Sergiu Ungureanu. ELECTIONS IN MOLDOVA. THE RETURN OF PLAHOTNIUC

Sergiu Ungureanu -expert (Moldova)

Vitalii Barvynenko spoke with well-known Moldovan expert Sergiu Ungureanu about the key political topic in the region – the parliamentary elections in Moldova, scheduled for September 28.
The discussion covered:

·         political polarization in Moldovan society and the risk of escalation;

·         the role and possible return of oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, his networks and influence;

·         economic performance under PAS compared to the Democratic Party;

·         the fate of Andrei Spînu and other figures;

·         the position of right- and left-wing parties, including the Patriotic Bloc;

·         possible post-election scenarios: PAS majority, coalitions, or repeat elections.

Ungureanu emphasized: “Most likely, PAS will either try to secure a majority through the diaspora vote or by buying support from parts of the opposition.”

Vitalii Barvynenko:
Hello, dear friends. This is Vitalii Barvynenko from the Danube Studies Institute and our geopolitical project. Today my guest is a well-known expert from Moldova, Sergiu Ungureanu. Sergiu, thank you for taking the time to join our broadcast.

Sergiu Ungureanu:
Good day, thank you for the invitation.

Vitalii Barvynenko:
Sergiu, the main hot topic today in our subregion — the Lower Danube and the Black Sea basin — is, of course, the parliamentary elections in Moldova, scheduled for September 28, just over a week after our broadcast. Many analysts consider these elections to be highly significant since Moldova is essentially a parliamentary-presidential republic, where parliament plays a crucial role.

I would like to ask a few questions about the election campaign and the narratives surrounding it. Recently, we participated in a meeting of experts organized by Moldovan journalist Nina Dimoglo. Most participants there were critical of PAS, the ruling Action and Solidarity Party closely affiliated with President Maia Sandu. Tell me, Sergiu, this political polarization in Moldovan society — could it escalate into civil confrontation, where people no longer listen to each other? How would you assess the current tension in society?

Sergiu Ungureanu:
Yes, thank you for the question. You know, this polarization has been building up in our society for quite some time. It appeared along various lines — language, religion, politics. But three or four years ago it was not nearly as pronounced. People had their opinions, sometimes expressed them strongly, but it was not as acute as now.

Today the level of confrontation is very high. Unfortunately, I must admit that the authorities have lost control of it, and in some cases even encourage this escalation. There are incidents of people being attacked for political reasons. Online space is full of threats and insults. For now, it hasn’t crossed into something catastrophic, but the tension is real and needs to be addressed.

Whether this will lead to serious conflict depends on the election results. If the police act responsibly, there should not be major clashes, though isolated incidents could happen.

Vitalii Barvynenko:
Thank you. My next question is about Vlad Plahotniuc. He was detained in Greece under strange circumstances, but Greece has since suspended his extradition to Moldova. Was this his personal initiative — to try to return before the elections — or was it requested by the Moldovan authorities?

Sergiu Ungureanu:
It was a mix of circumstances, combined with mistakes by Plahotniuc himself and by our authorities. After his arrest, many odd inconsistencies appeared.

But we must remember: Plahotniuc remains a politician with enormous networks in Moldova — in the prosecution service, courts, among mayors. Some of these links are still active today. He also has economic levers and compromising material on many politicians, including members of PAS.

PAS, when it came to power, promised the public that they would track down and punish those responsible for the “billion theft.” So Plahotniuc’s arrest presented a challenge for them.

We saw strange delays — the police claiming they lacked €1,500 for the extradition flight, later saying he did not want to return, then Plahotniuc himself wrote on social media that he did want to come back. This inconsistency raised doubts.

Now Greece refuses to extradite him, which is odd because there are no clear legal reasons to block it. This raises suspicions of a possible arrangement between Greek and Moldovan authorities not to hand him over before the elections, since his return and statements could seriously harm PAS.

