The Danube in Ukraine’s Strategic Resilience System From Wartime
Author: Vitaliy Barvinenko, Doctor of Law, Director of the Institute of Danube Research
The full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war has increasingly demonstrated not only the need for the state to adapt technologically to new methods of warfare, but also the necessity of reconsidering a significant number of established approaches to geopolitics, transport planning, cross-border cooperation, and economic security. While in the military-technological sphere Ukraine has shown over recent years an ability to develop new solutions relatively quickly, transform organisational models, and respond to changes in the nature of warfare, institutional approaches developed under fundamentally different security conditions continue to be applied to a considerable extent in the fields of regional policy and international logistics.
This is particularly relevant to the Danube, whose role has changed substantially since 2022. Before the start of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian segment of the Danube transport system was generally regarded as an important, though supplementary, component of the country’s national port and export infrastructure. Following the disruption of a substantial part of Black Sea communications, the ports of Izmail, Reni and Ust-Dunaisk, the Sulina Channel, Romanian port and railway infrastructure, transit through Moldova, and road border crossings in south-western Ukraine became elements of a much broader system of economic resilience.
This transformation requires a corresponding shift in strategic thinking. The Danube should be regarded not merely as an alternative export route to be used when Black Sea navigation is restricted, but as a permanent strategic transport corridor around which a new level of Ukrainian-Romanian, Ukrainian-Moldovan, and broader European integration can be developed.
The Historical Experience of the European Commission of the Danube
From this perspective, the history of the European Commission of the Danube, established under the Treaty of Paris of 1856, acquires particular significance. It may be regarded as one of the earliest European experiments in functional international integration, under which states agreed to establish a common mechanism for managing infrastructure whose proper functioning served the interests of all participating countries.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the regime of navigation on the Lower Danube was closely connected with rivalry among the major European powers. Navigation problems were both political and technical: river mouths were becoming silted, the condition of the navigable channel restricted vessel tonnage, and ineffective governance created significant obstacles to trade.
The Treaty of Paris of 1856 provided for the establishment of a commission comprising representatives of seven states — France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and the Ottoman Empire. Its task was to carry out the necessary works between Isaccea and the Black Sea in order to improve navigation conditions. Of fundamental importance was the provision allowing the cost of such works to be covered through special dues, the level of which could be determined by the Commission by majority vote. It was the Treaty of Paris that established the legal basis for such a mechanism.
Over time, the European Commission of the Danube gradually acquired a considerable degree of administrative and financial autonomy. Studies of its activities indicate that financial independence was among the factors that allowed it to move away from dependence on irregular intergovernmental funding towards more predictable implementation of hydraulic engineering works and maintenance of navigation infrastructure.
This experience is of scholarly relevance to contemporary integration processes not because the nineteenth-century model could or should be mechanically restored, but because of the principle underlying it. Where infrastructure is cross-border in nature and the effectiveness of its operation depends on coordinated action by several states, traditional mechanisms of diplomatic consultation are often insufficient. A need therefore arises for a permanent institution possessing clearly defined competences, decision-making procedures, and financial instruments for implementing those decisions.
Subsequent European integration developed to a significant extent according to a similar functional logic. The European Coal and Steel Community, for example, was also built around a specific sector of economic interdependence in which states agreed to establish supranational governance mechanisms.
The modern Danube Commission, established under the Convention regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, signed in Belgrade on 18 August 1948, has a different legal and political nature. Its activities are based on the interests and sovereign rights of the Danubian states, while its principal objective remains the maintenance and development of free navigation. At the same time, the Convention itself provides for a significant proportion of decisions to be adopted by majority vote and for the establishment of the Commission’s budget.
It is noteworthy that, under the conditions of the current war, the Danube Commission has itself been compelled to respond directly to new security challenges. In particular, it established a Register of Damage in the Lower Danube Region Caused by Russian Military Actions in order to systematise verified information concerning attacks that impede free and safe navigation.
The question, therefore, is no longer whether the security of the Lower Danube has an international dimension, but whether the existing coordination mechanisms are adequate to the scale of the emerging threats.
Strategic Decisions in the War and Ukraine’s Transport Geography
To understand the contemporary role of the Danube, it is useful to analyse Russian strategy not only through the prism of individual military operations but also as a sequence of decisions aimed at producing long-term changes in the political, economic and territorial conditions of Ukraine’s existence.
