Will the Chinese Dragon Outfly the American Eagle?
Author: Chingiz Mammadov
Graduated from Moscow Mining Technology University and the Moscow Literature University named after M. Gorky. Earned a Master’s degree in Public and Environmental Affairs from Indiana University, USA. From 1989 to 1993, established and edited the independent newspaper Vatan. In 1992–1993, headed the Communication Unit of the President of Azerbaijan. From 2002 to 2004, chaired the Azerbaijan Micro-Finance Association. In 2004–2005, conducted research on development perspectives in Azerbaijan at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C. In 2007–2008, conducted research on nation-building in Azerbaijan at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. From 2009 to 2023, served as Head of the “Environment & Energy” Unit at the UNDP office in Azerbaijan. Delivered presentations and published articles on various aspects of national and regional development in Azerbaijan, the United States, Poland, Russia, Georgia, and other countries. Editor of the website vatan.online-com
E-mail: [email protected]
Will the Chinese Dragon Outfly the American Eagle?
Instead of an Introduction—connecting to the previous article:
The main thesis of my first article, published a week ago, was that China is emerging as a new pole in global politics, ending three decades of unipolarity under U.S. dominance and pushing the world toward a new bipolar system. In some ways, this resembles the Cold War era, when the U.S. and the USSR dominated global politics, but with important differences. This second article focuses on those differences. So, let’s continue.
1. From Mountains to Drifting Ice
During the Cold War, the world resembled two formidable mountains: the United States dominating the ‘West’ and the Soviet Union the ‘East.’ Washington led North America and Western Europe, while Moscow controlled Eastern Europe and parts of Southeast Asia. The competition extended to South America, Africa, and other regions of Asia. Smaller states had little room to maneuver—their politics were largely dictated by the superpowers. The system was rigid, with very few exceptions—such as Yugoslavia, which remained in the Soviet camp but showed some ‘disobedience’ by maintaining economic ties with the West and allowing limited private property.
Today’s emerging bipolarity between the U.S. and China looks different. It is less like two rigid mountains and more like two gigantic ice masses drifting in a shifting ocean. Around them float other large ice pieces—Europe, India, Russia, regional powers, and alliances. Many smaller pieces—middle and small states—also move fluidly: sometimes drifting closer to one pole, sometimes toward the other, and sometimes remaining in between.
During the Cold War, countries like Poland had virtually no independent voice in their relations with Moscow; in turn, Western Europe’s key states, like Germany, rarely deviated from Washington’s line. Today, however, Poland plays a more active role in shaping its relationship with the U.S. compared with its former relations with the USSR. In turn, Germany, though acting cautiously, is increasingly asserting an independent voice in international affairs.
This fluidity creates opportunities for other states, both large and small, to advance their own interests while forcing the U.S. and China to account for them. India illustrates this dynamic: for decades it leaned toward the U.S., but after Washington imposed tariffs over Russian oil imports, New Delhi moved closer to Beijing—a shift that could reverse again if political calculations change. Another example is Azerbaijan—far smaller than both the U.S. and China in territory, economy, and military power—yet able, through careful maneuvering, to protect its own interests in relations with both.
2. The Battlegrounds of Competition
The rivalry between Washington and Beijing spans many areas—ideology, economics, military balance and alliances, new frontiers such as space, the Arctic, and advanced technologies, as well as culture. Many of these arenas echo Cold War patterns, but they also differ in fundamental ways.
Ideology
Unlike the Cold War, there are no longer fierce ideological battles. The Soviet Union and its socialist–communist appeal are gone. The United States, which after 1991 enjoyed three decades of unrivaled dominance and sought to shape the world in its own liberal-democratic image, has scaled back these ambitions.
Two factors explain this retreat. First, U.S. economic strength has weakened, limiting its ability to influence other countries. Second, liberal democracy no longer appears as irresistible as it did in the early 1990s, when it triumphed over Soviet communism. China’s experience has shown that alternative models of governance and development—including mixed systems like its own—can succeed.
As a result, ideology plays a smaller role in today’s rivalry. China’s emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference appeals to many states weary of external pressure. Even more strikingly, elements of current U.S. politics—such as Donald Trump’s nationalism and ‘America First’ rhetoric—resemble Beijing’s longstanding focus on self-interest and internal priorities. In this sense, China appears to be winning the less visible ideological contest.
