Valeri Chechelashvili: “Without Ukraine’s consent, any territorial exchange is outside international law”
Valeri Chechelashvili, Georgian diplomat and politician. Minister of Finance of Georgia (2005). Ambassador of Georgia to Switzerland (2005), Russia (2004-2005), Ukraine and Moldova (1994-1998). Secretary General of BSEC (2000-2004) and GUAM (since 2007).
Vitalii Barvinenko:
Hello, dear friends! This is Vitalii Barvinenko from the Geopolitical Project of the Danube Research Institute. Today, my guest is a well-known diplomat and expert: former Ambassador of Georgia to Switzerland, Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova; former Minister of Finance of Georgia (2005); former Secretary General of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and of GUAM; and a member of a major analytical center — Valeri Chechelashvili.
Mr. Chechelashvili, thank you for joining us.
Valeri Chechelashvili:
Thank you for the invitation, Vitalii. It’s always a pleasure to be with you on air.
On the proposed “territorial exchange” between Ukraine and Russia
Vitalii Barvinenko:
Recently, the media have been discussing a so-called “territorial exchange” between Ukraine and Russia allegedly proposed by Donald Trump. Does such an idea fit within the framework of international law? And who could guarantee Ukraine’s security if this happened outside the legal field?
Valeri Chechelashvili:
Any discussion of territorial exchanges under the current circumstances does not fit into international law. The existing system is based on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which enshrines ten fundamental principles — among them, respect for territorial integrity and the inviolability of internationally recognized borders.
The only exception is if such an exchange is mutually agreed by the states involved and subsequently recognized by the international community. Theoretically, if Ukraine and Russia agreed — for example — to swap one region for another, signed and ratified it, then it would be within international law. But any such arrangement without Ukraine’s consent lies completely outside the legal framework.
Today we hear speculative versions — trading Kherson for Luhansk, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant for something else. Without Ukraine, this has no legal force. And leading international players — the Weimar Triangle, the UK, Italy, Finland, and Ursula von der Leyen — have clearly reaffirmed the principle: “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.”
On Trump’s style in foreign policy
Vitalii Barvinenko:
Would you say Trump’s “market-style bargaining” in global affairs reflects a misunderstanding of international law, or is it a deliberate method?
Valeri Chechelashvili:
It’s his style — described in his book The Art of the Deal. For Trump, two priorities matter above all: striking a deal and claiming a success.
His political success now depends not only on how he talks with Putin, but on whether he can advance a consolidated Western agenda toward Russia. Even a symbolic “victory” for Putin would damage Trump by:
- Splitting the Euro-Atlantic community, weakening the US;
- Strengthening the Russia–China tandem, creating problems for Washington in Asia.
I don’t see Trump making concessions to Putin unless Putin himself offers something that Trump can sell as a win — such as a ceasefire and a return to early-2022 lines without recognizing Russia’s annexations, with sanctions remaining in place.
Why Alaska as the venue?
Vitalii Barvinenko:
Why do you think Alaska was chosen as the venue for a potential meeting?
Valeri Chechelashvili:
For Trump, it’s a symbolic victory — the meeting takes place on US soil. For Putin, it avoids flying over countries where he risks arrest under the ICC warrant.
There’s also historical irony: some in Russia still spin myths about the 19th-century sale of Alaska for 7 million gold rubles, claiming the money never reached the Russian treasury or that it was only a 99-year lease. Meeting there subtly punctures those narratives.
The lesson of 2008 and its link to Ukraine
Vitalii Barvinenko:
August 8 is a symbolic date for the South Caucasus — in 2008, Russia attacked Georgia. Many analysts say the weak Western response paved the way for Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. Do you agree?
Valeri Chechelashvili:
Absolutely. It was the first war in Europe in the 21st century, and the reaction was too soft. Russia faced no sanctions and kept its seat in the G8. This signaled impunity, leading to 2014 and then 2022.
At the time, we warned that this was not an exception but a classic manifestation of Russia’s imperial policy toward its neighbors. The West failed to internalize that lesson in 2008. Now, they clearly understand they cannot repeat that mistake in Ukraine — if Russia achieves its goals there, the next target will inevitably follow.
Comparing the 2020 Trilateral Statement and the 2025 Washington Declaration
Vitalii Barvinenko:
On August 8, 2025, the so-called Washington Declaration was signed. How does it differ from the November 2020 trilateral statement on Nagorno-Karabakh?
Valeri Chechelashvili:
The 2020 document froze hostilities but strengthened Russia’s role — placing Russian “peacekeepers” in the Lachin Corridor and giving the FSB control over the Zangezur Corridor.
By 2025, after Russia’s failures in Ukraine, its influence in the South Caucasus collapsed. The US quickly moved in. The Washington Declaration marked a point of no return: Russia lost its levers, while fragile trust grew between Armenian PM Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev.
It also launched a US-backed transport corridor beneficial to both Armenia and Azerbaijan and likely to remove the FSB from the Armenia–Iran border entirely.
On Georgia’s role in the new regional format
Vitalii Barvinenko:
Given that Armenia and Azerbaijan both signed the declaration in Washington, what is Georgia’s place in this new reality?
Valeri Chechelashvili:
The current format is “2+1” — Armenia and Azerbaijan plus the US. For stability, it should be “3+1,” with Georgia included. This would:
- Guarantee Georgia’s security;
- Give the US full South Caucasus coverage;
- Benefit Armenia and Azerbaijan through access to markets and projects.
I expect Washington to step up engagement with Tbilisi, starting with appointing a new ambassador close to Trump. Georgia’s leadership must not squander this historic chance — it could pull the country out of its current political deadlock and ensure lasting security.
Vitalii Barvinenko:
Thank you for this thorough analysis.
Valeri Chechelashvili:
Thank you. We believe in Ukraine’s Armed Forces — and in Ukraine’s victory.