Within this approach, a decision may be considered strategic when its consequences are not confined to a specific stage of hostilities but instead create a new systemic condition from which a return to the previous status quo would require considerable resources and time.
In 2022, Russia proclaimed the illegal annexation of four partially occupied regions of Ukraine and incorporated the corresponding territorial claims into its domestic legal framework. Another decision of strategic significance was the declaration of mobilisation in September 2022, which effectively marked the transition of the Russian state towards a model of military confrontation intended to continue over an extended period.
The next dimension was the systematic targeting of Ukrainian civilian and critical infrastructure, including energy facilities, ports, grain terminals, storage complexes, railway junctions and other elements directly connected with the functioning of the economy.
At the current stage, these developments have been supplemented by an increasingly evident attempt to influence the transport geography of Ukraine itself by systematically raising the risks associated with the use of maritime, river and land-based international communications.
In this context, the concept of a landlocked country requires clarification. Ukraine cannot be classified as a state without access to the sea either geographically or under international law. In the present case, however, it is possible to speak of an attempt to create conditions of functional transport isolation, in which formal access to the Black Sea and the Danube is preserved while their systematic commercial use becomes substantially more difficult because of military risks, infrastructure damage, higher insurance costs, shortages of available tonnage and instability in logistics chains.
It is in this sense that strikes against port and border infrastructure should be regarded not exclusively as isolated military episodes, but as factors capable of exerting a long-term influence on the economic geography of the state.
Border Infrastructure as a Separate Object of Systemic Risk: Chronology of 2023–2026
Particular attention should be given to attacks against border infrastructure in the Ukrainian Danube region. The chronology of recent years indicates that these were not isolated cases of damage to individual border crossing points, but repeated attacks against facilities providing direct connections between Ukraine and Romania and Moldova.
On 26 September 2023, a night-time attack involving strike drones caused significant damage to infrastructure in the area of the Orlivka–Isaccea ferry crossing on the Romanian border. According to information released at the time, the border crossing building, storage infrastructure and approximately thirty trucks were damaged; six trucks were destroyed by fire, and two drivers were injured. Border crossing operations at Orlivka were temporarily suspended, and traffic was advised to use the route through Reni instead. By the evening of 26 September, the crossing had resumed operations.
Importantly, the attack had a cross-border operational effect. The Romanian side also temporarily restricted traffic through Isaccea, while the strike occurred directly opposite the territory of a European Union and NATO member state. Thus, as early as 2023 it became evident that the security situation surrounding Ukrainian facilities on the Danube directly affected the functioning of the transport system of a neighbouring country.
On 6 October 2023, less than two weeks after the previous attack, operations at the Orlivka ferry crossing again had to be temporarily suspended following a night-time UAV strike against port and border infrastructure. According to the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, no persons were injured as a result of the attack, but transport flows were once again redirected to other border crossings, including the route through Reni.
On 2 October 2024, Orlivka was again affected by a strike. A UAV attack against port and border infrastructure in the Izmail district damaged the border crossing, while two drivers, one of whom was a Turkish citizen, were injured. Border crossing operations were temporarily suspended while measures were undertaken to stabilise the facility’s functioning.
On 22 November 2025, Russian strike UAVs once again attacked the Orlivka ferry complex. The State Customs Service reported damage to the infrastructure of the facility, as a result of which the international border crossing was temporarily closed while the consequences of the attack were addressed.
This sequence is important for assessing the events of August–September 2026 because it demonstrates that the 1 September attack on Orlivka was not the first time this transport hub had been struck. On the contrary, by that point a multi-year pattern of repeated attacks had already emerged.
At the same time, in August 2026 the geography of damage to border infrastructure expanded.
On 21 August 2026, during a large-scale Russian attack, infrastructure at the Tabaky–Myrne road border crossing on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border was damaged. The crossing temporarily suspended operations while damage was documented and initial restoration measures were undertaken. It resumed operations on 22 August, although temporary workplaces had to be established for border guards and customs officers, equipment had to be installed, and backup power had to be provided in order to restore the facility’s functionality.
On 25 August 2026, four days after the attack on Tabaky–Myrne, infrastructure at another road border crossing on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border — Vynohradivka–Vulcănești — was damaged. The movement of citizens and vehicles was temporarily suspended, with traffic redirected to alternative routes. Following initial restoration works, the crossing resumed operations on 26 August.