Economy
If ideology has faded, economics has become the primary battlefield. Half a century ago, the U.S. produced over 40% of global GDP, while China accounted for just 4%. Today, America’s share has fallen to 25–26%, while China’s has risen to more than 17%. By purchasing power parity (PPP), Beijing surpassed Washington already in 2014–2015. By nominal GDP, it may overtake the U.S. within the next five to six years if current trends continue. Even with growth slowing to around 5% last year, the sheer size of China’s economy means its annual expansion remains substantial.
China also holds foreign currency reserves and gold four times larger than those of the U.S. In turn, U.S. foreign debt is six times higher than China’s.
The nature of economic relations has also changed significantly since the Cold War. Back then, ideology acted as a barrier between the two ‘mountains.’ Now, with that barrier thin or even disappearing, the world economy has become highly interdependent.
Unlike during the Cold War, when U.S.–Soviet economic ties were insignificant, U.S.–China competition cuts directly through the same global economy. The two remain deeply interdependent: they trade daily, even as they impose tariffs and sanctions on each other. This makes economics and technology—semiconductors, artificial intelligence, green energy, space—the main battlegrounds of their rivalry.
China also seems to enjoy structural advantages. With a population 4.5 times larger than the U.S., two points stand out. First, it will take much longer for Chinese labor costs to reach developed-country levels, ensuring foreign investments continue flowing into China for a longer period than they did into the U.S. during its rise. Second, the size of China’s internal market, with growing purchasing power, helps the country absorb external shocks—such as the 2007–2008 housing crisis—much better than the U.S.
Military Power and Alliances
The United States still possesses the world’s most advanced military, and experts estimate that China may need another 20–30 years to achieve parity. Yet history shows that such gaps can close faster than expected. The war in Ukraine, for example, drains U.S. and European resources, indirectly strengthening China’s position. For comparison, in the early 20th century, the U.S. lagged behind Britain, but two world wars helped it surpass London in a relatively short time.
Similar to U.S. policy in the first half of the 20th century, Beijing now seeks to avoid direct confrontation, focusing on peaceful competition while building economic and technological strength. Washington, by contrast, has incentives to entangle China in conflicts that would drain its resources—much as Germany’s potential was blunted by two devastating wars.
Flashpoints already exist—in the South China Sea, around Taiwan, and across the Indo-Pacific. Proxy wars, sanctions, and economic tools dominate, but the risk of escalation remains.
Thus, not only military strength but also alliances will play a role. The U.S. is building a circle around China, including South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and others. China, in turn, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), is building its own security networks. It maintains friendly relations with states at odds with the U.S.—such as Iran, Venezuela and Russia.
It remains unclear to what extent Beijing anticipated or influenced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But three points are evident: the war benefits China by diverting U.S. attention and resources; it allows Beijing to purchase Russian resources at below-market prices; and it followed Russia’s withdrawal from Kazakhstan after unrest there, plus occurring immediately after the Beijing Olympics. Together, these suggest China was at least aware of Moscow’s intentions, if not supportive of them.
Trump understood the importance of splitting Russia from China and therefore invited Putin to Alaska. But the price demanded by Putin was too high—Ukraine’s capitulation—which Trump could not deliver. As Ukraine resisted, Russia remained in China’s orbit.
We may see future U.S. attempts to involve China in conflicts with its neighbors allied to Washington. Yet two factors give Beijing an advantage and may help avoid war. First, its centralized system allows it to better scan the environment and take preventive measures without rushing into conflict. Second, its policy of sovereignty makes it harder for Washington to mobilize others against China.
During the Cold War, the U.S. and USSR managed to avoid direct military confrontation. The most serious threat—the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962—was resolved through reasoning and mutual compromise by the leaders of both countries. The open question is whether the leaders of the U.S. and China will be able to demonstrate the same level of accountability in the face of direct confrontation, for example, over Taiwan.
Technology and the New Frontiers
In the past five years, China has filed 1.5 times more patents than the U.S. Its massive financial reserves allow it to attract global talent and offer salaries that rival or surpass those in Silicon Valley. A decade ago, China restricted the movement of its citizens; today, those barriers have eased, and the country is confident it can retain its best minds while also attracting foreign expertise.
