Elections in Gagauzia

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Alexandr Stoianoglo, Moldova’s former Prosecutor General and a former presidential candidate, has announced his intention to run for Bashkan of Gagauzia. Will his candidacy alter the political balance in the autonomous region and at the national level?

Yan Lisnevsky: His candidacy was not unexpected. Gagauzia is likely to see a competitive campaign involving politicians who largely appeal to the same opposition and anti-establishment electorate. Potential contenders include Irina Vlah, who has already served two terms as Bashkan, Victoria Furtună, and representatives of the Socialist and Communist parties. The main contest will therefore unfold not only between the authorities and the opposition, but also within the opposition camp itself.

Stoianoglo may try to occupy an intermediate position: acceptable to part of the opposition electorate while remaining a relatively non-confrontational candidate from the perspective of the central authorities. This is also his principal risk. His supporters tend to be deeply critical of the political system, and any suspicion of an arrangement with the government could substantially weaken his support. After the presidential election, part of the public already interpreted his political passivity as a possible sign of such an arrangement.

The conduct of the Party of Action and Solidarity, PAS, may prove decisive. Moldovan politics increasingly displays a backlash effect: public pressure, sanctions or excessive criticism can increase an opponent’s visibility and mobilise protest voters. A candidate targeted most aggressively by the authorities may therefore gain support precisely because of those attacks.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: What significance will the election of the Bashkan have for Gagauzia’s political future?

Yan Lisnevsky: This may be the last campaign conducted under the current personality-centred model. Moldova is discussing possible changes to the rules and a stronger role for political parties. If that happens, the distribution of resources and influence within the autonomous region will change. The present election therefore matters both as a contest for the office of Bashkan and as a stage in shaping the future relationship between Comrat and Chisinau.

The Contest for Chisinau

Vitaliy Barvinenko: What are Ion Ceban’s prospects for re-election as mayor of Chisinau? How did the public respond when he returned to public life in a wheelchair after his injury?

Yan Lisnevsky: Media attacks on Ceban, including speculation about the circumstances of his injury, appear to have harmed their initiators more than Ceban himself. National media should separate verified facts from conspiracy theories. When that boundary disappears, politically neutral audiences tend to react negatively to the methods of political competition rather than to the person being targeted.

Ceban knows how to present himself as a politician under pressure while continuing to demonstrate an ability to work. His rapid return to public events was received positively by his supporters. His critics did not change their views, but some neutral voters distanced themselves from the authorities. This does not necessarily translate into an automatic rise in Ceban’s rating, but it helps him preserve his support.

He also benefits from the absence of an obvious, strong PAS challenger. The governing party has not yet developed a municipal leader capable of competing with the incumbent mayor in the capital. An attempt to remove Ceban through administrative or legal measures could reinforce his political victimisation and help him move beyond the image of a purely municipal leader.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Why is control of the capital becoming so important ahead of the 2028–2029 presidential and parliamentary elections?

Yan Lisnevsky: Internal migration is increasing Chisinau’s political weight. A shortage of jobs and social problems in villages and smaller towns push people to move first to the capital, after which some leave the country. As a result, a growing share of the active electorate is becoming concentrated in Chisinau.

Whoever controls the capital and can convert municipal visibility into national support will hold a strong starting position in the next elections. Add the votes of Gagauzia and the possibility of agreements between regional and metropolitan political centres, and the strategic risk for PAS becomes clear. The party will therefore seek a candidate whose political profile resembles Ceban’s but who can offer a different model of urban governance.

The Return of Established Political Figures

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Veaceslav Platon has again become more visible in Moldova’s information space. Could a political project involving him succeed, or does he remain too controversial a figure?

Yan Lisnevsky: Political toxicity is not a fixed quantity. Moldova has many examples of figures with high negative ratings who rebuilt support after several years, while previously popular politicians lost it quickly. Platon’s prospects will therefore depend not only on his past, but also on the quality of his proposals, the consistency of his communications and the authorities’ response.

One or two television appearances do not create a political project. Moldova’s information environment is extremely dense: leading politicians may be mentioned in hundreds of reports during a single week. Influencing the agenda requires regular engagement, substantive proposals and an ability to debate with an undecided audience. Excessive criticism by the authorities may, paradoxically, help such a politician by drawing the attention of anti-establishment voters.

At the same time, society is gradually becoming more demanding about the substance of criticism. Personal attacks no longer always produce the desired result. Criticism of a specific proposal is more persuasive when it explains why the mechanism would fail, what it would cost and what risks it would create. Political competition should take place at that level.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: You link the quality of political debate to the state of political education. What has changed?

Yan Lisnevsky: During the 2000s and early 2010s, Moldova regularly hosted political schools, youth programmes, training courses and debate formats. They did not guarantee high-quality politics, but they developed basic skills: critical thinking, risk analysis, crisis management, and an understanding of public image and responsibility.

That infrastructure has largely been replaced by TikTok, Facebook, bots and paid comments. Politicians have retreated into information bubbles where they communicate mainly with supporters. Yet the task of both the pro-European government and the opposition is not to persuade already loyal voters once again. They must engage with people who have doubts, ask difficult questions and will change their position only in response to substantive arguments.