Finally, during the night of 1 September 2026, Shahed-type strike UAVs attacked the international Orlivka ferry border crossing on the Ukrainian-Romanian border. According to the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, strikes hit the building and the territory of the border crossing, causing fires that were subsequently contained by emergency services. Ferry operations were suspended, and transport flows were redirected to other border crossings.
Thus, within only twelve days — from 21 August to 1 September 2026 — three different international border crossings on two of Ukraine’s state borders sustained direct damage: Tabaky–Myrne, Vynohradivka–Vulcănești and Orlivka–Isaccea. The latter facility had also been repeatedly targeted in 2023–2025.
The chronology presented above is not in itself sufficient to draw a comprehensive legal conclusion regarding the existence of a single operational plan encompassing all the facilities concerned. From the perspective of strategic analysis, however, it provides grounds for treating the resilience of the border and transport infrastructure of south-western Ukraine as a distinct national security issue.
Why Orlivka Has Particular Strategic Significance
The Orlivka–Isaccea ferry crossing is significant far beyond the sphere of local passenger transport. The treaty and legal prerequisites for its establishment were developed by Ukraine and Romania as early as 2014–2015, while the Ukrainian government viewed the opening of the crossing as an instrument for developing transport and logistics infrastructure in the southern part of Odesa Region, attracting additional cargo flows and deepening Ukrainian-Romanian trade and economic relations.
The ferry crossing began actual operations in 2020. The distance between the two banks near Orlivka and Isaccea is approximately 900 metres, while the projected capacity of the complex at the time of its launch was estimated at up to 500 vehicles per day in each direction, including freight transport.
The strategic importance of this route derives primarily from the fact that it provides the Ukrainian Danube region with direct access to Romania without requiring the traditional transit route through Moldova via Reni–Giurgiulești–Galați. Accordingly, Orlivka is not simply a border crossing point, but an element of diversification of the entire transport system of southern Odesa Region.
It is also significant that contemporary national transport planning documents identify increased efficiency of the Orlivka–Isaccea ferry crossing as a separate area for development, including the expansion of the legal framework governing its operation.
This is why the periodic removal of this facility from operation has broader consequences: transport that would otherwise use the shortest route to Romania has to be redirected to other crossings, pressure on the road network and neighbouring border checkpoints increases, and the entire logistics system loses part of its reserve capacity.
From Individual Attacks to Network Risk
When assessing the economic consequences, it is essential to take into account the networked nature of modern logistics. Port infrastructure does not operate independently of railways, road routes, storage facilities, border crossings, customs procedures and the navigation infrastructure of neighbouring states. The failure of one network element can therefore be compensated for relatively quickly, but the simultaneous or sequential emergence of several bottlenecks produces a cumulative effect.
In the Lower Danube, this problem is particularly complex because a significant part of the logistics chain is cross-border in nature. Ukrainian cargo flows depend on the capacity of the Sulina Channel, the availability of pilots, the functioning of Romanian ports and railways, the Moldovan transport system, border procedures, road crossings and the availability of suitable vessels.
Attacks against port terminals, warehouses or border crossings may therefore have consequences extending far beyond the physical damage inflicted on a particular facility. Additional costs arise as a result of cargo rerouting, longer delivery times, vehicle and vessel delays, higher insurance premiums, the need to create reserve capacities, and reduced predictability of logistics operations.
For an economy with a high share of bulk export commodities — including grain, metallurgical products, ores and other goods with a relatively low value per unit of weight — the transport component is of particular significance. Higher logistics costs in such cases directly affect the competitiveness of Ukrainian exports.
Strategic resilience should therefore not be framed as a question of how quickly a particular border crossing can be repaired following a particular strike. Rather, the central question should be whether the entire system is capable of continuing to function when several key routes are simultaneously constrained.
The Need to Move from Restoration to Redundancy
The experience of recent years has demonstrated the strong capacity of Ukrainian services to restore damaged border crossings rapidly. Tabaky–Myrne, for example, resumed operations the day after the attack of 21 August 2026, while Vynohradivka–Vulcănești resumed operations on 26 August following the strike of 25 August. This demonstrates the effectiveness of emergency response, but it does not resolve the structural problem created by repeated attacks.
