The Black Sea According to Ankara’s Rules

By Toğrul İsmayıl - political scientist, Professor at the Department of Political History, Kahramanmaraş University 

Hakan Fidan’s visit to Kyiv demonstrated that Türkiye no longer intends to remain merely a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. Ankara is preparing to become the principal architect of the post-war security order in the Black Sea.

The visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Kyiv has become one of the most significant foreign policy developments of recent months. Its importance extends far beyond bilateral Turkish-Ukrainian relations.

In effect, the visit represented a public demonstration of Ankara’s new Black Sea strategy, through which Türkiye seeks to consolidate its status as a key regional power centre and one of the principal architects of the future European security system.

Over recent years, Türkiye has ceased to act exclusively as NATO’s eastern flank. It is now developing its own geopolitical course based on strategic autonomy, a balance of interests and regional leadership. Hakan Fidan’s visit to Kyiv should be viewed precisely within this context.

The reaffirmation of the strategic partnership with Ukraine signifies not only the continuation of military and technical cooperation, but also a transition towards a long-term alliance encompassing Black Sea security, the reconstruction of the Ukrainian economy, the development of the defence industry, transport connectivity and energy security.

For Ankara, Ukraine is a strategically important state in the Black Sea region. Any attempt by a single power to establish dominance over the Black Sea would objectively restrict Türkiye’s own freedom of action. Supporting Ukraine’s independence is therefore not an emotional or ideological choice, but an element of the national strategy of the Republic of Türkiye.

At the same time, it is essential to understand that Türkiye is not building its policy against Russia. On the contrary, Ankara remains virtually the only major power capable of simultaneously developing economic cooperation with Moscow, supporting Ukraine, maintaining open channels of communication with the Kremlin and remaining a member of NATO. This multidirectional approach has become Türkiye’s principal diplomatic advantage.

Particular attention should be paid to the statement expressing Türkiye’s readiness to provide Ukraine with naval security guarantees. Many observers interpreted it as a military step, although its actual significance is considerably broader.

In effect, Türkiye is proposing that the future Black Sea security system be constructed around its own military and political capabilities. This could include safeguarding freedom of navigation, protecting maritime communications, conducting mine-clearance operations, restoring Ukraine’s naval capabilities, organising joint patrols and participating in international security mechanisms after the war.

Such a role is entirely consistent with Türkiye’s capabilities. It possesses one of the most modern naval forces in the region, the largest shipbuilding capacity in the Eastern Mediterranean and NATO’s second-largest army. Moreover, Türkiye controls the strategically important Bosporus and Dardanelles straits under the Montreux Convention, making it an indispensable actor in any Black Sea security system.

In essence, Ankara is demonstrating its readiness to become the principal guarantor of stability in the region after the war.

The diplomatic dimension of the visit is equally important.

Today, very few states are capable of maintaining a stable political dialogue simultaneously with Kyiv, Moscow, Washington, Brussels and the countries of the Global South. Türkiye retains this capability.

For this reason, Ankara’s diplomatic resources are currently considerably greater than those of most European states. The experience of the Istanbul negotiations, the Black Sea Grain Initiative and numerous prisoner exchanges has demonstrated that achieving a sustainable peace settlement becomes significantly more difficult without Türkiye’s involvement.

Furthermore, the visit strengthens Türkiye’s position as a potential organiser of future Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. Ankara has not only preserved the confidence of both sides but has also demonstrated its ability to transform diplomatic initiatives into tangible political results.

In a broader geopolitical context, Fidan’s visit highlights another important trend. The Black Sea is gradually becoming an independent centre of global politics. The interests of Russia, NATO, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and regional powers intersect in this area. Under these conditions, Türkiye seeks to prevent the region from becoming an arena of uncontrolled confrontation among major powers.

Ankara is proposing an alternative model: a regional security system in which the Black Sea states themselves would play the central role, with Türkiye providing leading political and naval participation.

This approach reflects the broader transformation of Turkish foreign policy in recent years. Whereas Türkiye was previously viewed as a state implementing the strategies of its allies, it now increasingly shapes the rules of the game in the Eastern Mediterranean, the South Caucasus, Syria, Libya, Central Asia and, with growing intensity, the Black Sea region.

Hakan Fidan’s visit to Kyiv should therefore be assessed not as an isolated diplomatic mission, but as part of Ankara’s long-term strategy to transform Türkiye into an independent geopolitical pole.

The principal conclusion is that Türkiye is no longer limiting itself to the role of mediator between Russia and Ukraine. It seeks to become a state without whose participation it will be impossible to build a new security architecture for the Black Sea region. Should this course continue, Ankara may emerge as one of the principal political beneficiaries of the process of shaping the post-war geopolitical order in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea basin.

https://www.trtrussian.com/article/71e2629ac07b