024, exports to EAEU countries accounted for over 42% of Armenia’s total exports — about $11–12 billion, of which more than $8 billion was to Russia (food industry, wine, textiles, building materials, electronics). Trade with the EU is only about 7% of exports, or about $2–2.7 billion, with a limited range of products (mainly minerals, semi-precious metals, wines).
The preferential EAEU regime allows Armenian producers to avoid duties, receive subsidies, and export without additional certification — unlike the EU, where standards are much stricter. Leaving the EAEU would mean: loss of duty-free status (EU tariffs can reach 8–10%), the need to restructure logistics (including replacing Russian banking, insurance, and transit mechanisms), and higher energy prices (gas and oil from Russia are subsidized — Armenia pays $165 per 1,000 m³, while European prices often exceed $300).
The economic shock could trigger: rising unemployment (especially in processing industries, agriculture, transport), mass outflow of labor migrants from Russia (about 300,000 Armenians work in the Russian Federation annually, sending up to $1 billion in remittances), and increased social tension (falling incomes, rising prices, inflation, vulnerability of disadvantaged groups — especially in the regions).
Beyond trade, there are several infrastructure projects directly linked to the EAEU. Armenia is part of interconnected energy systems: agreements with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan on coordinated electricity supplies. Problems could arise with the “Mir” payment system and bank transfers. Transport corridors through Russia could be lost, as a significant share of cargo goes through Russian hubs and EAEU logistics.
The main dilemma for Armenia — can it make this transition to another geopolitical “host” without losing its economic and social health? Success could become an example for some other post-Soviet states, while failure could mean deep social and political turbulence.