Prof. Toğrul İsmayıl.Baku and Moscow: A New Normal in a Changing South Caucasus
Toğrul İsmayıl - Turkish political scientist, Professor at the Department of Political History, Kahramanmaraş University
Recent developments in Russian–Azerbaijani relations point not so much to a new crisis as to a deeper process: the gradual adaptation of Moscow and Baku to the changing balance of power in the South Caucasus.
The statement made on 19 August by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, in which she distanced the remarks of Ivan Knyazev, Semyon Uralov, and Alexey Chadayev from Moscow’s official position, represents an important diplomatic signal. In effect, the Russian side declined to allow the dispute surrounding statements by individual Russian public figures to escalate into an interstate confrontation. At the same time, it once again referred to the Declaration on Allied Interaction of 22 February 2022.
This decision should be considered within a broader context.
Over the past two years, Russian–Azerbaijani relations have undergone their most serious test since the signing of the allied declaration. The Azerbaijan Airlines aircraft crash in December 2024, the diplomatic disagreements that followed, tensions surrounding the activities of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, and the harsh rhetoric employed by certain Russian media outlets have created a substantial deficit of trust.
At the same time, both sides have demonstrated an interest in preventing their accumulated disagreements from developing into a strategic rupture.
This contradiction—the combination of political tension and a structural interest in cooperation—is currently the principal factor shaping Russian–Azerbaijani relations.
From a Crisis of Trust to Managed Rivalry
An important consideration is that Moscow and Baku are not on a trajectory towards inevitable conflict.
On the contrary, both sides have objective reasons to preserve functional relations.
For Russia, Azerbaijan is important as a key participant in developments in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region, as well as in transport connectivity between Russia, Türkiye, Iran, and Central Asia.
For Azerbaijan, Russia remains a major neighbour, an economic partner, and a state with significant capacity to influence regional security.
The nature of this interdependence, however, has changed.
Whereas Russian–Azerbaijani relations were previously viewed largely through the prism of Russia’s regional influence, Baku now enjoys considerably greater freedom of strategic manoeuvre.
This is a fundamental change.
Following the Second Karabakh War in 2020—and especially Azerbaijan’s restoration of control over the country’s entire territory in 2023—the political geography of the South Caucasus changed.
At the same time, Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Türkiye has deepened substantially.
Relations between Baku and Moscow must therefore now be analysed not within the context of a Russian monopoly over regional security, but within an increasingly multipolar regional system.
The Turkish Factor
The strengthening of the Turkish–Azerbaijani strategic partnership has become the most significant change in the regional balance.
The Shusha Declaration institutionalised relations between the two states in the areas of security and defence, creating a foundation for the further expansion of cooperation.
The importance of this partnership, however, extends far beyond the military and political sphere.
Türkiye and Azerbaijan are developing an increasingly interconnected system encompassing energy, transport, the defence industry, communications, and foreign-policy coordination.
For Moscow, this means that a new factor must be taken into account when formulating its policy towards Baku.
Azerbaijan can now develop relations with Russia, Türkiye, the European Union, Central Asia, and other centres of power without having to choose exclusively between them.
This is precisely why the traditional logic of “spheres of influence” is becoming increasingly inapplicable to the South Caucasus.
Armenia and the Changing Regional Balance
A second important factor is the shift in Armenia’s foreign policy.
In recent years, Yerevan has consistently sought to diversify its foreign and defence relations and reduce its dependence on the Russian security system.
This does not mean that Armenia is completely abandoning its relations with Russia. Nevertheless, the very fact that the previous model is being reconsidered is already changing the regional balance.
For Moscow, this reduces its ability to rely on the former configuration of influence.
For Azerbaijan, it creates new opportunities to develop a more sustainable regional architecture.
The normalisation of relations between Baku and Yerevan is becoming particularly important.
If this process continues, the South Caucasus may gradually move from a model of conflict-based security towards one of interconnected security, in which transport, energy, trade, and communications play a role no less important than military factors.