Vitalii Barvynenko:
Plahotniuc even released a message comparing the period when he de facto led the Democratic Party with today’s rule of PAS, claiming that Moldova developed more successfully under him. If we abstract from personal attitudes, who governed better: Plahotniuc’s Democrats or PAS under Sandu?

Sergiu Ungureanu:
We need to look at the full picture. Plahotniuc was never officially president or prime minister — not even an MP at that time — but everyone knew he was the one in control. He put competent people into key positions.

During his time, GDP growth averaged around 5% annually. Relations with the EU and the US were steady. Emigration slowed down compared to previous years.

Under PAS, however, the economic indicators are much weaker: 0.1% growth last year, with 0.3–0.4% expected this year. And this is despite large amounts of foreign aid and loans. Production is falling, prices are rising, and transparency is lacking. Much money seems to be absorbed by the real estate sector.

Corruption has not been curbed either. According to Transparency International, Moldova ranks 76th, and no major arrests have been made. Even economic data is being withheld before the elections — a sign of poor performance.

Vitalii Barvynenko:
Let’s talk about Andrei Spînu, the former Infrastructure Minister closely associated with gas contracts and other controversial schemes. Why has he disappeared from the political scene?

Sergiu Ungureanu:
There are several reasons. After the elections, a huge wave of public negativity targeted him. He was blamed for the costly gas contract with Gazprom and the rise in energy prices. Within PAS, they decided to push him out of the spotlight to protect the party.

But he hasn’t gone away permanently. After these elections, he may return in some role. His ties to PAS remain intact.

Vitalii Barvynenko:
What about former anti-corruption prosecutor Veronica Dragalin? She resigned amid scandal. Her mother, a well-known Moldovan activist in the US, supports the new LOK party. Why did PAS not create a satellite party on the pro-European flank?

Sergiu Ungureanu:
Because PAS follows a “no one but us” strategy. They attack even other pro-European parties, accusing them of being “Kremlin’s hand.” Instead of sharing votes with allies, they want either an outright majority or opposition status. This is shortsighted, but it’s the path they chose.

Vitalii Barvynenko:
Concerning Ion Ceban, mayor of Chișinău, and journalist Natalia Morari — both faced sanctions. What role did Moldovan authorities play in this?

Sergiu Ungureanu:
A decisive one. The sanction lists are drafted in Chișinău, then pushed through with strong lobbying in Brussels. Authorities use sanctions as a tool against opponents. And the EU tolerates it because they want to present Moldova as a “success story,” regardless of democratic backsliding.

Vitalii Barvynenko:
What is happening with the Patriotic Bloc — Dodon, Voronin, Tarlev, and Irina Vlah?

Sergiu Ungureanu:
They are under heavy attack. Accusations of “electoral corruption” with very questionable evidence, attempts to freeze bank accounts, smear campaigns. It is designed to split the bloc and eliminate a strong competitor.

Polls show the Patriotic Bloc’s support is comparable to, or even higher than, that of PAS. That is why the authorities are trying so hard to weaken them.

Vitalii Barvynenko:
Finally, let’s discuss possible post-election scenarios. Which outcomes do you consider most realistic?

Sergiu Ungureanu:
There are several:

1.      PAS secures a majority. This is only possible through violations — mainly manipulating the diaspora vote, where monitoring is minimal.

2.      A coalition with the Alternative Party or Renato Usatîi’s group. This would require negotiations or buying off deputies.

3.      Accepting defeat and moving into opposition. Highly unlikely, given their ties to financial schemes and contracts.

4.      Repeat elections. Also unlikely, since PAS risks losing even more support.

Most likely, PAS will try to hold a majority by manipulating diaspora votes or buying support from parts of the opposition.

Vitalii Barvynenko:
Thank you, Sergiu. Our guest today was Moldovan political expert Sergiu Ungureanu. We discussed the situation in Moldova, the upcoming parliamentary elections, and the potential political turbulence that may follow.

Sergiu Ungureanu:
Thank you. Goodbye.