The War in the Black Sea, Türkiye and International Law: Toğrul İsmayıl, Professor Responds to the Debate

Toğrul İsmayıl  

Turkish political scientist and Professor of Political History at Kahramanmaraş University

On 4 August, DANUBE.EU published an article entitled “The Black Sea Is Becoming a Test for Türkiye: Where Does the Limit of Ankara’s Strategic Patience Lie?” by prominent Turkish political scientist Toğrul İsmayıl, Professor of Political History at Kahramanmaraş University. The article was written especially for the Institute of Danube Research.

On 14 August, the Ukrainian publication Mirror of the week (ZN.ua)  published an article entitled “Does Türkiye Want to Stop the War in the Black Sea—or Profit Even More from It?” by Mykhailo Honchar, President of the Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”.

Institute of Danube Research publish response of Toğrul İsmayıl, Professor  to the issues raised in the article.

My Response to the Debate: The War in the Black Sea, Türkiye and International Law

I have carefully examined the critical assessments presented in the article “Does Türkiye Want to Stop the War in the Black Sea—or Profit Even More from It?” I consider the very fact that such a debate is taking place to be important. At the same time, certain aspects of this issue require a clear conceptual and legal distinction.

First and foremost, it must be acknowledged that Türkiye has significant economic interests in the Black Sea region. Turkish shipowners, the merchant fleet, logistics companies and the flour-milling industry directly depend on secure maritime routes and developments in the Black Sea. It would therefore be wrong to disregard the economic dimension of Ankara’s concerns about the safety of commercial shipping.

However, it would be equally mistaken to explain Türkiye’s entire Black Sea policy solely in terms of its desire to protect its commercial interests. Ankara’s position is shaped by a complex set of interconnected factors: the Montreux Convention regime, its commitments within NATO, energy and food security, the Russian-Ukrainian war, relations with Moscow and the need to maintain regional stability. The fact that Türkiye has interests of its own does not mean that its policy lacks legal and strategic foundations.

The international legal dimension is also important. As a general rule, a merchant vessel is a civilian object. Under certain circumstances, however, if it makes an effective contribution to military action and its destruction, capture or neutralisation offers a definite military advantage, such a vessel may qualify as a military objective. Even in that case, any attack must comply with the principles of distinction and proportionality, as well as the requirement to take all feasible precautions. The issue cannot therefore be reduced to the simplistic question of whether merchant vessels should or should not be attacked.

My principal disagreement concerns the idea of an unrestricted geographical expansion of the war. Extending hostilities from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean or Baltic seas may be viewed as a response to the actions of the aggressor state. International law, however, does not provide an unlimited right to strike an adversary wherever it may be technically possible to do so. One party’s violation of the law does not entitle another party to act outside the established constraints of international law.

Türkiye’s policy can and should, of course, be critically examined. At the same time, it would be a serious strategic error to regard Türkiye merely as a state seeking to profit from the war. When formulating its position, Ankara simultaneously considers Ukraine’s territorial integrity, its relations with Russia, NATO security, the Montreux regime, the stability of the Black Sea region and its own economic interests.

My position is therefore clear: it is entirely legitimate to examine and critically assess Türkiye’s economic interests, but it is wrong to use them as the sole explanation for its foreign and security policy. Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence must likewise be supported, while recognising that the idea of an unrestricted geographical expansion of the war remains legally and strategically contentious.

What we need today is not slogans, but rigorous analysis that takes international law, strategic realities and the regional balance of power into account. The way in which the war in the Black Sea is brought to an end and ultimately settled will shape not only the course of the present conflict, but also the future security architecture of the entire Black Sea region.