Transport as a Geopolitical Factor
It is within this context that projects associated with TRIPP and the broader development of the Trans-Caspian and Middle Corridors should be considered.
Today, the transport infrastructure of the South Caucasus is becoming part of the global competition for routes connecting Central Asia, the Caspian region, Türkiye, and Europe.
This creates fundamentally new opportunities for Azerbaijan.
The country seeks to transform its geographical position into a political and economic resource by connecting the Caspian region with the South Caucasus, Türkiye with Central Asia, and the region’s energy and transport flows with the European market.
If this strategy is implemented, Azerbaijan’s importance to the regional architecture will increase considerably.
For Russia, this development represents both a challenge and an opportunity.
It is a challenge because some transport and energy flows may gradually bypass traditional Russian routes.
It is also an opportunity because maintaining constructive relations with Baku would allow Moscow to remain a participant in regional transport processes instead of becoming an external observer.
Russia’s policy towards Azerbaijan will therefore depend to a considerable extent on Moscow’s ability to adapt to the new geoeconomic reality.
The Information Factor and the Problem of Trust
The information sphere currently remains the most sensitive area.
On the one hand, official Moscow seeks to emphasise that harsh statements made by individual Russian public figures do not reflect state policy.
On the other hand, the Russian media environment periodically displays highly confrontational rhetoric towards Azerbaijan.
This duality has political consequences.
In the contemporary international environment, state policy is shaped not only by official statements. The information environment influences perceptions of the other side’s intentions and therefore directly affects the level of strategic trust.
For Baku, it is fundamentally important to understand whether a gap exists between official Russian policy and the information signals emanating from influential Russian political and media circles.
For Moscow, meanwhile, the problem is that uncontrolled escalation in information rhetoric can undermine the very diplomatic channels that Russian foreign policy is simultaneously attempting to preserve.
The current dispute should therefore be viewed not merely as a conflict over individual statements, but also as a test of the two states’ ability to manage escalation within the information sphere.
The Diaspora Factor
The situation of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia remains another sensitive issue.
Individual cases involving the revocation of Russian citizenship from representatives of Azerbaijani diaspora organisations should, in themselves, be assessed primarily from the perspective of Russian law.
The political perception of such decisions, however, cannot be ignored.
If these actions begin to be perceived in Azerbaijan as part of a broader campaign of pressure against the Azerbaijani community, they inevitably become a factor in bilateral relations.
In this sense, diaspora policy is no longer solely a matter of Russia’s domestic affairs.
It is becoming part of the broader problem of trust between the two states.
Moscow has an evident strategic interest in preventing matters related to migration, citizenship, and the activities of diaspora organisations from becoming a new channel of interstate confrontation.
What the AZAL Crisis Demonstrated
The Azerbaijan Airlines aircraft crash was probably the most serious test of bilateral relations in recent years.
Subsequent developments, however, demonstrated an important feature of the Russian–Azerbaijani model.
Despite profound disagreements, the sides were able to preserve diplomatic channels and ultimately move towards a resolution.
This is a fundamental point.
Had the relationship been moving towards a strategic rupture, the AZAL crisis could have become a point of irreversible confrontation.
That did not happen.
Consequently, a certain reserve of pragmatism continues to prevent the relationship from collapsing.
At the same time, the crisis also demonstrated the limits of the previous model.
Baku is no longer prepared to accept Russia’s interpretation of events automatically when fundamental issues of national security are at stake.
This means that Moscow will have to take into account Azerbaijan’s substantially heightened sensitivity to questions of sovereignty and security.
What Does Moscow’s Response Actually Mean?
Against this background, Zakharova’s statement acquires broader significance.
Moscow has effectively recognised the need to distinguish state policy from the rhetoric of individual Russian public figures.
This can be interpreted as a tactical de-escalation.