Washington, for its part, strives to maintain leadership by deepening technological cooperation with allies. Trump’s recent visit to the U.K., which produced a $360 billion agreement in high-tech sectors, and his meetings with CEOs of major U.S. AI and communications companies underscore the centrality of technology in this contest.
Until recently, China was seen mainly as copying and stealing Western technology. This view still prevails in many analyses. But copying is often the first stage in industrial competition. Some states never progress beyond it; others eventually innovate. China has already moved to the next stage. Advances in AI, biology, chemistry, nanotechnology, and military technology—as well as the sheer number of patents filed—demonstrate that China is becoming an innovator. It will likely succeed in this sphere as well.
Space, the Arctic, and Antarctica are new frontiers of competition. Trump’s remarks on Greenland and Canada highlighted not only U.S. ambitions but also an understanding of their importance. China, meanwhile, relies on cooperation with Russia to secure advantages in the Arctic. Space rivalry is also set to accelerate, and the idea of ‘colonies’ on the Moon may soon appear realistic.
Culture and soft power
The U.S. benefited greatly from the fact that its main rival and predecessor as global hegemon—Britain—spoke the same language. The simplicity of the English language and script helped its rise. Schools, universities, and scientific publications around the world continue to use English. Without it, advances in science, culture, business, and finance would be much more difficult.
China is a different story. Mandarin has a complex script and is not widely studied, so China must build a new system of its ‘soft power.’ Should it continue to use English, or attempt to promote Mandarin as a universal language? Will Chinese films rival Hollywood globally? These most likely remain open questions for the Chinese leadership and intellectuals as well.
3. Internal Strength vs. Internal Division
In a world of drifting ice masses, the country that maintains internal stability and ‘temperature,’ preventing melting, gains an edge. On this score, China projects unity and stability through long-term strategies, centralized governance, and fewer visible divisions.
The United States, by contrast, suffers from polarization. Its democratic openness is both a strength and a weakness. When President Trump claims that the war in Ukraine began due to Joe Biden’s flawed policy, he is not merely attacking his rival—he is undermining America’s global credibility.
Lobbies and lobbying deliver another blow to U.S. integrity and image. The influence of powerful groups—especially the pro-Israel lobby—shapes Washington’s Middle East policy in ways that generate resentment not only in Muslim countries but also in many non-Muslim ones. These dynamics work to China’s advantage, as Beijing emphasizes sovereignty, avoids entanglement in ideological disputes abroad, and presents a more balanced position, less influenced by internal lobbies promoting external interests.
Another difference lies in speed. China’s centralized decision-making system allows it to adapt more quickly to shifting circumstances. By contrast, the U.S., with its pluralistic and divided politics, often reacts more slowly. This agility gives Beijing an advantage in today’s dynamic international environment.
As a centralized state, China is also better prepared to manage potential global calamities, such as the Covid-19 pandemic.
4. What This Means for the Future
The new bipolar world will not replicate the Cold War. It will be less about rigid blocks and more about constant maneuvering. States will shift positions depending on circumstances, sometimes leaning toward Washington, sometimes toward Beijing, and often keeping their options open. This makes the competition more unpredictable and harder to manage.
The United States now faces structural limits: internal polarization, economic challenges, and a diminished ideological appeal. China, meanwhile, plays the long game, betting that domestic cohesion and strategic patience will eventually tilt the balance in its favor.
Lacking a strong ideological counterweight and struggling to contain China’s economic rise, Washington’s remaining tool is indirect confrontation—encouraging proxy conflicts that might slow Beijing’s ascent without triggering direct war. A direct conflict would be catastrophic for both powers and for the world.
The trajectory of relations will also depend on whether China can assert itself without making the U.S. feel embarrassed or humiliated—and, conversely, on how tolerantly the U.S. responds to the emergence of a new ‘big player’ in the international arena.
Thus, the struggle between the eagle and the dragon is not about who can deliver a final blow, but about who can better adapt to a fluid, shifting environment—and who can endure and remain steady while the temperature in and around them rises and falls dramatically over time.