Government and the Limits of Personnel Changes

Vitaliy Barvinenko: The Tofan government has completed its first one hundred days. How do you assess this period and the appointment of former Romanian economy minister Claudiu Năsui as Moldova’s Minister of Economy?

Yan Lisnevsky: It is difficult to identify independent achievements by the new prime minister during the first one hundred days because the government is largely continuing the policies of previous cabinets. Replacing the head of government does not create a new government. A genuinely new government requires a new professional team, an audit of previous decisions, an assessment of the causes of failure and a programme with clear implementation mechanisms.

Moldova has changed prime ministers, but the administrative system, personnel selection principles and decision-making practices have remained largely the same. Changes in personnel therefore do not resolve the underlying problem. If the machinery of government cannot implement decisions, replacing the person at its head will not produce results.

Năsui’s appointment may be explained by his ideological proximity to the prime minister. Both favour liberal and libertarian approaches and are seeking ways to reduce state intervention in the economy. At the same time, recruiting a politician from Romania may indicate a shortage of personnel within Moldova and the reluctance of local specialists to assume responsibility in a government where the prime minister’s authority is constrained by an already established team.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Why, in your view, can the Argentine or Singaporean models not be transferred directly to Moldova?

Yan Lisnevsky: Books often describe these models through an attractive set of reforms, but economic success always depends on the wider context. Singapore has a distinctive geographical position, ports, logistics flows, specific arrangements and state institutions. Argentina has a different resource base, market scale and political history. If formal policy decisions are separated from those conditions, copying them will not produce the same result.

Moldova needs its own model, one that reflects the capacity of its economy, the structure of employment, institutional weakness and dependence on external markets. Ideological consistency matters, but it cannot replace analysis of practical mechanisms and the secondary effects of reform.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: What indicates that the government has limited control over its own work?

Yan Lisnevsky: The contradiction between the prime minister’s public statements and the actions of government members is revealing. If the head of government calls for fewer foreign trips or lower budget expenditure, but officials act differently the next day, the public concludes that the prime minister controls neither the team nor the information agenda.

One hundred days is not a period of immunity; it is the first review point. The government should show what it has done, what results it has achieved and which decisions it will implement next. It remains difficult to identify a coherent model in the current cabinet. Rapidly voting on large packages of legislation does not guarantee reform either. Parliament and the government must assess whether new provisions are compatible with existing law, whether the administration can implement them and what long-term risks they create.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: You stress that reform does not end when a law is adopted. What is required for effective implementation?

Yan Lisnevsky: Formal alignment with European Union standards is only the first level. The authorities must then determine whether the new provisions are consistent with national law, whether the government understands how to implement them, whether institutions have the necessary resources and expertise, and whether citizens have sufficient information and trust.

If a law exists only on paper, people will seek ways around it and officials will apply it selectively. A high percentage of formally completed reforms will then fail to produce a public benefit. Moldova also needs continuity in public policy. Projects should not disappear after a change of governing party merely because political opponents introduced them. Investors need predictable rules and laws, not a personal telephone call from the prime minister offering guarantees that may lapse after the next election.

Transnistria and Diplomatic Manoeuvring

Vitaliy Barvinenko: Russia plans to open polling stations in Transnistria for elections to the State Duma. How do you assess this decision, and does Chisinau have any practical means of preventing it?

Yan Lisnevsky: Chisinau has limited options, but responsibility for the escalation rests with all parties. Moscow should not open polling stations on the territory of another state without the consent of that state’s government. Such unilateral action creates additional tension between Chisinau and Tiraspol and complicates a diplomatic settlement.

At the same time, the Transnistrian issue cannot be reduced to geopolitical rhetoric. Economic and personal ties have long existed between the two banks of the Dniester. The central questions concern security guarantees for local elites and the future of Transnistrian institutions. If Chisinau proposes reintegration, it must explain the place that the region’s governing bodies would have within a common state and how they would be integrated into the national system. The erosion of Gagauzia’s effective autonomy also contributes to Tiraspol’s distrust of possible guarantees.

Small states cannot base their foreign policy solely on demonstrative confrontation with major geopolitical centres. Their resources are diplomacy, room for manoeuvre and the ability to gain control through negotiations and reciprocal concessions. If Chisinau cannot physically prevent a particular action, it should at least seek to establish rules and oversight mechanisms. This requires continuous dialogue, including with political opponents.

Vitaliy Barvinenko: What, then, is the main conclusion to draw from Moldova’s current political situation?

Yan Lisnevsky: Moldovan politics needs to move from personal conflict towards institutional thinking. Elections, personnel appointments, European integration and the Transnistrian settlement are distinct issues, but the same problem appears in each: decisions are taken without sufficient analysis of implementation mechanisms and long-term consequences.

The authorities must recognise that administrative pressure can strengthen their opponents, while the opposition must recognise that criticism alone is not a programme. The government needs a professional team, internal coordination and policy continuity. In its external relations, Moldova needs to restore a culture of negotiation and assess the balance of resources realistically. Without these changes, political change will remain largely a rotation of personalities.

This text is based on a video interview and has been edited for publication. Yan Lisnevsky’s assessments of political actors and processes represent his personal views.