In a broader sense, however, it also reflects Russia’s strategic caution.
Moscow understands that, under the present circumstances, a conflict with Baku would not serve its long-term interests.
Russia is simultaneously confronting changes in the situation in Ukraine, the need to preserve its influence in Central Asia, competition over transport routes, and the transformation of its relations with Türkiye.
Under these conditions, an open confrontation with Azerbaijan would generate additional risks without producing any evident strategic benefits.
A policy of managed engagement therefore remains the most rational course for Moscow.
Azerbaijan’s Strategy: Partnership Without Dependence
From Baku’s perspective, the situation looks different.
Azerbaijan is not interested in confrontation with Russia.
At the same time, it is not interested in restoring relations on the basis of their former asymmetry.
This is a fundamental distinction.
Contemporary Azerbaijani foreign policy seeks to maintain functional relations with several centres of power simultaneously.
Russia remains one of them.
At the same time, Azerbaijan continues to expand its relations with Türkiye, Central Asia, Europe, and other partners.
Baku’s principal strategy is therefore not to choose one centre of power against another, but to diversify its strategic relations while preserving national autonomy in decision-making.
From the perspective of international relations, this constitutes a considerably more sustainable model than a policy of unilateral alignment.
The South Caucasus After the Russian Monopoly
In a broader context, the current situation reflects the South Caucasus’s transition from a system characterised by the relative dominance of a single external centre to one shaped by competing influences.
Russia remains an important actor.
It now operates, however, in an environment characterised by a considerably more active Türkiye, a more independent Azerbaijan, a changing Armenia, the European Union’s growing interest, and Central Asia’s increasingly prominent role.
This is creating a new regional architecture.
Its defining feature is not the disappearance of Russian influence, but the decline of its exclusivity.
Moscow must therefore compete not so much for control over the region as for the preservation of its role within the region’s emerging system of interdependence.
Prospects
In the near term, the most likely scenario is not a rupture, but the continuation of complex and pragmatic engagement.
Periodic information crises, diplomatic disputes, and mutual signals can be expected.
Several factors, however, will constrain further escalation.
First, economic interdependence.
Second, geographical proximity.
Third, shared interests in regional stability.
Fourth, Azerbaijan’s importance to Russian policy in the Caspian region, its relations with Türkiye, and the transport geography of Eurasia.
Finally, neither side stands to gain any evident benefit from full-scale confrontation.
The most realistic scenario is therefore the emergence of a model that can be described as “competition without rupture.”
Conclusion
The current state of Russian–Azerbaijani relations cannot adequately be described either as an alliance without contradictions or as preparation for a new conflict.
The structure before us is more complex.
Moscow seeks to preserve its influence while adapting to a new regional reality.
Baku seeks to maintain relations with Russia, but on the basis of considerably greater strategic autonomy.
Türkiye is becoming one of the most important factors shaping the regional balance.
Armenia is reconsidering its previous model of foreign-policy dependence.
Central Asia is becoming increasingly integrated into the transport and energy geography of the South Caucasus.
Europe is interested in diversifying its routes and energy sources.
As a result, the South Caucasus is gradually evolving from a peripheral arena of competition into one of the key hubs of the emerging Eurasian geoeconomy.
Recent developments between Baku and Moscow should therefore be viewed as more than just another diplomatic crisis.
They are a test of the new regional system.
Baku is demonstrating that it is prepared to preserve its partnership with Moscow, but it is not prepared to accept restrictions on its strategic autonomy.
Moscow, in turn, is gradually being compelled to recognise that influence in the South Caucasus can no longer be measured solely through traditional instruments of power.
The principal task facing both sides is no longer to avoid disagreements. That is virtually impossible.
The task is instead to develop mechanisms that will enable them to manage their disagreements without allowing them to escalate into strategic confrontation.
The ability of Moscow and Baku to establish such a model of interaction will be one of the key determinants of stability in the South Caucasus in the coming years.