Over the longer term, transport policy should move away from the model of “damage — repair — restoration” towards a model of infrastructure redundancy, under which critical functions can be transferred rapidly to alternative facilities.
This requires increasing the capacity of alternative border crossings, creating reserve storage and transshipment facilities, decentralising critical logistics infrastructure, preparing pre-agreed cargo diversion routes, and synchronising these plans with Romania and Moldova.
Coordination at the level of transport planning is equally important. Expanding the capacity of a Ukrainian border crossing is meaningful only if the infrastructure of the neighbouring state is capable of receiving the corresponding volume of traffic. Similarly, expansion of Ukrainian Danube port capacity requires the parallel development of Romanian waterways, railway approaches and transshipment hubs.
Transport resilience on the Lower Danube has therefore, by its very nature, already become an international task for Ukraine.
A New Model of Regional Coordination
It is precisely in this context that the historical experience of the European Commission of the Danube acquires contemporary relevance. The issue is not the restoration of nineteenth-century models of international law, but the application of the principle of functional integration, under which states establish common mechanisms for addressing problems that cannot be effectively resolved exclusively at the national level.
Ukraine could initiate a discussion on the expansion or establishment of specialised coordination mechanisms in the Lower Danube region involving Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, other interested states, the European Commission and relevant international organisations.
Such cooperation could cover the management of navigation flows, coordination of port development, joint planning of infrastructure investments, digitalisation of transport and customs procedures, establishment of reserve routes, navigation security, and the creation of a rapid-response mechanism for damage to critical infrastructure.
A separate element should be a multiannual financial instrument for the development of the Lower Danube. Historically, financial capacity was one of the factors underpinning the effectiveness of the European Commission of the Danube, and contemporary practice likewise demonstrates that an institution without its own or guaranteed resources generally remains a coordination mechanism rather than an executive one.
At the same time, such a model would not necessarily require a radical limitation of national sovereignty. Contemporary European integration provides numerous examples of joint management of individual sectors and infrastructure systems while states retain the principal scope of their sovereign competences.
The Danube as a Practical Dimension of Ukraine’s European Integration
Ukraine’s negotiations on accession to the European Union understandably focus on legislative approximation, institutional reforms and compliance with membership criteria. Integration, however, also has a material and infrastructural dimension.
Functional integration begins when Ukrainian transport routes physically become part of European networks, customs and digital procedures are synchronised, and infrastructure development on both sides of the border is planned as an interconnected process.
The Lower Danube is one of the regions where this approach can already be implemented today. Ukrainian Danube ports, Romania’s Port of Constanța, the Sulina Channel, the transport hubs of Galați and Brăila, Moldovan routes through Giurgiulești, and railway and road border crossings can be regarded not as competitors or isolated pieces of national infrastructure, but as components of a broader system.
The creation of such a space would simultaneously serve several strategic objectives: increasing the resilience of the Ukrainian economy, diversifying transport routes, reducing dependence on individual ports and channels, attracting European financing, and facilitating Ukraine’s practical integration into the EU transport system.
Conclusions
The chronology of attacks against border and port infrastructure in the Lower Danube region during 2023–2026 indicates the emergence of a long-term security risk affecting Ukraine’s south-western transport communications. Particularly illustrative is the repeated targeting of the Orlivka–Isaccea ferry crossing in 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026, as well as the geographical expansion in August 2026 of directly damaged border crossings along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border.
These circumstances require a transition from a predominantly operational response to individual cases of damage towards comprehensive resilience planning for the transport system as a whole. Such planning should include route and capacity redundancy, infrastructure diversification, joint crisis-response scenarios with Romania and Moldova, and the establishment of a long-term international mechanism for the development of the Lower Danube.
Russian strategy creates a risk of functionally restricting Ukraine’s access to maritime and river transport communications. The response to this challenge, however, may consist not only in physically protecting existing infrastructure, but also in achieving much deeper integration of Ukraine’s transport system into the European system.
In this context, the historical experience of the European Commission of the Danube once again acquires practical significance. It demonstrates that cross-border infrastructure may serve not only as an object of interstate competition but also as a foundation for the creation of institutional conditions for integration.
For Ukraine, the Danube can perform precisely such a function today, evolving from a reserve wartime route into one of the long-term pillars of national economic security and practical European integration.